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Abstract
Runtime taint tracking is a technique for controlling data propagation in ap-
plications. It is typically used to prevent disclosure of confidential information or
to avoid application vulnerabilities. Taint tracking systems intercept application
operations at runtime, associate meta-data with the data being processed and
inspect the meta-data to detect unauthorised data propagation. To keep meta-
data up-to-date, every attempt of the application to access and process data is
intercepted. To ensure that all data propagation is monitored, different categories
of data (e.g. confidential and public data) are kept isolated.
In practice, the interception of application operations and the isolation of
different categories of data are hard to achieve. Existing applications, language
interpreters and operating systems need to be re-engineered while keeping meta-
data up-to-date incurs significant overhead at runtime. In this thesis we show
that runtime taint tracking can be implemented with minimal changes to existing
infrastructure and with reduced overhead compared to previous approaches. In
other words, we suggest methods to achieve both practical and efficient runtime
taint tracking.
Our key observation is that applications in specific domains are typically im-
plemented in high-level languages and use a subset of the available language
features. This facilitates the implementation of a taint tracking system because
it needs to support only parts of a programming language and it may leverage
features of the execution platform. This thesis explores three different applica-
tions domains. We start with event processing applications in Java, for which
we introduce a novel solution to achieve isolation and a practical method to
declare restrictions about data propagation. We then focus on securing PHP
web applications. We show that if taint tracking is restricted to a small part of
an application, the runtime overhead is significantly reduced without sacrificing
effectiveness. Finally, we target accidental data disclosure in Ruby web appli-
cations. Ruby emerges as an ideal choice for a practical taint tracking system
because it supports meta-programming facilities that simplify interception and
isolation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Runtime taint tracking [SAB10] is a simple, powerful and popular technique to track data
propagation in applications. It has been frequently used in the domains of security and
privacy: confidential data protection [VEK+07], malicious attack prevention [YWZK09] and
malware analysis [ESKK12] are all well-known use cases. Runtime taint tracking operates
by compartmentalising an application into multiple isolated components that handle data of
similar sensitivity. It then intercepts all operations that propagate data between components.
Despite being popular amongst researchers, taint tracking systems are rarely available or
used outside of academia (Perl’s taint mode [Doc12] is the most notable exception). We
argue that the main reason behind limited popularity is that current state-of-the-art taint
tracking systems are seldom both practical and efficient. To achieve component isolation,
researchers have suggested novel execution platforms such as operating systems [ZBWKM06]
and modified interpreters [YWZK09] but these are hard to adopt in practice. Others have
suggested to perform taint tracking by transparently modifying application code [XBS06]
but this typically leads to high performance overhead at runtime [KGJK12].
This thesis demonstrates three different approaches to build taint tracking systems that are
both practical and efficient. First, we show that by combining extensive analysis of the
Java execution platform with an efficient and domain-specific model for taint tracking, we
avoid extensive, non-portable platform modifications that make previous systems hard to
adopt. Second, we introduce partial taint tracking; an attempt to perform taint tracking
only in a subset of an application’s codebase. We demonstrate that partial taint tracking
leads to a significant reduction of performance overhead at runtime without sacrificing the
effectiveness of the technique. Third, we identify and leverage specific features of the Ruby
programming language that facilitate taint tracking. We design a practical such system in
Ruby, and we show how it can be used to improve security in the context of the National
Health Service (NHS).
The following paragraphs introduce runtime taint tracking, underline the limitations of ex-
isting systems and summarise the contributions of this work towards a practical and efficient
design for runtime taint tracking systems.
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Introduction
1.1 Runtime taint tracking
Runtime taint tracking is a simple data-centric technique to reason about data propagation
(also referred to as data flow) in applications. Conceptually, the core idea is to associate
meta-data with the data processed by an application and then use that meta-data to monitor
or constrain the application’s actions. The type of such meta-data, the methods used to
keep the meta-data updated and how the meta-data are used by the taint tracking system
are design parameters that vary greatly between different systems. This thesis collectively
refers to the design decisions for the above parameters as the taint tracking policy of the
system. The objective of a taint tracking system is to capture high level data propagation
requirements from the user (for example, whether output data from a particular component
should contain confidential information), adjust its taint tracking policy to cater for these
requirements, and finally monitor or constrain the application’s runtime behaviour.
The main advantage of runtime taint tracking is that it is precise. It reasons about an
application while the application executes. The taint tracking system has access to the
same information available to the application and it can closely monitor the application’s
actions. This is in contrast to similar taint analysis systems that perform static data flow
analysis [ALSU07] in application source code (presented in detail in Section 2.2.1). Run-
time taint tracking is also simple: instead of reasoning about all potential executions, it
focuses on specific executions, one at a time. This renders the resulting systems easier to use
than, for example, statically-typed languages (covered in Section 2.2.3), which encode data
propagation requirements as part of the language’s type system.
1.2 Application scenarios
In order to understand domains, in which runtime taint tracking systems operate, it is
important to consider potential scenarios, in which a runtime taint tracking system can be
applied. The following paragraphs introduce three representative scenarios that are further
examined later in this thesis.
1.2.1 Tracking data flow in event processing
Event processing systems integrate infrastructure in domains such as finance and health-
care [Luc02]. They handle sensitive data on behalf of multiple clients, organisations and
applications. Different principals communicate through an event processing system by ex-
changing event messages, or simply events. The event processing system propagates events
and processes them. The processing that it performs should never convey confidential data of
one client to another. This, however, is challenging to guarantee in practice if the processing
combines data of different clients: a bug in the processing logic may disclose confidential
data of one client to another.
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A runtime taint tracking system can monitor the event processing system and track data
flow across the events that it processes. If the event processing system combines information
from multiple events to generate a new event, the taint tracking system will identify potential
security policy violations, e.g. attempts to send the generated event to an unauthorised
destination, and notify the relevant principals or prevent that operation.
To be effective, a taint tracking system designed for event processing must be efficient. Event
processing applications, especially in finance, strive to minimise event processing latency—a
feature that is seen as a competitive advantage in the marketplace [Duh09]. This is chal-
lenging to achieve because taint tracking introduces an overhead by updating meta-data at
runtime.
1.2.2 Preventing injection attacks in web applications
The most common types of attacks on web applications involve code injection [Sec05]. Exam-
ples are Cross Site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection (SQLI), Shell Injection and Eval Injection.
Such attacks allow an attacker to execute code in either the web or database servers that host
a web application or even in the browsers of a web application’s clients. Injection attacks
commonly exploit an application’s trust in user-provided data. For example, if user-provided
data are not checked for malicious content such as SQL statements while concatenating an
SQL query (i.e. user data are not being filtered or sanitised), an attacker can trick the
application into performing arbitrary, attacker-controlled actions in the back-end database.
A runtime taint tracking system can mark the user request data and monitor their propa-
gation at the variable level in the web application. When the web application tries to use
the request data to perform a potentially dangerous operation (e.g. issue an SQL query), the
taint tracking system can inspect the user-supplied values and automatically sanitise them.
To be effective, a taint tracking system designed to prevent injection attacks should adapt to
the needs of different applications. If a particular web application considers a specific class
of user input as safe (e.g. because it originates from an administrator account), the taint
tracking system should not interfere with the web application’s operation. This means that
a single taint tracking policy that is enforced across all web applications would be inadequate.
1.2.3 Guaranteeing patient data confidentiality in the NHS
Government agencies in the UK and elsewhere increasingly collect confidential data. Or-
ganisations in the NHS, for example, accumulate data sets about diagnosis and ongoing
patient treatment for particular conditions1. This introduces an important challenge for
such organisations: all applications that provide access to their data must guarantee data
confidentiality, or must otherwise not be used outside a secure environment. However, build-
ing complex modern applications involves multiple developers who may have varying levels
1The Eastern Cancer Registration and Information Centre (ECRIC), http://ecric.nhs.uk/, last ac-
cessed: 5/9/2012
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of understanding of an application’s security requirements. A single implementation error is
enough to expose confidential user data. As a result, applications in the NHS are subject to
independent manual audit for security to prevent, amongst other threats, confidential user
data disclosure [HMP+11].
A runtime taint tracking system can facilitate the development of new applications by reduc-
ing the need for bespoke security audits. When sensitive user data leave an organisation’s
central database, the taint tracking system can mark them as confidential. It can then mon-
itor any application that processes that data and even enforce that data derived from the
original data (which may also be confidential) are only disclosed to their intended recipients.
To be effective, a taint tracking system that targets government organisations should intro-
duce minimal changes to existing infrastructure. Since the confidentiality of data depends
on the correctness of the taint tracking system, the system itself will have to undergo secu-
rity audits. A smaller and self-contained implementation of taint tracking is therefore more
likely to be accepted when compared, for example, to an implementation based on extensive,
third-party modifications to a language interpreter.
1.3 Problem statement
Runtime taint tracking systems benefit end users, developers and application administra-
tors. However, outside the security research community, runtime taint tracking is not pop-
ular. This thesis argues that to make runtime taint tracking a practical tool for monitoring
and controlling data flow, we need designs that: (1) significantly minimise the performance
overhead of the technique at runtime; (2) allow users to adapt the taint tracking policy of
the system to the data propagation requirements of their application domain; and (3) do not
require fundamental changes to existing infrastructure, applications and programming models.
These three requirements are hard to achieve at the same time. To minimise the performance
overhead of the technique, a taint tracking system could group application components with
similar requirements and maintain simple meta-data for each such group [EKV+05]. This
typically requires support from the execution platform to isolate application components
and input from developers to divide an application into multiple components. Similarly,
the ability of a user to adapt the taint tracking policy implies that the meta-data that a
taint tracking system maintains are configurable. This can significantly reduce performance
compared to a system based on simple, hard-encoded meta-data [CW09].
There have been several attempts to design taint tracking systems (see Section 2.3 for a
detailed discussion). A common approach is to create designs with existing applications in
mind. Typically an open-source execution platform (e.g. a language interpreter) is modified
to propagate a specific type of meta-data transparently and to enforce a (rarely configurable)
taint tracking policy. This approach minimises the changes required in application code.
Examples include Java [CW09], PHP [PB05], Python [YWZK09] and Javascript [DG10].
The advantages of these systems are increased application compatibility and often high
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performance. Yet, research-oriented prototypes rarely support all language features and are
not kept up-to-date with newer language releases. The resulting taint tracking systems are
thus not attractive because users prefer to maintain compatibility with official releases of a
platform.
A second approach is to incorporate taint tracking as a basic feature of an execution plat-
form and expose it to each application. Application developers gain access to the taint
tracking system and have to adapt their applications to leverage its features. Several new
operating systems have followed this approach, most notably Asbestos [EKV+05] and HiS-
tar [ZBWKM06]. One of the fundamental requirements for these systems, the one that
requires an extensive redesign of the execution platform, is support for isolation between dif-
ferent application components. An additional challenge is how to incorporate taint tracking
so that it does not impact application performance significantly while it is generic enough to
monitor data propagation for many different applications. This results in low-level applica-
tion programming interfaces that are hard for developers to understand and use in practice.
1.4 Research contributions
This thesis introduces three different runtime taint tracking systems: DEFCon, PHP Aspis
and SafeWeb. Each of these systems tracks data propagation in different types of appli-
cations and minimises the modifications required in the underlying infrastructure. We show
that by focusing on a specific class of applications, a practical and efficient implementation
of taint tracking is possible with few or no modifications to an execution platform.
DEFCon is a system to execute distributed event processing applications that handle
sensitive data on behalf of multiple clients. DEFCon can host event processing on behalf
of different clients, monitor their interactions, and control the propagation of data amongst
them. It labels the events exchanged in the system and tracks their recipients. Labels are
then used to limit the interactions of the recipients so that they cannot convey sensitive
information to unauthorised destinations. The main contributions of DEFCon are:
Application-level isolation for Java. DEFCon isolates the event processing performed
by different clients using modified Java Development Kit (JDK) libraries, in which
statically-chosen interceptors carry out runtime checks at carefully selected code-paths.
Since DEFCon only targets the specific class of event processing applications, it for-
goes language features that would otherwise introduce significant challenges to achieve
isolation for. In contrast to systems that target generic applications and introduce
extensive redesigns [EKV+05, ZBWKM06], the process to produce the modified JDK
libraries requires low manual effort and can easily be repeated for future JDK releases.
Decentralised Event Flow Control. Decentralised Event Flow Control (DEFC) is an ef-
ficient taint tracking policy that enables application developers and administrators to
specify arbitrary data propagation requirements between components of their event
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processing applications. DEFC involves tags, i.e. unique, opaque bit-strings that are
attached to events and are updated at runtime as events are processed. DEFC tags are
used by DEFCon to reason about and control data propagation without sacrificing
performance.
High-level policy specification. The DEFCon Policy Language (DPL) is a language
to express restrictions about data propagation between application components that
are under the control of different administrative domains and may be instantiated in
different DEFCon installations. With DPL, DEFCon provides a practical high-level
language to specify data propagation requirements while the underlying taint tracking
system still relies on low-level tags for efficient enforcement. A data propagation policy
(also referred to as a data flow policy) expressed in DPL can be translated to DEFC
tags.
PHP Aspis is a tool for protecting existing PHP web applications from injection attacks
such as XSS and SQL Injection. It augments PHP values to include meta-data and trans-
forms PHP statements to operate in the presence of meta-data and propagate these correctly.
The meta-data are used to automatically sanitise user-provided, untrusted values and trans-
parently prevent injection attacks. The main contributions of PHP Aspis are:
Partial taint tracking. PHP Aspis introduces partial taint tracking, which limits taint
tracking only to those functions of the web application, in which vulnerabilities are
more likely to occur. Partial taint tracking effectively captures the different levels of
trust placed in different parts of web applications. It significantly improves performance
because taint tracking does not occur in large parts of the application codebase.
PHP source code transformations. PHP Aspis does not require modifications to the
PHP interpreter or to the web server. Instead, it performs taint tracking only us-
ing source-to-source transformations. The transformations maintain the application’s
structure in terms of classes, methods and files. This facilitates interoperation with
parts of the application, in which taint tracking is not activated. PHP Aspis supports
most PHP language features—including dynamic code generation—and can effectively
protect existing web applications from real world exploits without the need of custom
PHP interpreters.
Configurable taint categories. PHP Aspis can adapt to the data sanitisation require-
ments of different web applications. The meta-data that it maintains, their propagation
and the actions that PHP Aspis takes based upon them (i.e. the taint tracking pol-
icy) are all configurable by the application administrator. PHP Aspis monitors the
sanitisation efforts of different applications and avoids false positives.
SafeWeb is a taint tracking system that guarantees data confidentiality in web applications.
SafeWeb intercepts application access to an organisation’s main database. Individual web
applications receive sensitive data in the form of labeled events and process them. SafeWeb
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ensures that, after processing, labels are attached to data to reflect their confidentiality. It
then enforces that no web application discloses data against the organisation’s policy. The
main contribution of SafeWeb is:
Compliance with Ruby. SafeWeb relies on standard features of the Ruby language and
leverages well-maintained libraries. Ruby supports extensive meta-programming facil-
ities that enable a taint tracking system to collect and update meta-data with minimal
overhead at runtime and without any modifications to the language interpreter. This
maximises compatibility and ensures that the use of SafeWeb does not introduce
extensive maintenance overhead. The resulting system is practical and can reduce the
need to audit new applications for security.
DEFCon, PHP Aspis and SafeWeb are evaluated in different scenarios and with different
applications. DEFCon’s effectiveness is demonstrated in the context of a stock trading
application, in which a single server carries out processing on behalf of multiple clients.
DEFCon guarantees confidentiality of trading, and it offers low latency for significantly
more clients when compared to a similar Java trading system. PHP Aspis is used to secure
an installation of Wordpress, a popular weblog platform. Partial taint tracking significantly
reduces the overhead of the system at runtime while preventing most injection attacks that
affected the Wordpress platform in the course of more than one year. Finally, SafeWeb
is evaluated through the implementation of a web application for an organisation in the
NHS. SafeWeb satisfies the organisation’s security requirements and is practical because it
reduces the need for extensive security audits when new applications are deployed.
1.5 Dissertation outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an overview of related systems that analyse and enforce data flow. It first
motivates the need for such systems to improve the security of event processing applications
and applications in the web. Subsequently, it examines static approaches and then presents
runtime taint tracking as an alternative technique that is more precise. The chapter covers
various taint tracking systems from the literature and suggests a model for runtime taint
tracking systems to establish common terms and facilitate presentation.
Chapter 3 introduces DEFCon, an event processing system with support for taint tracking
as part of its design. The chapter covers the low-level mechanism for specifying data flow
policies and how these are later enforced. It finishes with a detailed evaluation emphasising
the low overhead of taint tracking on event processing at runtime.
Chapter 4 completes the presentation of DEFCon by focusing on high-level data flow poli-
cies written in DPL and its support for distribution. The chapter identifies limitations when
multiple administrative domains collectively specify data flow policy (e.g. the need for do-
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mains to collaborate closely). It introduces specific features of DEFCon and DPL that
facilitate data flow policy specification and its enforcement across domains.
Chapter 5 presents PHP Aspis, a system to secure web applications from injection attacks
via partial taint tracking. The chapter starts with a strategy for enabling or disabling taint
tracking in parts of an application’s codebase and then devises a set of required transforma-
tions applied to application source code. The system is evaluated by securing an installation
of Wordpress in the presence of plugins that are vulnerable to injection attacks.
Chapter 6 describes SafeWeb, a taint tracking system for Ruby web applications. The
chapter presents the security requirements for new applications in an organisation within the
NHS that handles sensitive patient data. The chapter then suggests runtime taint tracking
to control data propagation end-to-end within the organisation’s network. It finishes by
evaluating the system’s effectiveness against common types of vulnerabilities.
Chapter 7 concludes, summarising the work described in this thesis and outlining future
research directions.
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Chapter 2
Background
The lack of practical and efficient mechanisms to control data propagation impacts the
security of applications in the web and in event processing. To provide data flow guarantees
in applications, past research has suggested both static and dynamic approaches [JKK06b,
ML00, ZBWKM06, KGJK12]. Static approaches analyse applications and reason about data
flow without introducing runtime overhead [JKK06b, ML00]. Static approaches are therefore
often preferable. However, the limitations of static approaches can be overcome at runtime,
and runtime taint tracking emerges as a simple and effective technique for dynamic data
flow analysis. Runtime taint tracking has been applied to a variety of problems, resulting in
multiple designs that explore different directions and often have conflicting terminology.
This chapter in Section 2.1 discusses security challenges in the domain of web applications and
event processing systems due to the lack of tools to analyse and enforce data flow. Section 2.2
presents an overview of static data flow analysis techniques. Section 2.3 focuses on different
types of runtime taint tracking systems. To unify the presentation of taint tracking systems,
the section proposes a generic model for runtime taint tracking that captures the available
design options and defines common terms. This model is used throughout this thesis to
present previous systems and to discuss the design choices in DEFCon, PHP Aspis and
SafeWeb.
2.1 Controlling data flow in applications
An important challenge in application security is the control of data propagation. When
users trust an application with their personal data, they expect that the data will not be
released to any third party without authorisation. Similarly, when developers write code to
process user data, they expect that only their code is executed and not code that originates
from the user. In practice, applications contain bugs that violate these assumptions.
This section introduces two application domains, in which control of data flow is important
for security. Section 2.1.1 describes injection vulnerabilities in web applications and shows
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that they can be expressed as violations of expected data flow. It then introduces the con-
cept of data integrity as a way to express data flow requirements. Section 2.1.2 discusses
event processing applications. It underlines that existing security mechanisms in event pro-
cessing systems cannot capture complex data flow requirements about data integrity or data
confidentiality.
2.1.1 Injection vulnerabilities in web applications
Injection vulnerabilities are a persistent problem for web applications despite a recent in-
crease in developer awareness. In 2010 alone, 23.9% of the total reported vulnerabilities to
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database [MIT12] were classified as SQL
Injection (SQLI) or Cross Site Scripting (XSS). Such vulnerabilities still remain because
proposed solutions typically require manual tracking and filtering of user-generated data
throughout the source code of an application. Yet, even a single developer error is enough
to cause an injection vulnerability.
The rest of this section introduces standard application behaviour that injection attacks
exploit and discusses sanitisation functions, i.e. the widely recommended method to prevent
injection attacks. It then attributes injection attacks to the application’s inability to enforce
data flow and underlines the need for a tool to achieve protection automatically.
Injection vulnerabilities
Consider a weblog with a search field written in PHP. Typically, input to the search field
results in a web request with the search term as a parameter:
http://goodsite.com/find?t=spaceship
A response of the web server to this request may contain the following fragment:
<p> The term ‘‘spaceship’’ cannot be found. </p>
The important element of the above response is that the user-submitted search term is
included in the output. This can be exploited by an attacker to construct an XSS attack.
The attacker first creates the following URL:
http://goodsite.com/find?t=<script%20src=’attack.com/attack.js’/>
When a user clicks on this link, the following HTML fragment is generated by the web
application at goodsite.com:
<p> The term ‘‘<script src=’attack.com/attack.js’ />’’ cannot be found. </p>
The victim’s browser fetches the malicious Javascript code and executes it. Since the HTML
document originated from goodsite.com, the browser gives to the downloaded script full
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Figure 2.1: Historical percentage of XSS and SQL Injection vulnerabilities across all vulnerabilities
reported to the CVE database.
access to the victim’s web browser session (e.g. the ability to manipulate the page or to
access any cookies set by goodsite.com). If the user has an account with goodsite.com
and is already logged in, the malicious script can perform unverified operations on behalf of
the user, e.g. it may erase all previous articles that the user has posted. In addition, the
user’s cookies can be sent to the attacker, and the attacker may then impersonate the user.
This type of attack is called a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attack [CER00] because it involves
loading a website while embedding a script from a second website, e.g. loading goodsite.com
with a script from attack.com. The corresponding vulnerability, i.e. the weblog hosted by
goodsite.com constructs its HTML responses by embedding the contents of incoming HTTP
requests, is called an XSS vulnerability.
SQL Injection attacks are analogous: they take advantage of applications that rely on user
input to form SQL queries. If the application constructs an SQL query by directly con-
catenating user-provided data, the attacker can influence the query semantics and perform
arbitrary operations on the database [HOM08]. Similarly, Eval and Shell Injection attacks
target PHP’s eval() and exec() statements, respectively1. Since these statements execute
arbitrary code at runtime, such attacks can compromise the host machine [PB05].
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of reported SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities amongst appli-
cations in recent years, as classified by the CVE database [MIT12]. Note that the CVE
database also contains vulnerability reports for problems and applications not specific to the
web (e.g. memory corruption [CXN+05]). Overall, both XSS and SQLI continue to affect
applications despite an increase in developer awareness.
Table 2.1 shows a classification of vulnerabilities for two popular open source PHP web ap-
plications, Wordpress2 and Drupal3. PHP web applications do not suffer from traditional
memory corruption vulnerabilities because memory management is performed by the lan-
1Many languages popular in web development provide similar functions to interpret application-generated
code at runtime, e.g. Ruby provides the Kernel::system method and Javascript provides the eval function.
2The Wordpress project, http://wordpress.org/, last accessed: 7/9/2012
3Drupal Open Source CMS, http://drupal.org/, last accessed: 7/9/2012
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Number of Occurrences
Type Wordpress Drupal
Cross Site Scripting 9 28
SQL Injection 3 1
Information Leakage 1 0
Insufficient Access Control 1 9
Eval Injection 0 1
Cross Site Request Forgery 1 0
Table 2.1: Classification of vulnerabilities for Wordpress and Drupal as reported in the CVE
database.
guage interpreter. As a result, code injection vulnerabilities are the most common type of
vulnerabilities for both applications, with higher percentages compared to the vulnerability
reports across all applications contained in the CVE (Figure 2.1). Additional vulnerability
categories such as Insufficient Access Control (e.g. forgotten access control checks before
specific operations) or Cross Site Request Forgery [Sec05] are significantly less frequent.
Prevention methods
Web applications have a genuine need to use user data in functions that may be exploited
in injection attacks. In the weblog example, the application developers wish to inform the
user about the exact search term that was not found in the local database. The traditional
approach to prevent injection attacks is to allow user data to reach functions used in injection
attacks only if the data are properly sanitised or filtered.
In the weblog example, a sanitisation function would translate all characters with special
semantics in HTML to their display equivalents, e.g. “<” to “&lt;” [WSA+11]. Sanitisation
functions such as htmlentities or escapeshellarg in PHP are part of most languages
in web development. After sanitisation, strings can safely be echoed to the client because
they can no longer change the semantics of the output. SQL Injection filtering functions
operate similarly but they also check and remove user-provided SQL keywords from the
query [NTGG+05, YWZK09].
Unfortunately, sanitisation functions are difficult to apply in practice. Each function that
can be used in an injection attack requires a different sanitisation function. For example, if
the same string is echoed to the user and used as part of an SQL query, two different strings
must be generated based on the original value. Applications should not filter input data
centrally when they are received because there is no single data representation that is both
meaningful and secure in all possible contexts. For example, the string “WHERE” is safe in
HTML but not in an SQL query. Therefore, developers have to propagate the original user
data and only sanitise them before they are used.
User-controlled sanitisation assumes that developers can effectively track the origin of data
and enforce that user-generated data always pass through their respective sanitisation func-
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tions. In practice, checks omitted by inexperienced developers or unforeseen interactions that
result in unexpected data flow are likely to occur. One such example is to assume that a
PHP script cannot be requested directly by an external user and therefore omit sanitisation.
If, however, access to the script depends on the web server’s configuration and the web server
is not configured as expected, vulnerabilities are likely to exist.
Injection attacks as a data flow problem
XSS, SQL, Eval and Exec Injection attacks are a result of a web application failing to enforce
a particular data flow. The data flow that the application should guarantee is that all user
data are always sanitised before they reach the set of functions that can be used to perform
injection attacks.
Another way to express the same data flow requirement is using the concept of data in-
tegrity [Bib77]. Data that originate from different sources should be considered of different
“quality”. For the problem of injection vulnerabilities, data from the web application are
considered trusted (or of “high” integrity) while data from users are considered untrusted (or
of “low” integrity). Thus, the data flow policy that should be enforced in web applications
is that only high-integrity data may reach the set of functions that can be used in injection
attacks.
Sanitisation functions relax the data flow requirement above by offering a way for low in-
tegrity user data to be used by the web application as high integrity, application-generated
data. Sanitisation functions are thus considered trusted to endorse low integrity data and
mark them as high integrity.
Web applications need a practical and efficient mechanism to enforce automatically this
policy for data flow integrity and thus prevent injection vulnerabilities, independently of
manual sanitisation efforts by developers. Manual security mechanisms have been shown to
be ineffective to reduce the number of injection vulnerabilities in web applications [FW11].
The main problem with manual mechanisms is that developers either do not understand
the security attacks and the protection mechanisms offered by a given framework or, more
importantly, fail to use the provided mechanisms consistently everywhere in the application
codebase.
An automated mechanism to prevent specifically SQL Injection are prepared statements4.
Instead of creating SQL queries using string concatenation, an application defines static
placeholder queries with parameters filled in at runtime. Parameters passed to the place-
holders cannot change the semantics of the query, as its structure is determined in advance
when the statement is prepared. By relying on prepared statements, the Drupal platform
has exhibited few such exploits compared to Wordpress (see Table 2.1).
4PostgreSQL 8.1.23 Documentation—PREPARE, http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.1/static/
sql-prepare.html, last accessed: 7/9/2012
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2.1.2 Security requirements in event processing
Data flow enforcement is also important in event processing. Event processing is a software
paradigm for performing analysis and transformation of flows of event messages [Luc02].
Central to the paradigm are event messages (or simply events). An event represents the
occurrence of a phenomenon, such as a stock tick in a financial application or a cancer biopsy
request in a healthcare application. The “business logic” of an event processing application
is organised in event processing units (or simply units). Units may actively emit events or
reactively perform processing when an event is received. The result of event processing may
be the modification of events received or new events emitted as output. Different formats
for events are possible with a typical choice being a fixed structure such as key/value pairs.
Event processing systems [TGP05] (e.g. Esper5, Progress Apama6 and IBM WebSphereMQ7)
are used in fraud detection, finance and, in a corporate setting, for enterprise application
integration and business process management [BEMP07].
Event processing has been shown to facilitate the design of systems that scale well [Arm07].
Scalability is achieved by decomposing business logic into multiple processing units that only
share data through the exchange of events. This avoids the need for synchronisation, i.e.
the main problem associated with shared-state concurrency. Event processing systems take
advantage of multiple cores to execute processing units concurrently. Assuming that a large
task can be performed by many processing units that exchange events and that these units
do not introduce significant ordering constraints for their execution, event processing systems
can scale linearly with the number of processor cores available.
Event processing also benefits systems that are amenable to distribution [Luc02]. Traditional
paradigms for distributed systems, such as CORBA [OMG02] and Java RMI [Mic99], intro-
duce tight coupling between systems by emulating the semantics of local procedure calls.
With event processing instead, inter-connected systems exchange information by sending
events. The sender and the recipient are decoupled because events are sent and received
at different times. Participating systems are simplified and distribution is easier [MFP06]
because the responsibility of dispatching events lies with the event processing system (also
known as an event-based middleware [Pie04]).
The rest of this section introduces two applications of event processing, low latency trading
and healthcare systems integration, and discusses how these applications can benefit from
data flow enforcement.
Low latency trading
Low processing latency is a key requirement for modern stock trading systems. With the
shift to algorithmic trading, the ability to react quickly to market changes affects financial
5Esper, http://esper.codehaus.org/, last accessed: 25/9/2012
6Progress Apama, http://progress.com/apama, last accessed: 25/9/2012
7IBM WebSphereMQ, http://www.ibm.com/webspheremq, last accessed: 25/9/2012
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Figure 2.2: A multi-domain event processing scenario in healthcare. Events are exchanged between
processing units belonging to multiple domains.
gains [Iat09]. It has been reported that reacting faster than the competition may translate
to increased earnings of $0.01 per share, even for trades that other traders perform [Duh09].
To support algorithmic trading, stock exchanges provide appropriate interfaces and event
flows. To achieve low latency, they charge for the service of having machines physically
co-located in the same data centre as parts of the exchange [Fla07]. However, even with
co-location within the same data centre rack, there is a minimum latency penalty due to
inter-machine network communication. In addition, physical rack space in data centres close
to exchanges is expensive and limited [Exc09].
The scalability offered by event processing can benefit applications with high message through-
put and low latency requirements such as algorithmic trading. Instead of allocating the
processing of traders that act for competing institutions to separate physical hosts, traders
can share a single, co-located machine. This benefits traders because latency is reduced, co-
location becomes more affordable and clients can trade with each other avoiding the exposure
associated with the stock exchange [Zen09].
Hosting event processing on behalf of competing traders on the same machine, however,
is challenging from a security perspective. The event processing system should never leak
proprietary information regarding trading strategies, stock subscriptions and orders from one
trader to another. Similarly, each trader’s incoming stock tick feed must not be influenced
by other traders in the same system—traders should always be able to take objective trading
decisions. Finally, trading strategies (which may be contributed by different traders) should
be unable to monitor the trading activity of their competition. All these requirements are
hard to meet given the likelihood of software defects either in the event processing system
or in event processing units exposing information. For such a co-location service to become
viable, clients should be convinced about the integrity and confidentiality of their trading
strategies.
Healthcare systems integration
In healthcare, data processing workflows involve distributed systems that span across mul-
tiple organisational domains. Figure 2.2 gives a representative example of the types of
workflows found in the UK National Health Service (NHS). The figure illustrates domains
(dashed regions) and application components inside these domains that exchange events.
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The workflow is triggered when a patient visits their General Practitioner (GP) for a con-
sultation. The GP takes a lump biopsy and forwards an electronic request with patient
information to an NHS pathology laboratory asking for specimen analysis (message e1). A
pathologist performs the analysis and responds with a report to the GP (message e2). The
report is also forwarded to an NHS registry for cancer incidents (message e3) but only if the
analysis of the lump reveals evidence of cancer.
In the above scenario, event processing facilitates system integration because it naturally
captures the existing distributed workflow. The GP, the pathology lab and the cancer registry
form individual domains, which process events independently from each other. Three types
of events capture the different messages exchanged: the biopsy requests (e1), the pathology
reports (e2) and the cancer registry reports (e3). Event processing units contributed by
the different domains receive these events and implement the application’s business logic: a
patient processing unit (for each GP domain), a report management unit (for each pathology
lab domain) and a cancer statistics unit (for the cancer registry).
For the above workflow security is important. The workflow involves events with confiden-
tial user data and their propagation is regulated by corresponding data protection legisla-
tion [NHS10]. Three security requirements must be enforced. First, only the requesting
GP or a cancer registry may receive pathology reports. Second, cancer registries may only
receive pathology reports about cancer cases. Third, only doctors in pathology labs may re-
ceive the confidential patient data included in biopsy requests. However, the three domains
may handle security policy differently due to inconsistent interpretations at implementation
time. Any information leaks will have serious consequences due to the sensitive nature of
patient data.
Enforcing data flow requirements
Event processing systems should be able to enforce data security policies that specify system-
wide, end-to-end confidentiality and integrity data flow requirements [BL73, Bib77]. For
example, pathology reports should only be exposed to the GP that requested a biopsy (con-
fidentiality requirement). The input data to a trading strategy should only be stock tick
events provided by the stock exchange (integrity requirement).
Most access control schemes [Lam71] are not designed to offer confidentiality and integrity
requirements end-to-end, i.e. across multiple event processing units. Typically, access control
systems rely on Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs), i.e. specific points at which compliance
with security policy is checked [RCFZ11]. The event processing system may help developers
define and control PEPs by allowing them to manipulate the checks they perform. However,
an important limitation exists: the access control system decides in advance whether to allow
or deny an operation—i.e. without knowing how the data that are accessed by the operation
will subsequently be used.
This limitation becomes evident in the confidentiality example above once implementation
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errors are considered. A processing unit that is otherwise able to access pathology reports
may still violate patient data confidentiality if, due to an implementation error, it does not
correctly identify the receiving GP.
In contrast, confidentiality and integrity data flow guarantees should be enforced end-to-
end by the event processing system, independently of the correctness of the implementation
of processing units. The event processing system should track the flow of events between
units and prevent event exchange when a violation of data confidentiality or integrity is
detected; not only in advance before a unit receives input. In the example above, assume
that the unit that accesses pathology reports is marked as having received a pathology report
before accessing one. The event processing system will be in a position to safely deliver the
pathology report to the unit as long as it can subsequently enforce that all output events of
that unit will only be received by the corresponding GP (i.e. independently of the processing
that the unit may perform).
2.2 Static methods for data flow analysis and enforcement
Static methods are popular for analysing and enforcing data flow in applications [ML00,
JKK06b, SAH+10, Sim03]. This section examines three representative examples: taint anal-
ysis, symbolic execution and security-typed languages. Taint analysis methods [JKK06b,
HYH+04] expand on classic data flow analysis of application source code [ALSU07] while
symbolic execution systems [SAH+10, CDE08] emulate program execution under various dif-
ferent inputs. Finally security-typed languages [ML00, Sim03] augment the language type
system with data flow information to facilitate static analysis.
The first advantage of static methods for data flow analysis and enforcement is that they can
be applied oﬄine. They incur no runtime overhead and, as a result, they can be adopted in
environments in which execution speed is a priority. Second, developers are notified during
development about potential data flow violations instead of when the problems manifest in
production. This helps construct applications free of many types of security vulnerabilities.
Third, static methods for data flow analysis, if applied oﬄine on a large corpus of existing
applications, can identify undiscovered security vulnerabilities. This enables security studies
of large application datasets aiming to pinpoint common instances of security problems.
However, the lack of runtime information limits the applicability of static methods. Many
applications have data flow requirements that depend on runtime information. For example
in the healthcare scenario (§2.1.2) enforcement that patient data is only released to the
correct doctor in the pathology lab is hard to guarantee statically because the potential type
of cancer is not known yet. Static analysis is also challenging for languages with dynamic
features, which are popular in the web (e.g. PHP). Features such as dynamic code generation
or dynamic function calls lead to programs with behaviour that changes at runtime, and thus
programs that cannot be fully analysed statically.
Static methods are also more complex than their runtime counterparts. The source of this
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complexity is that static methods reason about any potential execution of a program. The
advantage is that data flow that occurs by not executing particular code paths at runtime is
also captured (see the discussion of implicit data flow in Section 2.3.2). The disadvantage is
that adapting static analysis to enforce custom data flow tailored to individual applications
requires significant developer expertise.
Another limitation of static methods is the problem of worst-case assumptions. Static anal-
ysers attempt to detect all instances of a security problem. When the tool that performs
static analysis is faced with a scenario that it cannot fully assess, it takes the conservative
approach and assumes the worst possible outcome [JKK06b]. Worst-case assumptions have
a direct impact on the result of the analysis: the analysis will identify safe programs as
unsafe introducing false positives. Since developers have to assess the result of the analysis
manually, increased numbers of false positives reduce the usability of a tool.
2.2.1 Taint analysis
Taint analysis [JKK06b, TPF+09, BKMW10] is a method to identify illicit use of untrusted
data in applications. The techniques that it employs are largely borrowed from classical
data flow analysis [ALSU07], which are introduced in this section. The main limitation of
taint analysis is the lack of runtime information. Thus, after presenting taint analysis, this
section continues with a discussion of string analysis [CMS03, Min05, HO05]. String analysis
is often suggested to improve the results of taint analysis by reasoning statically about the
potential content of strings at runtime.
Overview of data flow analysis
Data flow analysis is an influential static analysis method originally developed in the context
of code optimising compilers [ALSU07]. It has since been used and extended by the security
research community to enforce data flow confidentiality [TPF+09] and integrity [JKK06b,
TPF+09] requirements.
In data flow analysis, the analyser associates meta-data with each point in the analysed
program. The meta-data represent the program state that may be observed at that point
and that is relevant for the particular analysis. The content and the type of the meta-data
vary according to the goal of the analysis. For example, if the analysis aims to pinpoint
injection vulnerabilities, the meta-data may consist of a set of variables that are potentially
set by the user [JKK06b].
Data flow analysis calculates the meta-data for each program point according to some con-
straints. The constraints stem from the semantics of statements and the control flow of the
application. Statement semantics describe how each particular statement affects the meta-
data for the program points before and after the execution of that statement. The control
flow of the application then introduces constraints on the meta-data for the program points
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across two different statements; after the first is executed but before the second. For two
consecutive program points their meta-data must be equal. However, the control flow of
a program is not linear and forms a graph known as the Control Flow Graph (CFG). As
a result, the CFG puts additional constraints on the meta-data of the program points for
statements at its edges. In code optimisation, the meta-data generated by the data flow
analysis shows whether the requirements of a given optimisation are satisfied and thus if the
optimisation is applicable.
As an example of data flow analysis, consider the reaching definitions problem [ALSU07]. In
the reaching definitions problem the compiler computes which variable definitions are visible
when control reaches a given program point. This enables the compiler to generate warnings
when an undefined variable is used.
To solve the reaching definitions problem, data flow analysis stores for each program point
the set of defined variables along with their definition points. An algorithm starts from the
first instruction of the program at which the set of defined variables is known. A potential
reaching definitions algorithm traverses iteratively the CFG to calculate the set of defined
variables for each program point [ALSU07]. To do so, the algorithm uses the statement
semantics; according to each statement, new variables may be defined and the definition of
existing variables may change. The algorithm converges to a solution when no modifications
are made to the meta-data of any program point in a single iteration.
By carefully selecting appropriate meta-data, data flow analysis can be used to enforce data
flow integrity guarantees. Pixy [JKK06b] and similar systems [HYH+04, BKMW10, XA06,
LL05], as discussed next, follow this approach.
Taint analysis in detail
Taint analysis is a type of data flow analysis suggested to enforce integrity requirements in
web applications [JKK06a]. Examples of its use in the web include PHP applications [JKK06b,
HYH+04, XA06], Java applications [LL05, TPF+09] and browser extensions written in
Javascript [BKMW10]. On the server-side, taint analysis detects injection vulnerabilities,
i.e. data flow that originates from the user and reaches functions that are used in injec-
tion attacks (§2.1.1). On the client-side, taint analysis detects data flow from the user to
privileged browser APIs, possible due to vulnerable browser extensions [BKMW10]. This
is dangerous because untrusted web applications may hijack the browser and execute privi-
leged operations that circumvent the browser’s security restrictions. The rest of this section
discusses taint analysis using Pixy as a representative example.
Pixy [JKK06b] is a taint analysis tool that automatically detects XSS vulnerabilities in PHP
applications. It locates statements in PHP applications that return data to the client (e.g.
print or echo) and can be used in XSS attacks. It achieves this by applying data flow
analysis to identify statements that use input parameters without sanitisation.
To perform taint analysis, Pixy stores and updates a single bit of meta-data that marks
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each variable as potentially tainted if the variable may contain data that originated from the
user. Initially, only the variables that contain HTTP request data are tainted. Pixy then
applies a standard iterative algorithm to the application’s CFG and calculates the meta-data
for each program point. Pixy models PHP library functions and operator semantics so that
operations on tainted data result in tainted values and calls to sanitisation functions result
in untainted return values. When a potentially tainted variable is used in an operation that
requires sanitisation, taint analysis reports an injection vulnerability.
Pixy combines taint analysis with two additional types of data flow analysis that improve
its effectiveness: alias analysis and literal analysis [JKK06a].
PHP supports variable references, i.e. two variables that reference the same physical memory
location. These variables must be considered equivalent in taint analysis. For this, alias
analysis maintains meta-data about groups of variables that reference the same memory
location. This information is used in variable assignment operations because it allows Pixy’s
taint analysis to update the meta-data for every variable affected by an assignment.
A PHP application may contain code that is not executed, e.g. an if branch only activated
under some configurations. To allow taint analysis to avoid such code paths, which should
not affect taint analysis, literal analysis maintains meta-data about the potential values that
each variable may hold at runtime. This allows taint analysis to rule out some of the branches
followed by the application and, as a result, achieve more precise results.
The three static data flow analyses suggested by Pixy have a number of limitations. First,
literal analysis is only effective for constant values and cannot precisely specify variable
values when these depend on user input. In fact, Pixy only uses literal analysis results to
prune branches in conditional statements and not for other dynamic language features that
are typically combined with runtime data, e.g. the target function in variable function calls.
Second, the lack of knowledge about the actual variable values limits Pixy’s taint analysis
when arrays are involved. For example, when an application references the ith element of
an array that contains some tainted elements using the variable $i, Pixy cannot statically
compute which element is referenced. Thus, it cannot fetch the element’s meta-data and has
to mark the element as tainted to avoid false negatives, i.e. considering a data flow to be safe
when it is not. Finally, Pixy does not automatically analyse files imported with the import
keyword, and it requires developer input to specify the actual files to analyse. Again, literal
analysis cannot capture the exact target file of import statements since the actual file name
often depends on the runtime configuration of the host system.
Overall, Pixy is an important system for static taint analysis in PHP that identifies XSS vul-
nerabilities in existing code. Compared to other static analysis systems for PHP [HYH+04,
XA06], Pixy better supports common language features such as references and multi-level
arrays and its taint analysis is more accurate [JKK06a]. When compared to similar taint
analysis systems for Java [LL05], Pixy offers comparable false positive rates while supporting
a significantly more dynamic language than Java.
Without runtime information, however, Pixy’s support for most dynamic aspects of PHP is
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1 <?php
2 $s=”b”;
3 for ($i=0 ; $i<$n ; $i++)
4 $s = ”a”.$s;
5 echo $str;
6 ?>
1 S → b
2 S → aS
Listing 2.1: An example of string analysis in a PHP program. The resulting grammar that describes
the contents of the generated string is shown on the right hand side.
limited. In PHP, the developer can use a dynamically constructed string as (1) the script
filename to include (dynamic import), (2) the name of a variable to read or write (variable
variables), (3) the name of a function to invoke (variable function calls), (4) the name of
a class to instantiate (variable new) and (5) the code to execute (eval support). These
language features limit Pixy’s practicality. For example, Wordpress, the popular weblog
platform that is used in Section 5, makes extensive use of these language features.
Dynamic language features are a common problem for static taint analysis systems. VEX,
the system for taint analysis in browser extensions, does not support Javascript’s eval with
dynamically generated strings [BKMW10]. For Java, Livshits and Lam’s taint analysis does
not handle dynamically loaded classes [LL05] while TAJ explicitly models common J2EE
operations, such as calls to Enterprise JavaBeans, because it does not support Java’s dynamic
features used in their implementation [TPF+09]. As presented next, string analysis collects
information about how strings are constructed, and this information can be used to improve
support for dynamic language features.
Improving taint analysis with string analysis
String analysis [CMS03, Min05, HO05, WS07] is a static analysis technique that approximates
the structure of strings generated by an application at runtime. String approximation is
important for taint analysis because it enables precise taint analyses with minimal user
input and, for dynamic languages, it provides better support for their dynamic features.
The core idea of string analysis is to consider string operations in the original program
as production rules for a context-free grammar [Min05]. The output of string analysis is
a context-free grammar, which approximates the contents of each string generated by the
program at runtime. Listing 2.1 shows an excerpt of a PHP program and the resulting
grammar, after string analysis [Min05]. In this example, static analysis may be unable
to identify the exact final value of $str—it depends on the runtime value of $n—but it
can reason about $str’s structure. In particular, the assignment in the fourth line of the
PHP program in Listing 2.1 corresponds to the second production rule in the right-hand
side grammar. Such a grammar enables queries using regular expressions on the potential
content of each string [Min05], e.g. “can $str contain the value [/a.*/]?”.
String analysis operates on a simplified version of the CFG, the flow graph, that is constructed
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based only on string operations [CMS03]. The flow graph uses nodes to represent string
creation and manipulation statements (such as calls to the subString method in Java) and
edges to link strings with the statements that they are involved in. The static analyser
walks the flow graph and creates a context-free grammar with explicit string operations,
i.e. grammars similar to Listing 2.1, in which terminal symbols (or else terminals) represent
string-processing library functions. In the final step, the functions are removed from the
grammar using library function approximations, and the context-free grammar is generated.
Library function approximations are required because some of the operations performed on
strings by the corresponding library functions cannot be described by context-free grammars.
Such examples are character replacement or regular expression functions [Min05]. When the
analyser uses an approximation, the accuracy of the result suffers because false positives and
false negatives are possible.
String analysis eliminates a need for endorsement annotations in taint analysis. In a system
such as Pixy, developers have to annotate sanitisation functions manually, effectively trusting
them as integrity endorsement functions (§2.1.1). Instead, string analysis systems have
information about the structure of each string. Thus, with string and taint analysis combined,
when a variable is used in a function that can be exploited in an injection attack, static
analyses devise a context-free grammar to capture the variable’s potential content. Individual
terminals in this grammar are annotated with taint meta-data. Using this information,
injection vulnerabilities are only reported when the grammar permits tainted terminals to
change the semantics of the function [WS07]. The advantage of string analysis is that it can
pinpoint errors in the sanitisation functions themselves. There are cases, however, in which
the application uses different sanitisation functions according to the context: an application
may allow its administrators to sidestep the normal sanitisation operations regarding HTML
content. In such scenarios, annotations are still required [WSA+11].
String analysis is also used to support the use of dynamic language features in the analysed
program. Wassermann and Su [WS07] rely on string approximations to resolve statically the
target of dynamic import statements in PHP. Without information about the data that the
program receives at runtime though, string analysis has only limited potential to improve
support for other dynamic language features such dynamic code generation. String analysis
approximates only the structure of strings, and for taint analysis to analyse code, the precise
content of the generated strings is required.
Overall, taint analysis is an important technique for static data flow analysis that is limited
by the use of dynamic language features. The next section introduces symbolic execution,
which employs traces from concrete program executions to guide the analysis when dynamic
language features are used.
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1 <?php
2 $uid = isset ($ GET[’uid’]) ? $ GET[’uid’] : ’’
3 if ($uid==’’ || $uid > 1000) {
4 exit $uid−>error;
5 }
6 {...}
7 ?>
Listing 2.2: An example PHP program to demonstrate symbolic execution.
2.2.2 Symbolic execution
Symbolic execution is primarily a testing technique, designed to automatically generate test
suites with high code coverage [CDE08, CGP+08]. Recently, it has been suggested as a
method for data flow analysis in web applications [CF10, SAH+10, WYC+08]. This section
outlines the basic principles of symbolic execution and discusses its applicability as a data
flow analysis technique.
Overview of symbolic execution
Symbolic execution emulates the execution of a program under every potential input. In
contrast to taint analysis, symbolic execution follows every program path separately. On
each path, it inspects the values that the program uses and identifies cases, in which a value
is being used in an unsafe way, e.g. a pointer that is dereferenced without a check for a null
value. Symbolic execution is applied oﬄine and incurs no overhead at runtime. Therefore,
it is classified here a static method for data flow analysis.
Symbolic execution can identify violations of arbitrary pre-conditions for specific program
operations. In general, pre-conditions are necessary checks that the application must invoke
before performing an operation. Pre-conditions are hard-coded in the symbolic execution
system [SAH+10, WYC+08] or added to the analysed program as annotations [CF10].
Symbolic execution assumes program variables contain symbolic values. A symbolic value
does not represent concrete data such as $v=5. Instead, it captures the application’s op-
erations as a set of constraints. For example, “$v is greater than 0” can be the symbolic
value of variable $v in a code path that is only executed if $v>0. Application operations are
replaced with operations on symbolic values that produce symbolic results with additional
constraints. When the code branches after inspecting a symbolic value, symbolic execution
follows both branches each with a complementary new condition associated with the sym-
bolic value. When the exploration of all program paths finishes, symbolic execution can use
the constraints on symbolic values to generate concrete input.
As an example, assume that a symbolic execution system analyses the PHP program in
Listing 2.2 for dereferencing errors. Initially, the variable $ GET, which represents the HTTP
request, is marked as symbolic. The check in line 2 has two potential results: $uid is assigned
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isset($_GET['uid'])
is_array($_GET) && isset($_GET['uid'])!is_array($_GET) || !isset($_GET['uid'])
terminated
$uid=='' || $uid>1000
$uid=='' || $uid>1000 $uid!='' && $uid<=1000
no errorserror found
1
2
3 4
Figure 2.3: Exploration of the program from Listing 2.2 using symbolic execution.
either to the concrete empty string value or to the symbolic value in $ GET[’uid’], with the
restriction that $ GET is an array and $ GET[’uid’] exists. Both cases must be checked so
symbolic execution follows both paths, each with different constraints on the value of $ GET.
These two cases appear in Figure 2.3 labeled (1) and (2), respectively, right after the rhombus,
which captures the check. The former case only involves concrete values and executes until
termination in line 6 (Listing 2.2). The latter case, however, involves the symbolic value $uid
being compared to concrete values. The checks in line 3 thus generate two complementary
constraints on $uid, one when the condition is true (labeled (3) in Figure 2.3) and one when
the condition is false (labeled (4) in Figure 2.3). Both constraints can be satisfied for some
values of $uid. Therefore symbolic execution continues with both paths until it has explored
the whole program.
The detailed exploration of the program using symbolic execution can generate concrete test
cases. Given the previous analysis, for example, three test cases that derive from the con-
straints on $ GET[’uid’] are sufficient to explore the excerpt in Listing 2.2: $ GET[’uid’]
not set, $ GET[’uid’]=0 and $ GET[’uid’]=1001. A symbolic execution system may pin-
point programming errors by only generating test cases that lead execution to particular
code paths. In the previous example, there is no constraint that forces $uid to be an object
in the path labeled (3) in Figure 2.3. As a result, the corresponding test case, in which
$ GET[’uid’] is not set, reaches line 4 in Listing 2.2, crashes the application and exposes a
dereferencing error.
Data flow analysis with symbolic execution
Symbolic execution identifies various different errors in applications. Since errors are nothing
more than violations of pre-conditions for specific program operations, symbolic execution
systems [SAH+10, WYC+08, CF10] have devised pre-conditions that, if satisfied, enforce
data flow confidentiality and integrity requirements.
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Rubyx [CF10] is a symbolic execution system for Ruby-On-Rails (RoR)8 web applications
that identifies XSS vulnerabilities. Rubyx introduces the boolean property trusted in the
Ruby String class as part of its runtime libraries. During symbolic execution, symbolic
values that represent user data have initially trusted set to false and RoR’ sanitisation
functions are modified to change trusted to true. The pre-condition required to avoid XSS
vulnerabilities is: “for all statements that return data to the user, the data’s trusted prop-
erty must be true”. This effectively enforces a policy for data flow integrity, i.e. untrusted
user data should flow though sanitisation functions before they are sent to the client.
A similar system for client-side XSS mitigation is Kudzu [SAH+10]. Kudzu performs sym-
bolic execution for Javascript applications. A client-side Javascript application is vulnerable
to XSS when it passes non-sanitised user input to a Javascript evaluation construct such as
eval. In contrast to Rubyx, Kadzu does not trust the sanitisation operations of the applica-
tion and verifies them manually. To achieve this, it models the Javascript string functions as
constraints on symbolic values and uses the result constraints to check whether they preclude
known XSS attack vectors.
Symbolic execution as a static data flow analysis technique offers two advantages over taint
analysis: reduced numbers of false positives and improved support for dynamic languages.
First, symbolic execution systems incur fewer false positives because they verify with con-
crete input values the data flow violations that they discover [SAH+10, CF10, WYC+08].
Second, symbolic execution systems better support dynamic languages by leveraging concrete
execution traces [SAH+10, WYC+08]. When symbolic execution reaches a path, in which
the use of a dynamic language feature requires precise knowledge of a value (e.g. to calculate
the name of a variable), the symbolic execution system generates such concrete input that
makes concrete execution (i.e. execution without symbolic input parameters) reach the same
program point. The symbolic execution system instruments that particular concrete execu-
tion of the program, discovers the specific value that the program generates and proceeds
with symbolic execution based upon that value. This reduces generality but allows symbolic
execution to achieve better code coverage.
Symbolic execution, however, has a number of limitations, with the most important being
limited scalability with the size of the analysed applications. During the analysis of larger
applications, the number of different paths that symbolic execution needs to explore increases
significantly. Symbolic execution systems optimise the order, in which they explore paths but
they employ timeouts as the potential number of paths may be impractical for inspection.
In practice, symbolic execution systems rarely achieve full code coverage. This means that
their results suffer from false positives because they do not account for every potential data
flow in the analysed application.
Another challenge for symbolic execution systems is modeling the environment. Accesses
to files, databases or interactions with the operating system must be modeled to increase
code coverage and to avoid false positives. Kudzu, for example, introduces a browser event
8Ruby on Rails, http://rubyonrails.org/, last accessed: 12/9/2012
47
Background
generator so that all application event handlers are triggered. KLEE [CDE08], a symbolic
execution system for C applications, supports a simple model of the file system. It allows
the analysed applications to store and retrieve symbolic values. Similar models, however,
do not exist for other components such as databases. When the analysed application reads
data from a database, existing systems treat the returned value as symbolic without any
constraints [CF10]. This increases the number of paths that need to be checked needlessly.
A third limitation of symbolic execution is constraint solving. Each time a new code path is
introduced after a conditional statement, a constraint solver [GD07] inspects the constraints
and decides whether they can be satisfied or not. Constraint solvers have limited capabilities
in practice, e.g. for cases in which the program calculates a cryptographic hash, solvers fail
to generate a solution for the constraints that arise from the calculation of the hash in a
reasonable amount of time [AKD+08]. This effectively prevents symbolic execution from
automatically analysing code past a certain point (e.g. an hash-based access control check)
and requires domain- and application-specific annotations for symbolic execution to proceed.
To summarise, symbolic execution is a promising technique to analyse applications for viola-
tions of data flow requirements. However, for large applications, for applications that employ
dynamic language features or for applications that use external services such as data stores,
symbolic execution is currently inadequate to achieve effective data flow analysis.
2.2.3 Security-typed languages
Volpano and Smith [VS97] suggested in their seminal work to augment a traditional language
type system with data flow annotations. This would enable developers to express arbitrary
confidentiality and integrity data flow policies, which the compiler can enforce. Jif [ML00],
the programming language that Myers and Liskov subsequently introduced, is known as a
security-typed language because data flow requirements are explicitly declared as part of the
type of each variable. Jif’s design has influenced a number of languages [SM03, Sim03] and
successor systems [VEK+07, ZBWKM06, KYB+07], which are presented below.
Programs written in a security-typed language such as Jif [ML00] or FlowCaml [Sim03] en-
force non-interference and are composable [VS97, SM03]. Non-interference [GM82, KWH11]
dictates that data belonging to a security category cannot interfere with data belonging to
another category. For confidentiality, non-interference requires that variations of secure input
data do not result in variations of public output data while for integrity, variations of un-
trusted input data must not affect trusted output data. Non-interference forces developers to
declare correctly the security types of generated data for their application to compile success-
fully. Due to composability, when two programs that enforce non-interference are combined
in a larger program, the resulting program also enforces non-interference [SM03]. Both these
properties make security-typed languages an important tool for creating applications that
enforce data flow by design.
The rest of this section presents security-typed languages using Jif as a representative ex-
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ample. Jif introduces the Decentralised Information Flow Control (DIFC ) label model to
express data flow policies in its security types. DIFC is the basis of DEFCon and of other
dynamic systems, both presented later in the thesis. This section also discusses the limi-
tations of static data flow analysis in security-typed languages and introduces the need for
runtime extensions.
Decentralised Information Flow Control and Jif
DIFC, the label model used by Jif’s security types, is an extension of the label models used in
traditional Information Flow Control (IFC) systems [BL73, Bib77]. Such Mandatory Access
Control systems are used in military multi-level security [US 83]. Principals and objects
are typically assigned security labels denoting levels. Principals represent the users of the
application. Access decisions are governed by a “can-flow-to” partial order relation. As an
example, a principal operating at level “secret” can read a “confidential” object but cannot
read a “top-secret” or write to a “confidential” object. Through this model, a system can
enforce confidentiality of data flows: information marked as “secret” only flows to principals
with “secret” (or higher) clearance. The privilege to override confidentiality IFC restrictions,
e.g. write “secret” data to a “confidential” object, is known as the declassification privilege.
In an IFC system, only the few principals that are trusted to respect an organisation’s data
disclosure policy should possess the declassification privilege.
The main idea in Decentralised IFC (DIFC) is that the responsibility to create new labels
and to distribute the privileges that allow principals to override the corresponding data flow
policies is decentralised across applications. In contrast to traditional IFC systems, which use
a centralised trusted entity to create labels and distribute privileges, in DIFC each application
devises its own labels and uses them to protect the data that it processes. This allows each
application to express its own data flow policies that the DIFC system should enforce and
not be limited by the select policies that an administrator has preconfigured.
In the context of Jif, consider L = {o1 : r1, r2} as an example of a DIFC label. L consists
of the principals o1, r1 and r2. Communication channels, such as network sockets, are
associated with the principals that they communicate with. Processes execute on behalf of
principals. The label L specifies that any data annotated with it are owned by o1 (i.e. o1 has
the declassification privilege) and that, apart form o1, only principals r1 and r2 are allowed
to read the data (i.e. they can act as readers).
Jif extends Java by adding DIFC labels to its type system [ML00, CVM07]. The compiler
examines all program statements based on the DIFC labels of the variables involved and the
semantics of each Java operation. The Jif compiler enforces that data stored in a variable
protected by a label, such as L, do not reach a variable or a communication channel with a
more permissive label, e.g. a label that contains additional readers than r1 and r2. If this
happens, the compiler rejects the program, and this prevents a potential data flow violation at
runtime. The compiler then generates executable applications that propagate data according
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to the data flow requirements stated by the DIFC labels. The compiled programs run on the
unmodified Java Virtual Machine after the security annotations have been removed.
Jif enables developers to protect data by devising arbitrary labels and use them to restrict
data flow for each variable. DIFC labels are not restricted to confidentiality; they can be
used to express policies about the integrity of data flows as well [ML00]. Jif also assumes
that different principals have different privileges in regard to labels. The declassification
privilege, for example, i.e. the ability to read a variable protected by L and store data to a
variable labelled with an additional reader, is reserved only for processes that run on behalf
of the owner, i.e. o1. Since the user that executes a program is only known at runtime, Jif
programs need runtime support to ensure that static analysis’ assumptions hold at runtime.
Static analysis and runtime extensions
Jif supports most features of Java but highlights the limitations of static analysis. The DIFC
label model, as used by Jif, is unable to specify data flow requirements when the application
principals are only known at runtime. The healthcare scenario from Section 2.1.2 is such
an example because new patients arrive while the system operates. To support this, a Jif
application would have to be modified and recompiled with additional principals in its labels.
Newer versions of Jif support dynamic labels and principals to avoid recompilation [And99,
CVM07]. In such cases, Jif reverts to dynamic data flow checks because static analysis
alone is not enough. Dynamic features of Jif have been shown to be essential for building
non-trivial applications [HAM06, CVM07].
Access to a database or a file system is another challenge for Jif’s static checks. SIF is a
servlet container for Jif web applications [CVM07]. In SIF, database access is performed
through a set of methods with security-typed input parameters. This means that, statically,
the Jif compiler only enforces that all data sent to such methods are labelled with a common
DIFC label, i.e. the label of the input parameter of the method. This may be acceptable
for data flow policies, such as the policy to prevent injection attacks from Section 2.1.1. In
practice, however, many applications have different data flow requirements for data stored
in the same database. For example, cancer registry reports from Section 2.1.2 cannot be
disclosed to a GP while pathology reports, potentially stored in the same database, can.
In such cases, Jif requires privileged application code that dynamically serialises labels and
stores them in the database at runtime.
Finally, another limitation of security-typed languages is that they require applications to
be rewritten in a novel programming language with static typing and low-level, label-based
data flow policies. While this may be a reasonable requirement for domains in which en-
forcement of data flow is a priority, the additional complexity is not typically justified. In
fact, subsequent research indicates that building realistic applications using Jif requires ad-
ditional runtime tools, such as policy management infrastructure, that are currently not
available [HAM06]. The prevalence of dynamically typed languages in the web render the
adoption of a static- and security-typed language such as Jif particularly challenging.
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2.3 Runtime taint tracking
Runtime taint tracking is a technique for analysing and enforcing data flow in applica-
tions [SAB10]. In contrast to static analysis, the program statements that an application
executes as well as their execution order are known at runtime. These include statements
generated dynamically, e.g. when fetching code at runtime from remote locations. At run-
time, the result of program statements is also known to the taint tracking system. The
analysis therefore can focus on the current execution and not on alternative paths, which
may never affect data flow. These properties render runtime taint tracking suitable for
data flow analysis in large systems written in dynamic languages, which are hard to analyse
statically.
At the same time, runtime taint tracking is a simple technique for developers to understand
and use. Conceptual simplicity has motivated research on systems that expose taint tracking
to developers as a stand-alone security mechanism [VEK+07, ZBWKM06, YWZK09, SBL09].
Such systems use developer input to devise a data flow policy and then restrict processing as
a result of that policy. Assuming that the part of the system that enforces data flow policy
has been implemented without errors, correct data flow follows in any application built on
top. In contrast to security-typed languages, developers continue to program in familiar
languages and only have to learn how to interact with the taint tracking system.
Multiple runtime taint tracking systems have been suggested in the past but the lack of
common terminology hides the shared design principles across them. With this in mind,
Section 2.3.1 establishes a model of runtime taint tracking systems and introduces the main
design decisions that differentiate them. Section 2.3.3 uses this model to discuss the design
choices in a range of recent runtime taint tracking systems.
2.3.1 A model for runtime taint tracking
Definition 2.1 (Runtime Taint Tracking). Runtime taint tracking is a security technique to
track data flow inside a running application. It operates by associating taint meta-data with
the data that the application processes. The application is instrumented to create, modify,
and propagate the taint meta-data transparently at runtime according to the statements that
it executes. The taint meta-data are used to analyse the data flow inside the application or
to enforce a specific data flow policy.
How a runtime taint tracking system achieves its intended purpose, i.e. data flow analysis
or enforcement, depends on a set of design decisions. In general, there are three important
decisions: (1) how the system isolates data, (2) how the system tracks data flow across
isolated data and (3) how the system uses the output of data flow tracking to enforce data
flow. The choice of application programming language often restricts how the designers of
a runtime taint tracking system may answer these questions. As explained next, the reason
is that different languages offer varying support for isolating application data and varying
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inspection points to which checks for data flow tracking and enforcement can be attached.
To gain a better understanding of the design choices above, Figure 2.4 illustrates a generic
runtime taint tracking system. The figure shows in an abstract form an application that
is compartmentalised to facilitate data flow analysis along with the structures needed to
perform taint tracking. The figure, along with the different design choices for isolation, data
flow tracking and enforcement, are explained in the following paragraphs.
Data isolation. Data isolation is a prerequisite for effective data flow tracking. It prevents
the application from exchanging data using mechanisms that are not explicitly controlled or
monitored by the runtime taint tracking system. When data exchange is monitored by the
taint tracking system, the results of data flow analysis do not contain false negatives (i.e.
data flow that occurs in the application but is not detected by taint tracking).
To achieve data isolation, the system first separates the analysed application from its en-
vironment. All outside communication is inspected by the runtime taint tracking system,
effectively preventing any unmonitored access to external data. In Figure 2.4, this is depicted
as a grey border around the application. The external isolation is important because most
data flow policies and analyses specify concerns about how the application receives data
from or communicates data to the outside world. For example, an application that performs
stock trading (§2.1.2) should only receive stock tick data from the stock exchange and never
disclose confidential data about the trading that it performs.
Data, however, must be isolated so that data flow is effectively tracked inside the application.
Thus, the application is internally compartmentalised into multiple isolated components.
Compartmentalisation keeps the data of each isolated component separate similar to the
external isolation of the entire application. In Figure 2.4, this internal compartmentalisation
is depicted using colourless borders. The runtime taint tracking system explicitly monitors
all data exchange across isolated components. An isolated component can be as small as a
single program variable or as large as a set of executable scripts.
Data flow tracking. Assuming effective data isolation, the propagation of data in the
application can be tracked. To achieve this, the taint tracking system maintains taint meta-
data for each isolated component. The taint meta-data may range from simple bits that
mark the data as “tainted” or “confidential” to more complex constructs. Taint meta-data
store information about the security properties of the actual data in the same component.
Maintaining accurate taint meta-data at runtime is the sole purpose of a taint tracking
system when it is used to analyse data flow, e.g. to pinpoint malicious application behaviour.
In the case that the system also aims to enforce a data flow policy, accurate taint meta-data
enable the taint tracking system to stop any policy-violating data flow before it occurs.
The granularity at which data is internally isolated and tracked, thereafter referred to as the
tracking granularity, is an important property of most runtime taint tracking systems. It
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Figure 2.4: Overview of a generic runtime taint tracking system. The main design parameters
are the tracking granularity, the isolation of components, and the tracking and checking operations
imposed.
is rarely configurable by the system’s users and affects the ability of the system to analyse
and enforce data flow. Finer tracking granularity results in more precise data flow tracking.
Increasing the granularity also increases the runtime overhead for storing and updating
meta-data, and this can slow down the application significantly. Two typical examples of
tracking granularities that many of the systems presented in Section 2.3.3 use are process-
level granularity and variable-level granularity.
While the application exchanges data across isolated components, the taint tracking system
(1) intercepts the data exchange, (2) inspects the data and (3) updates the taint meta-data
of each component. These three actions consist a tracking operation, which is automatically
invoked by the taint tracking system to maintain accurate taint meta-data. Data exchange
occurs frequently therefore, unless tracking operations are efficient, performance suffers.
To track data flow effectively, tracking operations must be invoked at every data exchange
point across isolated components and when an isolated component communicates with the
outside world. Such points appear in Figure 2.4 marked (1) and (2), respectively. In practice,
the internal isolation provided by many runtime taint tracking systems does not always
guarantee that tracking operations are invoked. For example, taint tracking systems that
use a process-level tracking granularity are typically unable to intercept data exchange as a
result of processes manipulating the scheduling of the CPU. Two collaborating processes may
use this mechanism to exchange arbitrary data, circumventing the taint tracking system.
Data flow enforcement. When a runtime taint tracking system supports data flow en-
forcement, it provides tracking operations that also perform policy checks. These checking
operations inspect the taint meta-data of the isolated components when data exchange oc-
curs, reason about the policy compliance of the data exchange and act to prevent data flow
that violates policy. As presented in Figure 2.4, checking operations may be invoked on data
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Design Parameters Design Decisions in the Literature
Tracking granularity Process, memory segment, memory byte, object, variable, string
character, scope of code, group of scripts
Taint meta-data DIFC labels, 1 (“taint”) bit, 2 bits, 32 bits, arbitrary bitmap,
transformer object, policy object
Tracking operations Taint bit propagation, union, overridable method
Checking operations “Can-flow-to”, taint bit check, context sensitive string evaluation,
filter object
Table 2.2: Overview of design choices from taint tracking systems presented in Section 2.
exchange across isolated components (3) or on data exchange with the outside world (4).
Checking operations are similar to tracking operations but differ in purpose and in how fre-
quently they are invoked. While tracking operations ensure that the system has an accurate
view of the data stored in each isolated component in the form of taint meta-data, checking
operations leverage this information to enforce data flow policy. As a result, the frequency
of checking operations depends on the number of points during program execution in which
the system must decide whether a particular action is permitted or not. The number of such
points depends on the data flow policy being enforced. For many runtime taint tracking sys-
tems and data flow policies, only few inspection points are needed compared to the number of
data exchanges across isolated components. For example, to enforce an integrity policy that
prevents injection vulnerabilities in web applications (§2.1.1), checking operations should
only ensure that a small set of functions are never called with user-supplied data. Instead,
tracking operations must be called every time the application combines the data stored in
two variables. Thus, checking operations are typically less frequent than tracking operations.
At a high level, a taint tracking system translates a data flow policy to a specific tracking
granularity, taint meta-data and tracking/checking operations. This thesis refers collectively
to the choices in each of these design decisions as the taint tracking policy of the system.
Systems have different flexibility in devising taint tracking policies. At one end of the spec-
trum, runtime taint tracking systems enforce domain-specific data flow policies with limited
or no input from the application administrator or user [NTGG+05, DKZ09, VNJ+07]. In
such systems, the taint tracking policy is largely fixed and the user has few or no configu-
ration options. At the other end, systems that expose taint tracking to the developers offer
the ability to set the values of taint meta-data [VEK+07, ZBWKM06, KYB+07], control the
actions of checking operations [BMW+11] or even alter the type of taint meta-data that the
system maintains [YWZK09].
2.3.2 Covert channels
A common assumption in runtime taint tracking systems is that the developer does not ac-
tively try to evade tracking. This is known as the benevolent developer assumption [BMW+11,
DC10]. The benevolent developer assumption reflects the inability of runtime taint tracking
54
Process A
public
Process A1
confidential
Process A2
public
Process A3
confidential
Process B
confidential
Process C
confidential
101 12 ✔
✖
1
0
1
3
✖
Figure 2.5: Exploiting implicit taint meta-data changes to leak confidential information [KT09].
systems to guarantee that all data flows are monitored effectively. An unmonitored data
flow is know as a covert channel [KWH11].
Covert channels are divided into storage and timing channels. Both types of channels may
be used by malicious developers to evade tracking. Covert storage channels, such as a
shared memory location that is not under the control of the taint tracking system, typically
allow high-bandwidth, reliable communication. Access to covert storage channels must be
prevented or else the taint tracking system cannot reliably track data flow. In contrast,
taking advantage of timing channels requires monopolising or exhausting system resources,
and such behaviour is likely to be noticed. As an example of a timing channel, consider
a process that, if a confidential event occurs, increases its CPU utilisation. Collaborating
processes may observe a reduction in their performance and deduce that the confidential
event occurred.
The following paragraphs introduce two important types of covert storage channels that
significantly limit the design and applicability of runtime taint tracking systems. Implicit
taint meta-data changes are a covert channel that impacts the design of taint tracking systems
with coarse tracking granularities. Control and implicit flows are covert channels that limit
the applicability of variable-level taint tracking systems when operating on malicious code.
Implicit taint meta-data changes. Implicit meta-data changes are an important de-
sign flaw for taint tracking systems with coarse tracking granularities because they can be
exploited as a covert channel. Asbestos [VEK+07] (later presented in Section 2.3.3) suffers
from this problem and subsequent systems took explicit measures to avoid it.
Figure 2.5 presents two processes, A and B, which collaborate to learn and disclose a confi-
dential value while evading taint tracking. Assume that the taint tracking system monitors
these processes and updates the taint meta-data of each process according to the confiden-
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1 int<confidential> i=get boolean result();
2 int<public> j=false;
3 if (i) j=true;
4 print(j);
Listing 2.3: Control and implicit flow from variable i to variable j.
tiality of the data that it receives. A third process C stores the confidential binary value 101.
To mount an attack, process B requests from process C the confidential value. In step 1,
process C sends the data. Tracking operations in the taint tracking system update the taint
meta-data of process B implicitly so that the process can receive the data. Process B stores
the confidential value 101, however, it is unable to communicate the value to A without it
being reflected on A’s taint meta-data.
The problem with this design is that updating taint meta-data implicitly is externally visible,
i.e. other processes that were previously able to communicate with B are then unable to do
so. This effectively “leaks” one bit of information to any other process. When implicit taint
meta-data changes are combined with the ability to spawn a large number of processes, there
exists a high-bandwidth covert channel that is not monitored by the taint tracking system.
In the example of Figure 2.5, processes A and B exploit this channel. In step 2, process A
spawns three child processes, A1–A3, that communicate back to A in regular intervals. Pro-
cess B can now follow a simple strategy to disclose the confidential value 101 to A: it
identifies which bits in the confidential value are set and, in step 3, sends to the correspond-
ing processes A1–A3 an empty message (here A1 and A3). The taint tracking system detects
this, updates the taint meta-data of A1 and A3, and therefore prevents their subsequent
communication with process A. This effectively discloses to process A the confidential value
101 without it being reflected in A’s taint meta-data.
Successor systems to Asbestos avoid this covert channel by requiring explicit changes to
taint meta-data [ZBWKM06, KYB+07]. For a process to receive an incoming confidential
message, it has to change its taint meta-data explicitly so that they reflect the confidentiality
of the message. This eliminates the covert channel in the scenario from Figure 2.5 because
all three processes A1–A3 have to change their meta-data explicitly to receive confidential
messages from process B. Process A only learns that processes A1–A3 are interested to learn
confidential information—not that they they have received such. Krohn and Tromer [KT09]
formally proved non-interference in the context of the Flume operating system, which uses
a taint tracking policy that requires processes to modify taint meta-data explicitly.
Control and implicit flow. Runtime taint tracking systems that use a variable tracking
granularity may need to track control and implicit data flow between variables. While control
flow can be tracked at runtime with the cost of increased false positives, implicit flow is an
important limitation for all taint tracking systems that operate only at runtime.
Listing 2.3 shows an example of control and implicit flows in pseudocode. In lines 1 and 2,
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variables i and j are declared and marked with different taint meta-data. The conditional
assignment in line 3, however, effectively stores the confidential value of i to the public
variable j. This happens both when i is true and the assignment is executed, or when i is
false and the assignment is skipped.
The first type of data flow is known as a control flow [GMPS11]. The value of the confidential
variable i is implicitly known in every statement that executes as a result of the control
statement in line 3. This means that every statement that updates a variable in the if-
branch that is taken at runtime may disclose the value of i. Some of the systems that will
be presented in Section 2.3.3, track control flow by considering the taint meta-data of the
tested expression (i.e. i’s meta-data in this example) in every assignment that is performed
as a result of the control statement. In the above example, the runtime taint tracking system
can detect that the assignment to the public variable j can leak confidential data because
the control statement tests a confidential variable. The downside is that the number of false
positives increases because most of the assignments that benevolent developers perform as a
result of control statements are not used to store the value of the tested expression.
The latter data flow, however, i.e. when i is false, is an example of an implicit flow because
the value of i flows to j without an explicit assignment. Implicit data flow occurs when
the branches of a control statement alter different sets of variables. It is an important
problem, because at runtime, the taint tracking system can only detect which variables
are updated in the branches that the application actually follows. This means that any
data flow that a malicious application may try to generate by omitting to update specific
variables would remain undetected [AF09, AF10]. Recent research suggested to prevent
implicit flow by halting program execution early [SR09, Rus10, AF09] but this may prevent
legitimate applications from executing [AF10]. For this reason, variable-level runtime taint
tracking is combined with static analysis when the system must handle potentially malicious
code [VNJ+07].
Cavallaro et al. [CSS08] demonstrate the above types of covert channels and also suggest
additional types of strategies that malicious code can use to evade a runtime taint tracking
system that tracks data flow at the variable granularity. In particular, malicious code can
overwrite pointers and trick benign applications into disclosing sensitive data as part of
their normal operation. Such attacks can disclose confidential data without malicious code
accessing them therefore they remain undetected. Subsequent research [SB09] showed that
pointer tainting which was typically suggested to protect against such exploitation strategies
is inadequate in practice due to increased numbers of false positives.
2.3.3 Runtime taint tracking systems
Runtime taint tracking systems are popular in the security research community. Table 2.2
shows an overview of the various design choices made by taint tracking systems described
next. The tracking granularity varies significantly across systems and is never configurable
by end users. For taint meta-data, Jif’s DIFC labels are a popular choice because they can
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express both integrity and confidentiality policies. Other systems use generic policy objects,
i.e. data flow policies are specified using code written in the same language as the application.
The advantage of specifying data flow policy with code is that no translation of data flow
policy to specific tags or labels is required. When the taint tracking system only tracks data
flow for a particular type of analysis, a single bit of meta-data is often enough.
The choice of taint meta-data limits the design choices for checking and tracking operations.
DIFC labels are ordered by a “can-flow-to” relation (§2.2.3). Thus, all systems with DIFC
labels use “can-flow-to” in checking operations. Systems with bit-based taint meta-data
propagate the value of the taint bit when one isolated component receives data from another
isolated component. According to the bit’s value, checking operations prevent specific appli-
cation actions. Systems with policy objects often allow the user to control how policy objects
propagate in tracking operations and how policy objects are checked in checking operations.
This section presents influential runtime taint tracking systems. It begins with implemen-
tations in the operating system, continues with the domain of web application security and
privacy, and closes with taint tracking systems for desktop and mobile applications.
Operating Systems
Runtime taint tracking has inspired the development of a new breed of operating systems,
which enforce data flow and limit potential data leaks in the presence of application-level
vulnerabilities. Asbestos [VEK+07, EKV+05], HiStar [ZBWKM06] and Flume [KYB+07]
are runtime taint tracking systems that use the DIFC label model from Jif for their taint
meta-data combined with process-level tracking granularity.
The motivation to incorporate taint tracking inside the operating system lies in the difficulty
to adhere to the Principle Of Least Privilege (POLP) [SS75]. POLP requires that each
application is split into multiple isolated compartments and each compartment uses only the
minimum set of privileges necessary to perform its task. The authors of Asbestos observe
that this is cumbersome to achieve in existing operating systems such as Linux using chroot-
style tools [KEF+05]. In practice, most developers deliver over-privileged binaries that are
prone to large-scale data leaks when a vulnerability is discovered.
To support applications structured according to the POLP and simultaneously enforce data
flow, the authors of Asbestos suggest to incorporate runtime taint tracking within the operat-
ing system. This section describes Asbestos, HiStar and Flume and discusses the challenges
that arise from supporting taint tracking inside the operating system.
Asbestos. The main promise of Asbestos is to enforce that data are processed accord-
ing to the application’s data flow policy independently of the correctness of the applica-
tion [VEK+07]. In Asbestos, an application declares a data flow policy, and the operating
system enforces it using runtime taint tracking.
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Each Asbestos process can create a new label and use it to protect the data that it generates.
Asbestos uses Jif’s DIFC model (§2.2.3). Unlike Jif, however, Asbestos does not employ
the concept of principals. Instead, each Asbestos label consists of a set of tags with a
corresponding sensitivity level. Tags are opaque bit streams randomly generated by the
operating system. Each tag captures a security category, such as “patient documents” or
“administrator input”. For each tag, there are four sensitivity levels, i.e. 0 to 3, which are
used to implement confidentiality and integrity policies (explained next).
From the scope of taint tracking system design, Asbestos uses process-level tracking granu-
larity and DIFC-based labels as taint meta-data. For each process, Asbestos maintains labels
that limit how the process communicates with other processes. Its checking operations im-
plement a DIFC “can-flow-to” partial order relation according to the tags and sensitivity
levels of two labels, the sender’s tracking label (Ls) and the receiver’s clearance label (Lr).
To allow communication, each tag in Ls must exist in Lr and the corresponding sensitivity
levels in Lr must be higher or equal to the sensitivity levels in Ls. Higher sensitivity restricts
data propagation: data labeled using the tag “patient documents” with sensitivity 3 can only
flow to processes that have the same tag with sensitivity 3 in their clearance label. Since
Asbestos processes communicate only using asynchronous message passing, no information
is conveyed to the sending or the receiving process when a message is discarded due to an
unsuccessful checking operation.
Asbestos supports both confidentiality and integrity data flow constraints using the four
sensitivity levels per tag and two labels per process. The process’ tracking label reflects the
sensitivity of the data that the process has observed and changes automatically according
to the labels of the messages that the process receives. The process’ clearance label imposes
limits on the changes of the tracking label. When a process p allocates a tag t to enforce
confidentiality, the labels of all other processes in the system are automatically updated with
t at level 2 for the tracking label and at level 3 for the clearance label. Process p may now
protect its messages with t at level 3 so that the tracking label of each receiving process is
increased to level 3 on message reception. This effectively enforces confidentiality because
the labels of all subsequent messages from any receiving process contain t at level 3. In order
to declassify data by reducing the sensitivity level, a process must have the ? privilege. Such
a process is known as being privileged for tag t. Since only the process that allocates the tag
gets the ? privilege (here that is process p), user data confidentiality is enforced. Levels 0
and 1 are used analogously for integrity data flow constraints.
Process-level tracking granularity introduces the problem of cross-contamination. Asbestos
encourages data flow containment by using different tags for data that belong to different
users. When a single unprivileged process receives such data, its tracking label contains
all the tags used to protect each individual user’s data. This reflects that the process has
inspected sensitive data on behalf of all users. Any output data of this process is of limited
use because it is “cross-contaminated” with all the tags that the process has received. To
remove tags used by specific users, the process must have the ? privilege for each such
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tag. Possessing the ? privilege though means that a process may entirely ignore data flow
restrictions for a user’s tag. Cross-contamination therefore hampers Asbestos’ promise for
data flow enforcement.
Asbestos avoids cross-contamination using the concept of event processes. An event process
is a reactive process-like abstraction, which efficiently emulates multiple isolated processes
automatically forked on the reception of a message. When an event process receives a message
protected with a unique user tag, a new instance of the process is forked with an appropriate
tracking label to process the message. Any subsequent messages sent by the instance are
only labeled with the particular user tag, avoiding cross-contamination. On completion, the
state of this instance is erased, and another instance is forked when a new message arrives.
The operating system controls this mechanism and prevents data flow across instances of the
same event process.
Expressing high-level data flow policies in Asbestos is challenging. The implementation of
taint tracking inside the operating system is geared towards performance and expressiveness
but not towards usability. Asbestos may enforce arbitrary data flow policies: it invokes
checking operation to check policy compliance on every message dispatch and does not use
tracking operations. For the checking operations to be efficient, the taint meta-data, i.e.
DIFC labels, are simple collections of tags and levels that are easy to compare. As a result,
high-level data flow policies must be translated to low-level taint tracking policies that di-
rectly manipulate, amongst others, tags, sensitivity levels, the ? privilege and set up event
processes. Asbestos assumes that this translation is performed by trusted code in each ap-
plication. In practice, this is an error-prone process that may invalidate all the data flow
guarantees of Asbestos if a mistake is made.
To facilitate this translation, a policy language has been suggested to declare data flow [EK08].
Developers provide a high-level policy file that describes the processes involved in the data
flow and the expected pair-wise communication between them, e.g. “process a can send mes-
sages to processes b and c, but b can only reply to a”. Asbestos automatically translates this
data flow policy to a taint tracking policy and executes the corresponding binaries with the
correct tags and privileges.
The main contribution of Asbestos is a runtime taint tracking system design with user-
defined data flow policies and low performance penalty for applications. Good performance
is achieved by three important design choices: process-level tracking granularity, low-level
DIFC-based taint meta-data and message-based inter-process communication. Process-level
tracking introduces overhead only when a process communicates with its environment and
not on each internal operation (e.g. for each variable assignment). When a checking opera-
tion is needed, the tag-based label model for taint meta-data enables self-contained checks
that do not rely on a centralised data structure (e.g. Jif’s principal hierarchy [ML00]). Fi-
nally, message-based asynchronous communication decouples the sender and the receiver,
and no additional action has to be taken to avoid disclosing information if checking opera-
tions prevent communication. This means that when a label check fails, the message can be
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discarded safely (e.g. the sender never learns that the receiver was unable to receive the mes-
sage). These design choices have influenced subsequent runtime taint tracking systems, such
as HiStar [ZBWKM06], Flume [KYB+07] and DEFCon (presented in Chapters 3 and 4).
Asbestos is hard to adopt from a practical viewpoint. To enforce data flow, Asbestos requires
both changes to the operating system and a non-trivial application porting effort. Runtime
taint tracking changes several parts of the operating system, including the file system, to
enable label persistence [VEK+07] and error reporting to enable debugging data flow policy
errors [EK08]. Application developers must compartmentalise their applications to avoid
code that handles data with different data flow requirements and adopt a message-passing
model for inter-process communication. These changes undermine potential adoption be-
cause they require a steep learning curve for application developers and result in a significant
maintenance effort for the operating system.
HiStar. HiStar [ZBWKM06] is an operating system that leverages runtime taint tracking
and aims to avoid covert communication channels, which reduce its ability to enforce data
flow. It is influenced by Asbestos and reuses its label model for taint meta-data. In contrast to
Asbestos, HiStar requires processes to explicitly change their own labels before exchanging
data and thus avoids Asbestos’ problem of implicit taint meta-data changes (§2.3.2). In
addition, HiStar monitors the storage resources allocated to processes and prevents storage
exhaustion, which can be manipulated as a covert channel. These changes improve HiStar’s
data isolation and data flow enforcement.
Another contribution of HiStar is its support for enforcement of data flow across multiple
machines. In Asbestos, only processes with the declassification privilege for each tag in
their tracking label are able to exchange data with other machines. This reflects the sys-
tem’s inability to track data flow outside the boundary of the operating system. DStar,
HiStar’s framework and protocol for distributed taint tracking, introduces the notion of an
exporter [ZBWM08]. Exporters enable communication across two processes that execute on
different DIFC systems. To enforce data flow, exporters rely on the local enforcement of a
DIFC operating system and only impose checking operations on data flows across machines.
However, since DIFC tags are specific to a machine, there is no inherent correspondence of
tags across machines, which can be used in cross-system checking operations. As a result,
DStar establishes new, globally meaningful DIFC tags that correspond to the local tags used
in each machine.
HiStar’s kernel is designed around a small set of constructs; threads, address spaces and
memory segments, whose interactions are monitored using DIFC labels. The tracking gran-
ularity in HiStar is the memory segment. This is similar from a practical viewpoint to the
process granularity of Asbestos but allows HiStar to support shared memory concurrency
in addition to message passing. To avoid covert communication channels, HiStar does not
permit changes to the labels of most kernel constructs after initialisation.
HiStar supports a Unix-like environment implemented on top of a DIFC-based kernel. Ab-
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stractions such as processes, file descriptors or signals are supported at the user level as
untrusted library code. Compatibility with Unix facilitates porting of existing software to
HiStar with minimal effort, easing the transition from an existing Unix-based environment.
Nevertheless, most of the practical challenges for Asbestos’ adoption, i.e. operating system
maintenance and application compartmentalisation, still apply to HiStar rendering its adop-
tion comparably challenging.
Flume. Flume [KYB+07] is a successor system to both Asbestos and HiStar. Similar to
Asbestos and HiStar, it does taint tracking at the process granularity and uses DIFC-based
tracking meta-data. In contrast to Asbestos and HiStar, Flume focuses on practicality. It
adds taint tracking capabilities to Linux as a user-level library and introduces a simplified
DIFC label model that is easier to understand and use.
Flume is implemented on Linux as a user-level reference monitor that intercepts system
calls. This design facilitates adoption because Flume benefits from regular Linux updates
and broad device support. Linux applications that do not use taint tracking execute without
modification. Applications that leverage taint tracking to enforce data flow are linked to
a custom libc library that interposes calls to the reference monitor. The downside when
compared to HiStar is that the trusted computing base increases significantly because it
encompasses the Linux kernel.
Flume’s DIFC label model avoids Asbestos’ sensitivity levels for simplicity and only uses tags.
To maintain the ability to enforce both confidentiality and integrity requirements about the
data flow in applications, Flume assigns two labels to each process: the confidentiality (Lc)
and the integrity label (Li). The “can-flow-to” relation in Flume only uses tags. For confi-
dentiality, data flow is permitted from process A to process B if all tags in A’s confidentiality
label are present in B’s confidentiality label (i.e. A’s confidentiality label is a subset of B’s)
and, for integrity, all tags in B’s integrity label are present in A’s integrity label (i.e. A’s
integrity label is a superset of B’s). As an example, a process with tag t but not tag d in
its confidentiality label can send messages to a process with Lc = {t, d} but not to a process
with Lc = {}. A process may allocate a tag and use it in either of its labels.
Flume’s label model consolidates the privileges of clearance and declassification. On alloca-
tion of a new a tag t, Flume assigns to the requesting process the privilege to add the tag to
its labels (t+) and the privilege to remove it from its labels (t−). When using t to enforce
data confidentiality, having t+ gives a process privilege to receive data protected with t, i.e.
clearance. After receiving the data, such a process is restricted by t and thus cannot com-
municate freely. The only other processes that are able to receive its output are processes
with t in their confidentiality labels. The process may avoid this restriction by possessing
t−, which is known for confidentiality as the declassification privilege. A Flume process with
data flow requirements typically allocates a new tag but shares with other processes only
one of the two privileges.
By extending Linux, Flume avoids the maintenance cost of a new operating system. Adapting
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applications to take advantage of taint tracking though still requires significant effort. The
authors of Flume report that a version of MoinMoin wiki, a Python web application, required
changes to 1000 lines of original MoinMoin code and the addition of 1000 lines of C++ code
in launchers for setting up labels and privileges. Such effort renders Flume’s adoption in
domains such as the web challenging. In the web, most applications are written in interpreted
languages, and their authors strive to minimise platform dependence by eliminating the use
of features specific to the operating system. At the same time, it is web applications that
most often handle data of multiple users and violate the POLP by employing over-privileged
components. As described in the next section, runtime taint tracking systems designed for
web applications typically track data flow in the language interpreter and use variable- or
character-level tracking granularity to avoid modifications to existing code.
Web applications
Runtime taint tracking is a popular technique in the domain of web security and privacy. Web
applications typically store sensitive data on behalf of many of users and this makes them
an attractive attack target. As explained in Section 2.1.1, the most common attacks on web
applications, i.e. injection attacks, exploit developer errors in the propagation of untrusted
user data. Multiple researchers suggested runtime taint tracking systems to avoid injection
vulnerabilities [NTGG+05, VNJ+07] or, more generally, to guarantee that a web application
processes, stores and discloses user data according to a data flow policy [YWZK09, SBL09].
In contrast to system software development, most languages used in the web are interpreted,
e.g. PHP, Ruby and Javascript. Runtime taint tracking implementations in the interpreter
are easier to adopt compared to a new operating system because they require less pervasive
changes to an organisation’s infrastructure (although they still incur the maintenance cost
of a proprietary interpreter). Nevertheless, such systems have proven effective in enforcing
data flow because they focus on well-understood data flow requirements of a single domain,
integrate with the programming language and take advantage of common components in
the web architecture (e.g. relational databases). Various implementations exist both for the
server-side and client-side.
This section begins server-side. Runtime taint tracking systems here either improve the
security of the web server that hosts the business logic of a web application or guarantee the
privacy of the user data that it processes. The section then covers the problem of how taint
meta-data persist across different sessions and finishes with similar taint tracking systems
for the client-side layer of web applications in browsers.
Server-side security. Runtime taint tracking is an established technique for improving se-
curity of server-side applications written in interpreted languages [Doc12, Fla08, NTGG+05].
Perl and Ruby support taint tracking by default but the checking operations that they im-
pose do not target XSS and SQLI [Foy07, Fla08]. Subsequent research has lead to im-
proved taint tracking systems, which effectively prevent common web application vulnera-
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bilities, including XSS, SQLI and vulnerabilities that result from insufficient access control
checks [NTGG+05, BMW+11, DKZ09].
The built-in taint tracking implementation in Ruby, known as the Ruby taint mode [Fla08],
is representative of most systems described in this section. It is derived from Perl’s similar
mode [Doc12]. In contrast to the operating systems of the previous section, Ruby uses
an object-level tracking granularity. For each object, Ruby stores one bit of taint meta-
data that marks the object as “tainted” or “untainted”. When a script is executed, the
Ruby interpreter marks each object, which stores data that originates from the external
environment, as tainted (e.g. the objects that contain the script’s command-line parameters).
The interpreter automatically invokes tracking operations to propagate taint meta-data each
time a Ruby object is used to derive another object. For example, when a string’s slice
method is called, the resulting string slices inherit the taint meta-data of the original string.
Similarly, when strings are concatenated, the result taint is the union of the taints of the
concatenated strings. Developers may explicitly set the taint meta-data of any object using
the taint and untaint methods. Developers should also inspect tainted objects and mark
them as untainted when their value is considered secure. Ruby’s checking operations then use
the one bit of taint meta-data to abort dangerous operations, which should not use tainted
parameters. Examples of such operations are importing scripts with require or the use of
eval with a tainted string parameter.
The main limitation of Ruby’s taint mode is the lack of configuration options with regard
to the data flow policy enforced. Developers can only set the value of the global variable
$SAFE and select one of four predefined sets of Ruby operations to be protected with checking
operations. Ruby thus can only enforce one of four predefined integrity data flow policies, all
of which focus on isolating untrusted scripts from their environment rather than preventing
web application vulnerabilities. The predefined data flow policies are, however, sufficient to
avoid some classes of injection attacks, such as Shell injection or Eval injection. The lack of
protection from XSS and SQLI attacks has lead frameworks such as GuardRails [BMW+11]
(which is covered later in this section) to implement additional taint tracking libraries that
ignore the built-in mechanism.
The first attempt to use taint tracking focused on injection attacks in web applications was
in PHP. Anh Nguyen-Tuong et al. [NTGG+05] suggested that performing taint tracking at
the granularity of individual string characters enables the taint tracking system to automat-
ically mitigate injection attacks without developer intervention. With character-level taint
tracking, the system maintains taint meta-data about which individual characters originate
from the user and which from the application. This information enables the taint tracking
system to sanitise transparently only those characters that originated from the user—the
sanitised string can then safely be used by the application. Instead, a system that main-
tains variable- or object-level taint meta-data can only discard the tainted string as a whole.
Any attempts for sanitisation of the whole string would introduce false positives because
application-generated code that is part of the string would also be sanitised.
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Anh Nguyen-Tuong et al. implement their system as a modified PHP interpreter, which
stores one bit of taint meta-data per character and imposes tracking operations on each PHP
string manipulation function. In contrast to Ruby and Perl, tracking operations propagate
taint meta-data per individual character: e.g. when substr is invoked, the characters in
the result string are only tainted if the corresponding characters in the original string were
tainted. The character-level meta-data are used by the system’s checking operations when
the application generates its HTML responses (e.g. using print statements) or issues SQL
queries (e.g. using calls to mysql query). In the former case, the checking operations replace
tainted string characters with HTML equivalents (e.g. < with &lt;). In the later case,
the checking operations parse the SQL query and reject it if tainted SQL identifiers or
symbols are detected. This technique of using different checking operations according to the
operation that the application performs is called Context Sensitive String Evaluation (CSSE)
by Pietraszek and Berghe [PB05] and was later extended by GuardRails [BMW+11].
Taint tracking systems that store taint meta-data at the granularity of individual string char-
acters have also been implemented for Java web applications. Halfond et al. [HOM08] use
positive tainting, i.e. they mark only those strings that are declared inside the application
as tainted. This design is effective against injection attacks, even when the taint tracking
system fails to identify untrusted sources of user data. It also requires that developers ex-
plicitly mark external sources of data as trusted (e.g. files stored in the local file system)
and may increase the runtime overhead for applications that primarily process trusted data.
Chin and Wagner [CW09] detail the tracking operations required to achieve character-level
tracking while ensuring that existing applications continue to work without modifications.
Both systems are realised using a modified Java class library in which selected classes are
augmented with taint meta-data and tracking operations, e.g. String and StringBuilder.
This approach enables taint tracking with limited changes to the Java platform but can-
not track taint for Java primitive types. Additionally, modifications to the class library
introduce incompatibilities with Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) of different vendors due to
undocumented assumptions about the implementation of library classes [CW09].
GuardRails [BMW+11] is a runtime taint tracking system for Ruby-on-Rails web appli-
cations. GuardRails performs character-level taint tracking but it stores a reference to a
transformer object as taint meta-data. The transformer object contains a list of transfor-
mation (i.e. sanitisation) functions along with the context in which each function should
be invoked. For example, a transformer object for XSS may specify different sanitisation
functions when a tainted string is found inside the context of a <script> tag compared to
the context of an HTML page’s head. In terms of taint tracking system design, transformer
objects enable the developer to choose arbitrary operations to be invoked when the system’s
checking operations detect violations of data flow policy and enables developers to control
which program statements trigger checking operations.
In contrast to PHP and Java, Ruby is a pure object-oriented language with powerful meta-
programming features that allow applications to augment existing library functions and
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classes (see Chapter 6 for more details). Using these features, GuardRails is implemented as
a Ruby library without changes to the language interpreter.
Runtime taint tracking has also been used to prevent authentication and access control
vulnerabilities in web applications. Dalton et al. [DKZ09] observe that a runtime taint
tracking system can infer when a user is authenticated, independently of how authentication
is implemented in a web application. Their system, Nemesis, extends the PHP interpreter
to store two bits of tracking meta-data per string. The first bit, referred to as the “taint”
bit, marks strings that originate from the user. The second, the “credentials” bit, marks
the user password when it is fetched from the database during a login attempt. Nemesis’
tracking operations propagate each of the two bits of meta-data similar to Ruby, e.g. using
union-based semantics when two characters are collapsed. Nemesis imposes a single checking
operation on PHP equality operations. When a string with the “tainted” bit set is equal
to a string with the “credentials” bit set, Nemesis assumes that the equality indicates a
successful authentication attempt. This allows a shadow authentication and access control
system to detect when a user logs in and to prevent security vulnerabilities when developers
omit access control checks in their applications.
Server-side privacy. Runtime taint tracking systems were also suggested to protect the
privacy of user data in the server. The taint tracking policies that such systems support are
more configurable compared to their counterparts that prevent injection vulnerabilities; de-
velopers may modify the taint meta-data and control when checking operations are invoked.
Runtime taint tracking systems that improve server-side security are designed to track data
flows specific to injection attacks and rarely offer any configuration options (GuardRails’
transformer objects enable control over the checking operations). Instead, user data privacy
depends on the semantics of each application, and there is no single data flow policy suitable
for all applications. Therefore, to guarantee user data privacy, the taint tracking system
must be able to enforce arbitrary data flow policies.
Resin is a runtime taint tracking system for PHP web applications, which improves server-side
security and can be used to guarantee user-data privacy [YWZK09]. For example, Resin can
enforce that a user’s password is never disclosed by an application despite implementation
errors. In Resin, taint tracking is performed at the character granularity and the taint
meta-data and the tracking and checking operations are all configurable.
Resin requires developers to annotate the user data that they want to protect with references
to policy objects. In contrast to label-centric taint meta-data, policy objects specify the data
flow policy as PHP code. For example, assume that a web application must ensure that a
password is only released via email to the user that it belongs to. Instead of encoding this
as a label attached to data, a policy object may store the name of the password owner, logic
to compare the name to the current user and actions to take when these two do not match.
To encode data flow policy similar to this, Resin policy objects expose a check method that
receives information about the context of where user data are about to be used. An example
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1 class PasswordPolicy extends Policy {
2 private $email;
3 function construct($email) {
4 $this−>email = $email;
5 }
6 function check($context) {
7 if ($context[”type”] == ”email” && $context[”email”] == $this−>email)
8 return;
9 global $Me;
10 if ($context[”type”] == ”http” && $Me−>privChair) return;
11 throw new Exception(”unauthorized disclosure”);
12 }
13 }
Listing 2.4: A Resin policy object that ensures user passwords are never disclosed via email to the
wrong recipient [YWZK09].
of this policy, as implemented by Resin’s authors [YWZK09], appears in Listing 2.4.
Resin’s tracking operations are invoked on string operations to propagate references to policy
objects. In most cases (e.g. in calls to substr or in string concatenation), this is straight-
forward. Policy objects though may need to be merged, for example, when two characters
are added to calculate a checksum. In these cases, Resin merges the policy objects involved
and generates a new policy object that calls the check methods of both initial objects. This
is another version of Ruby’s union semantics. However, this mechanism in Resin can be
controlled by overriding the merge method of policy objects.
Resin also supports configurable checking operations implemented as filter objects. A generic
filter object is attached by default to all PHP functions that communicate data between the
application and its environment, e.g. functions used for file input/output. Each filter object
implements two methods, read and write. When data are returned from or passed to a
function protected by a filter object, the corresponding filter method is invoked. Typically,
the filter method inspects any policy objects associated with the data and calls their check
method. According to its result, the function call may be aborted. In the password example,
it is a filter object attached to PHP’s mail function that calls the policy object’s check
method and guarantees that the policy in Listing 2.4 is enforced.
Resin is the most flexible character-level taint tracking system. Due to its ability to configure
taint tracking policy, it is suitable for guaranteeing user data privacy and for improving se-
curity. Resin is implemented as a custom PHP interpreter and its authors suggest additional
changes to the web server, i.e. to have the web server directly call the check methods of
policy objects attached to static files. However, unless taint tracking is considered part of
the PHP language specification and is officially adopted, third party implementations are
impractical. As the PHP manual puts it:
“modifications to the Zend9 engine should be avoided. Changes here result in
9Zend is the name of the official PHP interpreter.
67
Background
incompatibilities with the rest of the world, and hardly anyone will ever adapt to
specially patched Zend engines. Modifications can’t be detached from the main
PHP sources and are overridden with the next update using the “official” source
repositories. Therefore, this method is generally considered bad practice”
In the past, taint tracking support has been suggested as a feature to the PHP community
but it has not been adopted, partly because of fears that it may lead to a false sense of
security for inexperienced developers [Ven06].
Taint meta-data persistence. Data flow in web applications typically involves a database.
Using a database, traditional injection attacks such as XSS become more effective: an adver-
sary may store a persistent malicious string and attack every user without requiring that each
user clicks on a suspicious link. Web applications may also store in the database sensitive
data for multiple users. Thus, bugs in the web application may result in unauthorised data
disclosure for any of its users. Runtime taint tracking systems cannot effectively improve
security or user data privacy without tracking data flow in the database. For example, if a
user-provided string is stored in the database and taint meta-data are lost in the process,
that string may still be used in injection attacks when the application later retrieves it.
The first systems that performed taint tracking in web applications did not store taint meta-
data in the database [NTGG+05, PB05, HOM08]. Pietraszek and Berghe [PB05] treat all
data stored in the database as untrusted and mark them as tainted when fetched by the web
application. This approach may lead to false positives if the application sanitises user data
before it stores them in the database. The alternative, i.e. considering all data stored in the
database as untainted, is prone to false negatives. A false negative may result in undetected
injection attacks when the web application omits sanitisation.
DIFC-J [PB05] associates taint meta-data with individual database columns. It is a Java
taint tracking system that tracks taint at string granularity. Developers specify the taint
meta-data of each database column. When the application attempts to store data in a
database column, a checking operation verifies that the meta-data of the input matches the
meta-data of the column. When data is read from a column, a tracking operation sets the
meta-data of the output to the meta-data of the column. Web applications, however, may
store in a single column data that belong to multiple users, e.g. user passwords. DIFC-J’s
approach requires that all such data are labeled the same. Such a design therefore does
not support the use of separate labels per user and prevents the taint tracking system from
tracking the data of each user individually.
Resin improves upon DIFC-J and associates taint meta-data with individual database cells.
Resin initially intercepts SQL CREATE TABLE queries and rewrites them to introduce one
additional meta-data column for each data column in the query. When SQL queries insert
data to the database, Resin determines the policy objects that correspond to the data of
each cell, serialises them and stores them in the meta-data column. Similarly, when data
are fetched from the database, any associated policy objects are deserialised and attached
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to the result query. From the perspective of the taint tracking system, this design fully
maintains the character-level taint meta-data and renders the database equivalent to any
other non-persistent data structure.
A comprehensive attempt for storing taint meta-data into the database is DBTaint [DC10].
DBTaint follows Resin’s design and stores taint meta-data separately for each database
cell. In contrast to Resin, DBTaint uses the composite types available in PostgreSQL10 and
extends all default data types with a taint meta-data field. DBTaint is implemented as a
custom JDBC driver, which transparently rewrites application queries.
DBTaint supports prepared statements that, due to composite types, require additional
taint parameters. When using prepared statements applications bind data to placeholders in
queries using numeric indexes. Since the indexes that the application provides will no longer
match the indexes in the transformed queries, DBTaint modifies the bind indexes provided
by the application with indexes that correspond to how the query is rewritten. Overall,
DBTaint does not require any changes to the database server or the application. It may also
be retrofitted to support most taint tracking systems only with minor edits to the type of
the taint meta-data that it stores.
Client-side security. Runtime taint tracking has been used at the client-side, i.e. in the
the browser, to reduce the impact of XSS vulnerabilities in web applications. Vogt et al.
[VNJ+07] suggest a taint tracking system for Javascript, which stops XSS attacks in the
browser as they occur. The taint tracking system detects flows of sensitive data from the
browser to any domain other than the page’s initial origin and asks the user for approval when
this happens. In contrast to server-side systems, the injected Javascript code is executed but
the taint tracking system stops its attempts to leak data. Taint tracking thus acts as an
additional security layer in the browser, which is independent of a developer’s ability to
eliminate XSS vulnerabilities.
Vogt et al. follow a design similar to Ruby’s taint mode, i.e. variable-level tracking granu-
larity, one bit of tracking meta-data and non-configurable tracking and checking operations.
Sensitive user data, such as the session cookie, which identifies a client to the web server, are
marked as tainted. Checking operations use the taint meta-data to prevent sensitive data
flow to third-party domains. Notice though that, at the client-side, the benevolent developer
assumption does not hold: malicious scripts injected via XSS may actively try to evade the
taint tracking system. This forces the runtime taint tracking system to track both control
and implicit data flow (§2.3.2).
Control flow occurs when information is encoded in the control statements of a program.
For example, consider the script in Listing 2.5 injected via XSS to a page. When executed,
the script inspects the user’s tainted cookie and tests the session identifier for a given value
(line 10). If the script is allowed to contact a remote server as a result of the comparison,
10PostreSQL Documentation: Composite Types, http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.1/static/
rowtypes.html, last accessed: 5/9/2012
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1 <script type=”text/javascript”>
2 if (document.cookie==null) return;
3 var cookies=document.cookie.split(”;”);
4 for (i=0; i<cookies.length; i++)
5 {
6 var k=cookies[i].substr(0,cookies[i].indexOf(”=”));
7 var v=cookies[i].substr(cookies[i].indexOf(”=”)+1);
8 if (k==”SSID”)
9 {
10 if (v==”AAYSMkxHM5324JPQ”)
11 {
12 var l=document.getElementById(’logo’);
13 l.src=”http://attack.com/img52.jpg”;
14 break;
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 </script>
Listing 2.5: Control flow in Javascript. The script discloses a particular value of the session identifier
(line 10) to a remote server without explicit data flow via variable assignments. The image URL
(line 13) may or may not correspond to an actual image.
e.g. by changing the src property of an image (line 13), this conveys to the remote server
attack.com the outcome of the comparison.
To track control flow, the taint tracking system associates one bit of taint meta-data to
scopes of code, i.e. sets of statements, which may execute as a result of a control statement.
In the example above, a scope spans all the instructions from lines 12 to 14. A scope becomes
tainted when it is executed as a result of an if or while statement with a tainted expression
in its condition. Every variable assignment that occurs inside a tainted scope generates a
tainted result and every static value defined there is considered tainted. In the example of
Listing 2.5, the constant string in line 13 would be considered tainted, and the system would
prevent data disclosure. For implicit data flow, Vogt et al. employ a simplistic form of static
data flow analysis. Nevertheless, their system is inherently unable to prevent XSS attacks
that do not involve a remote domain, e.g. an XSS attack that covertly changes the user’s
password will go undetected.
Another source of security vulnerabilities in the client is a browser’s extensibility mechanism.
In Firefox, extensions are implemented as privileged Javascript code that freely interacts with
individual pages and remote domains. This is in contrast to untrusted scripts embedded in
web pages, which are restricted to manipulate pages only from the same domain. In practice,
however, an untrusted web page script may trick a vulnerable extension script to execute
on its behalf, for example, to eval untrusted Javascript code. If this happens, the code is
executed with the extention’s full privileges, and thus a web page script may take control of
the user’s browser.
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Djeric and Geol [DG10] observe that most extension vulnerabilities in Firefox can be modeled
as violations of the integrity of data flows and suggest to use runtime taint tracking to
mitigate attacks. Their system marks all objects defined in untrusted page scripts as tainted
and checks plugin calls to eval and dynamic function calls for potential tainted parameters.
Dynamic function calls can be used to execute arbitrary functions if the target function of
the call is chosen by an attacker. Djeric and Geol implement taint tracking by modifying the
Javascript interpreter following the simple design from Ruby: object granularity, one bit of
taint meta-data and checking operations attached to specific Firefox functions.
Client-side privacy. Web applications typically combine client-side code from multiple
sources to display rich user interfaces, create mashups or show advertisements. Existing
browser security mechanisms, however, cannot control how user data flow to different servers
in the presence of third-party source code. Researchers have suggested browser-based taint
tracking systems to analyse data flow [DJLS10] and to enable the browser to enforce data
flow constraints in web applications [YNKM09, SBL09].
Jang et al. [DJLS10] implement taint tracking in the Chrome browser and use it to analyse
50,000 popular websites for privacy-violating data flows. Similar to Resin, their system offers
configurable taint tracking policies. Users may attach generic Javascript objects to variables
as taint meta-data and configure the location and actions of checking operations. In contrast
to Resin, their implementation also tracks control data flow by associating taint meta-data
with scopes of code. Their system favours simple strings for taint meta-data and does not
provide extensible tracking operations.
The flexibility in devising taint tracking policies allowed Jang et al. to detect various privacy-
violating data flows at a large scale. The authors crawled websites while tracking different
types of privacy-violating data flows. Examples include monitoring of user mouse movements
and attempts to disclose the history of visited pages. Their results identified hundreds of
offending web sites, showing the practicality of taint tracking for data flow analysis. Since
their system is purely dynamic, however, it cannot detect implicit data flow. This allows
websites that are aware of the taint tracking system to evade analysis.
BFlow [YNKM09] and xBook [SBL09] are two taint tracking systems that can additionally
enforce data flow policy in the browser. They suggest to do this for third-party applications
embedded in web sites that offer extensibility mechanisms, e.g. Facebook. When such a
third-party application receives sensitive user data from the host website, it is typically able
to communicate with external servers without restrictions. BFlow and xBook suggest to
track the sensitive information that third-party applications receive and to enforce that their
external communications adhere to a user-approved data flow policy.
BFlow and xBook are effective against malicious code and support configurable data flow
policies for different applications. They constrain malicious code through tracking taint
meta-data at “zone” granularity. Zones are groups of scripts that monitor and control
communication with other scripts and external servers. Communication across zones occurs
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through asynchronous message passing. This avoids the implicit flows inherent to tracking
taint at variable granularity (§2.3.2). To support configurable data flow policies, both systems
use DIFC labels as taint meta-data. Labels are initialised per zone according to a user-
approved manifest file or according to the server’s response. Checking operations employ the
“can-flow-to” relation to enforce data flow policy.
The main limitation for BFlow and xBook is their reliance on server-side counterparts to
track data flow effectively. In BFlow, the server is expected to return correctly labeled
data according to the label of the incoming request and process data with different labels
separately. BFlow’s authors suggest using an DIFC-based operating system for this purpose.
In xBook, a dedicated trusted server hosts third-party applications and tracks data flow
with similar mechanisms as in the browser. Such requirements make the adoption of the
taint tracking system hard as neither users nor web application developers may benefit from
data flow enforcement without the other party also adopting the suggested system, as well.
Hails [GLS+12], a similar system for confidential data privacy in the web, requires both server
and client-side components, and in addition, web applications must be written in Haskell.
The above discussion highlights the applicability of taint tracking in the web, spanning from
tackling well-understood problems, such as injection vulnerabilities, to enforcing application-
specific data flow policy. Most of the systems, however, that implement taint tracking intro-
duce unrealistic requirements (e.g. use of a proprietary interpreter or a modified browser),
which hamper adoption.
Java applications and taint tracking via code rewriting
Data flow analysis and enforcement is useful in other application domains. Modern mobile
applications and traditional desktop applications, for example, handle and communicate user
data in practically unconstrained fashion. Privacy-conscious users are limited to use only
applications from developers that they fully trust. The breed of DIFC operating systems
presented earlier provides a pathway for enforcing data flow policy in the future but it is
seldom practical for analysing existing applications or enforcing data flow without significant
re-engineering effort.
Different researchers have suggested taint tracking systems which incur few changes to the
execution platform either because they focus on the Java class library or because they apply
taint tracking via code rewriting. Both techniques are easier to maintain and adopt than
a novel operating system. As presented in the previous section, easy-to-maintain imple-
mentations of taint tracking for Java leverage the class library of the language and avoid
modifying the bytecode interpreter [CW09, HOM08]. Applications such as web browsers, in-
stant messengers and text editors, however, are often written in languages that are compiled
to machine code. To support taint tracking there, code rewriting is a simple but sometimes
inefficient choice. This section concludes with research related to data flow tracking in Java
applications and with code rewriting.
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Java applications. Taint tracking systems that track data flow inside Java applications
are implemented either by changing the semantics of bytecode operations to propagate taint
meta-data [EGC+10, NSCT08] or by using a modified class library [CW09, HOM08] as pre-
sented previously. A customised bytecode interpreter inside the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
is more accurate because it can track data flow that occurs via primitive types but, as similar
systems for PHP [NTGG+05] and Python [YWZK09], is hard to maintain in practice.
TaintDroid [EGC+10] is an extension to the Android operating system11 that analyses data
flow within third-party applications. Android applications are written in Java and use a
manifest file to specify the permissions that they require from the operating system. Android
permissions control application access to sensitive user data but are limited in practice. If,
for example, the user accepts an application’s requests for the internet access permission and
for a permission that gives access to sensitive user data, there is no mechanism to track if
the application discloses the data that it receives. TaintDroid’s purpose is to detect such
behaviour and enable real-time privacy monitoring on existing Android applications.
TaintDroid performs taint tracking for DEX, a machine language equivalent to Java bytecode
that runs on Android’s Dalvik VM. TaintDroid executes DEX bytecode and stores 32 bits of
taint meta-data per DEX variable. This is equivalent to tracking data flow at the granularity
of Java variables. Each of the 32 bits of taint meta-data corresponds to one source of
sensitive information, e.g. one bit marks data that originated from the GPS location sensor
and another bit marks data from the phone agenda. TaintDroid propagates taint meta-data
in each DEX operation following similar semantics as Ruby’s taint mode, considering each
meta-data bit individually (i.e. bits at different positions are never collapsed in a single bit).
When the analysed application sends information to external servers, tracking operations
log attempts with non-zero taint meta-data. Since applications are not expected to evade
taint tracking actively, control and implicit flows are not addressed. Enck et al. [EGC+10]
use TaintDroid to analyse multiple popular Android applications and report that one third
of the tested applications disclose to third parties private data, such as the device ID and
the SIM serial number.
A JVM that offers data flow enforcement for generic Java applications is Trishul [NSCT08,
NSCT07]. Similar to TaintDroid, Trishul uses a set of bits as taint meta-data and a variable-
level tracking granularity. In contrast to TaintDroid, Trishul supports configurable data
flow policies. Using a policy file, the user controls the instantiation of taint meta-data as
well as the location and actions of checking operations. Trishul is implemented by modify-
ing an open source JVM that is no longer maintained [BHL00]. To improve performance,
extensions of Trishul integrate with the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler and take advantage
of unused Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE) registers to store taint meta-data [NSCT08].
Nevertheless, Nair et al. report a 167% overhead compared to the unmodified JVM when
using Trishul with CPU-bound applications.
Trishul assumes a malicious developer and thus tracks control and implicit data flow (§2.3.2).
11The Android Open Source Project (AOSP), http://source.android.com/, last accessed: 13/9/2012
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This is achieved by combining runtime taint tracking with static data flow analysis [NSCT07],
which identifies the set of variables that are updated in each program scope. This analysis
occurs when a class is first loaded. Every time that Trishul is about to execute a control
statement, it uses the results of the static analysis to identify all variables that may change
in the statement’s alternative branches. It then updates the taint meta-data of all those
variables with the meta-data of the control expression independently of whether each partic-
ular branch is executed. This guarantees that every variable has updated taint meta-data,
even if the variable is not updated as part of the specific branch taken at runtime.
Tracking implicit data flow in Trishul is more secure but may result in overly conservative
meta-data propagation and increased numbers of false positives. The important limitation,
however, with both systems is that, without support from the official platform vendors,
adopting a custom JVM is challenging in practice. For example, TaintDroid’s implemen-
tation in Android 2.1 was quickly made obsolete by the JIT-enabled Dalvik release with
Android 2.212.
Source and binary code rewriting. An alternative technique to implement runtime
taint tracking is code rewriting. Instead of modifying the execution environment, a code
rewriting system transforms each application to propagate taint meta-data explicitly. This
is achieved by introducing additional statements in the language that the application is
written in. The main advantage of code rewriting is that the resulting applications are com-
patible with existing execution environments. This avoids the maintenance effort for custom
operating systems or interpreters and facilitates adoption. For applications distributed in
binary form, code rewriting via binary instrumentation or even performed by an emulator
are both practical alternatives compared to custom hardware [SLD04, CXN+05]. An impor-
tant limitation of code rewriting is its runtime overhead. Explicit tracking operations are
invoked before each program operation, and they are often slower than the program opera-
tion that they intercept. Therefore an important challenge for code rewriting systems is how
to optimise the tracking operations without sacrificing the precision of taint propagation.
Xu et al. [XBS06] use code rewriting to implement runtime taint tracking for C applications.
Their system enforces integrity data flow policies to prevent injection-style memory exploits,
such as the dereferencing of a user-provided pointer or using untrusted user data for printf’s
format parameter. The taint tracking policy in their system uses one bit of taint meta-data
per memory byte, tracking operations similar to Ruby and a simple policy language to
configure the location and actions of checking operations.
Xu et al. propagate taint meta-data by transforming every C assignment and arithmetic/bit
expression to fetch the taint of the values involved and to taint the result appropriately.
Taint meta-data are stored in a global bit-array indexed by memory address. This correctly
captures the shared taint meta-data when a single memory location is aliased by multiple
12Dalvik JIT, Android Developers Blog, http://android-developers.blogspot.co.uk/2010/05/
dalvik-jit.html, last accessed: 13/9/2012
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pointers but introduces significant overhead: transformed C operations on local variables
now require access to a global array. Such accesses disrupt locality optimisations performed
by the compiler. Xu et al. report that their unoptimised transformations cause an application
slowdown by a factor of five and suggest a number of optimisations for storing taint meta-
data to improve performance. Despite these optimisations, their final prototype slows CPU-
intensive applications by 76% on average.
Chang et al. [CSL08] suggest a similar system that targets C applications and uses source
code transformations. To reduce the impact on performance at runtime, the system performs
static taint analysis on the transformed application. The taint analysis identifies portions of
the application, in which data flow is known in advance therefore no data flow tracking has to
occur at runtime. This approach significantly improves performance but its applicability in
dynamic languages that are harder to analyse statically remains to be explored. Nevertheless,
we later show (cf. §5) that a similar approach can be applied to dynamic languages and can
lead to similar performance improvements.
Argos [PSB06] modifies an emulator, Qemu [Bel05], to implement taint tracking. In contrast
to Xu et al. Argos does not create binaries that perform taint tracking explicitly. Instead,
Argos extends the target code that Qemu generates while translating blocks of instructions
for execution to also propagate taint meta-data. This technique is similar to source code
rewriting but it has the advantage that it can be applied on third-party binaries even when no
source code is available. The disadvantage of the system, however, is increased performance
overhead at runtime, which makes applications execute 15–30 times slower. For this reason,
Argos was primarily suggested for malware analysis.
A similar system that targets Windows x86 binaries is TaintEraser [ZJS+11]. TaintEraser
rewrites x86 instructions to propagate one bit of taint meta-data per memory byte. Binary
rewriting is performed using Pin13, a generic x86 instrumentation tool. The use of Pin slows
down tracking operations significantly because Pin maintains a second call stack and swaps
CPU registers when switching from the application call stack to propagate taint meta-data.
Zhu et al. report that an unoptimised version of TaintEraser slows applications down by
up to two orders of magnitude. In some cases, the transformed binary is no longer usable
because internal timeouts stop the program’s execution, e.g. Yahoo Messenger attempts to
sign-in for a predefined interval and then aborts.
To improve the performance of their system, Zhu et al. introduce function summaries. A
function summary is a tracking operation that calculates the taint meta-data of a func-
tion’s return value given the taint meta-data of its input parameters. They notice that a
small number of operating system functions account for large portions of application exe-
cution time. Since these functions have well-defined semantics, generic function summaries
embedded in TaintEraser achieve taint propagation without the cost of instruction-level in-
strumentation. In spite of the extensive use of function summaries, a transformed version of
Internet Explorer is 1.4–4.6 times slower than the original.
13Pin: A Dynamic Binary Intrumentation Tool, http://www.pintool.org, last accessed: 25/9/2012
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Background
Code rewriting is a practical method to implement taint tracking because it requires no mod-
ifications to existing applications or execution platforms. However, it suffers from increased
overhead. Recent attempts that focus on optimising checking and tracking operations at the
binary level [KGJK12, BSB11] incur less overhead but slowdowns of 2-4× are still typical.
In Chapter 5, this thesis shows that by performing taint tracking only inside part of an
application, the performance overhead of code rewriting is significantly reduced.
2.4 Summary
This chapter provided an introduction to the problem of data flow analysis and presented
methods that researchers employ to enforce data flow policy in applications.
We begun with an overview of security challenges in web applications and event processing
systems. We observed that data flow confidentiality and integrity are two complementary
concepts useful to capture various data propagation policies. In web applications, injection
attacks are a violation of a simple integrity policy that should restrict the use of untrusted
user data in specific application operations. In event processing, applications that handle
confidential data require restrictions on data disclosure that event processing systems do not
currently provide.
The chapter continued with a discussion of static methods that are used to analyse and
enforce data flow. We presented taint analysis (i.e. a form of data flow analysis), symbolic
execution (i.e. the emulation of an application’s actions under every potential input) and
security-typed languages (i.e. languages that capture data flow requirements as part of their
type system). Static methods do not introduce runtime overhead and are effective even
with malicious code. However, they have limited applicability when the data flow policy
relies on runtime information, cannot analyse applications that use dynamic features of a
programming language and are overly conservative resulting in false positives.
We then focused on runtime taint tracking and introduced a model to capture the important
properties of relevant systems. Characteristic properties of every taint tracking system are
its tracking granularity, the type of taint meta-data that it maintains and the operations
that it invokes at runtime to propagate or check taint meta-data (tracking and checking
operations, respectively). Taint tracking introduces overhead at runtime, yet it is a simple
and accurate technique suitable for data flow analysis and enforcement in systems that are
hard to analyse statically.
The chapter closed with a detailed presentation of runtime taint tracking systems suggested in
the literature, with a particular focus on applications of taint tracking in operating systems
and web applications. We showed that while past research attempts have explored many
design options, the suggested implementations often require extensive modifications to the
underlying infrastructure or incur important performance penalties. In particular, taint
tracking systems implemented as part of the operating system support generic applications
but require a significant effort to port existing applications and are hard to maintain. Code
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rewriting was shown to offer a practical alternative for implementing taint tracking and
support existing applications but performance suffers.
In the next chapter we describe DEFCon, a high-performance event processing system with
data flow enforcement capabilities. DEFCon only supports event processing applications
in Java. This removes much of the complexity that stems from supporting arbitrary Java
applications and enables a taint tracking implementation that is efficient and is easy to
maintain with future versions of the Java platform.
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Chapter 3
Taint Tracking for
High-Performance Event
Processing
This chapter presents DEFCon [MPE+10a], a distributed event processing system written
in Java with support for data flow enforcement using runtime taint tracking. DEFCon im-
proves the state of the art in runtime taint tracking because at the same time (1) it incurs
minimal overhead and can support demanding event processing applications, e.g. in finance,
(2) it allows users to modify extensively the data flow policy that it enforces, and (3) it is
implemented with easily-reproducible changes to Java library classes. A central observation
in DEFCon is that event processing applications need only access a subset of the function-
ality provided by the Java libraries, and this is used to simplify the implementation of the
system. DEFCon shows that taint tracking can benefit specific application domains without
the problems that are commonly associated with it, i.e. changes to existing infrastructure
and runtime overhead.
DEFCon introduces DEFC, a taint tracking policy that uses labels to enforce data flow re-
quirements both inside a single system and across systems that belong to different domains.
Data flow requirements are expressed in DPL [MPE+10b], a high-level policy language to
specify the flow of events between distributed software components. DPL policies are trans-
lated to DEFC labels for enforcement. DPL provides an expressive and practical language
for most common data flow policies while DEFCon achieves efficiency by using labels for
enforcement. To guarantee that software components only exchange data via channels that it
monitors, DEFCon uses a lightweight isolation scheme, which avoids extensive modifications
to the Java class library.
This chapter covers the single-node design of DEFCon. We begin with an overview of the
performance requirements in event processing and the threat model for attacks (Section 3.1).
We then cover the main features of DEFCon, i.e. the DEFC taint tracking policy for
enforcing data flow in Section 3.2 and the Java isolation mechanism in Section 3.3. Section 3.4
79
Taint Tracking for High-Performance Event Processing
Machine 4
Trader 1
Broker
Trader 2
Machine 1
Machine 2
Trader 3
Machine 3
Figure 3.1: An example of an event processing system for stock trading. Event processing units
exchange events via message queues.
presents the implementation of the DEFCon prototype and its low-level API for specifying
data flow policy. Finally, we evaluate DEFCon in Section 3.5, and the chapter finishes with
a summary in Section 3.6.
3.1 Requirements
DEFCon supports event processing applications [Luc02]. The unique property of event pro-
cessing is that data are structured as event messages, or in short, events. The processing logic
of the application is implemented as individual event processing units. Each unit receives,
processes and subsequently emits events. An event may be processed and transformed by
multiple units. Units are deployed on physical machines, yet they may perform processing on
behalf of a different administrative domain than the one that controls the physical machines.
The event processing system is responsible for event dispatch between units, either within a
single machine or, via the network, across multiple machines.
Event processing systems are used frequently in financial data processing and algorithmic
trading1 because they facilitate scalability and distribution (§2.1.2). In algorithmic trading,
traders implement trading strategies as processing units that issue stock orders, i.e. events.
Another unit (i.e. a broker) receives these orders, matches them and generates additional
events to notify traders about successful transactions. Figure 3.1 illustrates such a scenario,
in which clients perform stock trading. Each client implements the core of its trading logic
with an event processing unit, e.g. Trader 1 and Trader 2. The broker is also implemented as
a unit that receives order events, matches them and publishes trade events. Trade events are
communicated to all other clients in the system, e.g. Trader 3, as part of a stock tick feed.
Communication in this example occurs via message queues.
Such a trading scenario introduces important performance challenges because high perfor-
mance, e.g. low stock tick processing latency, directly translates to higher profit [Fla07]. The
reason why low latency increases profits is that when opportunities arise, the transactions of
traders that react first affect stock prices and this makes future transactions for slower traders
less profitable [Duh09]. Traders thus place their event processing systems in close physical
1Apache ActiveMQ use cases, http://activemq.apache.org/use-cases.html, last accessed: 25/9/2012
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proximity to the broker to minimise latency (a practice known as co-location). This is, how-
ever, expensive because order matching (also known as brokering) is typically performed at
major stock exchanges and nearby space is limited [Exc09]. Most traders who cannot afford
co-location accept the additional delay of receiving the stock tick feed remotely. As a result,
they have a disadvantage compared to competitors with co-located systems.
A way to reduce costs for smaller traders is to share event processing infrastructure co-located
with the stock exchange. Instead of buying hardware and space separately, they can share
a single execution platform and split the co-location costs. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2,
such a shared platform may additionally match buy/sell orders between traders and act as
a broker, a scenario known as a “dark pool”. Even smaller traders, however, want to keep
their trading algorithms secret from the competition. Confidentiality is therefore critical if
a single machine executes processing on behalf of multiple traders. The same is also true
for integrity: a malicious trader should never be able to manipulate the trading strategies of
other traders in the same system, e.g. by tricking them into buying stocks of their choosing.
The next two sections present first the performance requirements of a simple pairs trading
strategy and then the security requirements for a scenario in which mutually-distrustful
trading strategies are hosted by a shared machine.
3.1.1 Performance requirements (latency and throughput)
Pairs trading [Vid04] is a trading strategy based on the observation that some stocks have
highly correlated prices and eventually converge to their past price ratio after temporary
divergence. A simple example of pairs trading involves the following three steps:
1. Identify two stocks that have had historically a high correlation. Calculate the mean
and the standard deviation of their price ratio and decide on the price ratio, which
triggers the decision to trade.
2. Start observing the stock prices of the two firms. When their ratio becomes greater
than the triggering ratio from step 1, buy shares of the stock with the low price and
sell shares of the stock with the high price.
3. Continue observing the stock prices. Once their price ratio drops below the ratio from
step 1, reverse the positions from step 2.
Latency is crucial for successfully tacking advantage of pairs trading. The actions of step 2,
when performed collectively by many traders, tend to move the market in the opposite
direction, i.e. the price of the cheaper stock increases and the price of the more expensive
stock decreases. Those traders who react first have the largest profit and limit the profit
margin for slower, remote traders.
Event throughput is also important when multiple traders use pairs trading in a shared,
co-located machine. In order to support monitoring of arbitrary stocks, the event process-
ing system must dispatch the incoming stock tick events from the stock exchange to every
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processing unit. This is a demanding task when the number of traders and the event rate in
the stock tick feed are high (see Section 3.5 for a detailed discussion). In order to support
monitoring arbitrary stocks without limiting the number of units in the system, events must
be transfered at high rates between units.
3.1.2 Security requirements (threat model)
The main challenge for an event processing system that hosts processing on behalf of different
clients comes from unauthorised parties perceiving or influencing information contained in
events. The event processing system should guarantee that events are only accessed by their
respective recipients (event confidentiality) and that only specific units are able to modify
the content of particular events (event integrity).
The event processing system should protect from event processing units performing inten-
tional violations of event confidentiality and integrity, and from unintentional violations, in
which units contain bugs. Examples include developer errors in the implementation of units
that disclose sensitive events or allow unauthorised parties to affect the content of events;
back-doors introduced by developers to enable unauthorised access to data; and inconsistent
handling of events by units at runtime due to developers understanding data flow policy
differently. The underlying cause for all these problems is that the enforcement of data flow
policy depends on the correctness of the implementation of every unit that processes an
event. In practice, any unit in a system can potentially violate the confidentiality of the
events that it receives and destroy the integrity of the events that it emits.
The event processing system should not focus on protection from malicious code provided by
untrusted third parties, which may attack the event processing system itself. A reasonable
assumption is that the event processing system is a closely guarded asset of an organisation
and the organisation only permits the execution of code on behalf of accountable parties.
The threat model therefore does not consider cases, in which the adversary exchanges data
between processing units by monopolising system resources such as the main processor (see
also the discussion of covert timing channels in §2.3.3). This is again reasonable to assume
because such channels are unreliable and typically offer low bandwidth. Similarly, the threat
model does not include adversaries that employ denial-of-service attacks. Such attacks often
render the system unusable and, as such, it is unlikely that they are employed by legitimate
users of the system—protection against them is left for future work.
Overall, the event processing system should protect from adversaries that attempt to learn
data that must otherwise be kept private or affect the processing of other users by introducing
bogus data. Adversaries that are willing to attack the event processing system itself are
not considered in this work. The operating system, the language runtime and the event
processing system are assumed to be trusted because they are maintained by the organisation
that supports the event processing system. This assumption reflects the observation that a
service can only be as trusted as the organisation that maintains it.
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Figure 3.2: DEFCon as a runtime taint tracking system. DEFCon uses unit tracking granularity
and labels that consist of tags for taint meta-data. Checking operations inspect taint meta-data for
every event that units emit or receive.
3.2 Decentralised Event Flow Control
Decentralised Event Flow Control (DEFC) is a taint tracking policy (§2.3.1) that constrains
the flow of events in an event processing system. DEFC provides to unit developers a set of
methods to devise arbitrary data flow (or event flow) policies. For this, it exposes primitives
to control the value of the taint meta-data and therefore the outcome of checking operations.
Figure 3.2 shows DEFC in the context of the runtime taint tracking model from Section 2.3.1.
DEFC associates taint meta-data with the state of each unit and, in addition, it associates
meta-data with the individual events that units emit (not shown in the figure). Checking
operations involve two steps: when a unit emits an event and before a unit receives an
event. Upon emitting an event, checking operations enforce that the taint meta-data of the
event correctly reflect the taint meta-data of the unit. Upon delivering of an event, checking
operations ensure that the receiving unit is eligible to receive the event. Together these two
steps enforce that the “can-flow-to” relation (see Section 3.2.2) holds between the sending
and the receiving unit. Unit taint meta-data and event taint meta-data are specified by
DEFC.
The novel features of DEFC are aimed specifically at event processing. These are:
1. Each event is associated with multiple labels to support fine-grained data flow tracking
(see Section 3.2.1).
2. Separate delegation privileges control the ability of a unit to delegate privileges to
other units—this allows units to enforce that their events are processed by a particular
sequence of units (see Section 3.2.3).
3. Privilege propagation occurs dynamically via privilege-carrying events, a mechanism
that uses the event-processing system to avoid introducing covert channels (see Sec-
tion 3.2.5).
4. Units can process only event parts that they are allowed to access without cross-
contaminating every other part stored in the event (see Section §3.2.6).
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As explained next, these features of DEFC facilitate taint tracking when events store data
that adhere to different data flow policies and when events are are transformed by multiple
units in a sequence.
3.2.1 Anatomy of an event
A key element of DEFC is the association of taint meta-data with individual events. Events
consist of multiple event parts. Each part contains a name, stored data and a DEFC security
label to control access to data. Event parts enable multiple collaborating units to process
events while, due to different labels per part, each unit can only access parts of the data
stored in an event. This means that units can only read from and write to those parts of
events that they have privileges for and cannot affect the data flow for other units that may
occur via the same events. Dispatching events as single, connected entities while restricting
access to parts using labels supports the principle of least privilege (§2.3.3).
An alternative to using a single event with multiple, independently labeled parts would be
to send multiple events, each carrying only the data appropriate for a given recipient. This
would lead to a larger number of dispatched events and the relationship between these events
would be lost.
Figure 3.3 illustrates an event in the trading scenario from Section 3.1. The event consists
of three parts: type, body and trader id. It contains a bid order issued by Trader 1. Different
requirements exist for confidentiality, and the event consists of three parts. The first part,
type, is not confidential (R1). The second, body, should only be accessible by the Broker unit
(R2). The final part, trader id, contains information that should be disclosed to the Broker
unit but the Broker unit may not further communicate the information that it contains (R3).
3.2.2 Security labels
DEFC tracks data flow and enforces data flow policy via the use of security labels (or
simply labels). Labels are the input to the taint tracking system’s checking operations and
protect the confidentiality and integrity of attached events. They are similar to labels in
Flume [KYB+07]. For example, in the scenario from Section 3.1, labels can be used to
enforce requirement R3: when the Broker learns the id of a trader from the trader id part of
an bid order, it may only communicate with the trader that issued the order.
Figure 3.3 also illustrates the labels of the bid order event. Security labels are pairs of a
confidentiality component S and an integrity component I. The notation (S, I) is used to
denote these two components when referring to a label. S and I are each sets of tags. A tag
represents an individual and indivisible concern over data. If a tag is placed in S, the concern
involves data confidentiality; if it is placed in I it involves data integrity. Tags are opaque to
units and are implemented as unique, random bit-strings. This chapter refers to them using
symbolic names, giving hints whether they are used for confidentiality or integrity security
concerns, e.g. i-trader-1 is an integrity tag used by Trader 1.
84
E
ve
nt conﬁdentiality tagsname data
∅type bid
{s-broker}body ...
{s-broker, s-trader-1}trader_id trader-1
integrity tags
{i-trader-1}
{i-trader-1}
{i-trader-1}
security label
event
parts
Figure 3.3: A DEFCon event with multiple named parts. Different confidentiality and integrity
tags protect data in each part.
Tags that are added to the confidentiality component of an event label are “sticky”, i.e.
when a unit receives the event and processes it, the tags in the confidentiality component of
the event propagate to the labels of subsequent events that it emits. Adding a tag to the
confidentiality component of an event label restricts access to the event for other units. All
units must propagate this tag to their output (unless a unit exercises privileges over the tag).
The opposite happens with integrity tags—they are “fragile”. Once a unit mixes data from
events that contain an integrity tag with data from events that do not, any events that it
emits will not contain the integrity tag (unless, again, the unit exercises privileges).
Assume that the Broker unit in the trading scenario from Section 3.1 receives data from an
event with the confidentiality component {s-broker, s-trader-1} in its label. If a second event
arrives labeled with {s-broker, s-trader-2}, the label of any subsequently emitted events will
include all tags (i.e. s-broker, s-trader-1 and s-trader-2) in its confidentiality component. This
correctly captures the confidentiality of output data due to both data sources. Similarly,
assume that the Broker unit emits stock tick events with {i-broker} in their labels’ integrity
components. If a unit combines such events with data from events labeled {i-trader-1}, the
result data should no longer be associated directly with the Broker unit. Thus, any events
emitted will have empty integrity {}.
Overall, the requirements for the trading scenario from Section 3.1 that were described in
Section 3.2.1 may be enforced with the following labels (illustrated in Figure 3.3):
 The type part of the event is unprotected (R1).
 The body part is protected with the tag s-broker to enforce that the event is matched
by the Broker unit (R2).
 The trader id part is further protected with a tag unique to the sender in order to
prevent the Broker from disclosing the order’s issuer (R3).
Labels are ordered and form a lattice [Den76]. For their confidentiality component S, order-
ing is achieved by the subset relation: information labeled with Sa can flow to units labeled
with Sb if and only if Sa ⊆ Sb. For their integrity component I, ordering is achieved with
the superset relation: information labeled with Ia can flow to units labeled with Ib if and
only if Ia ⊇ Ib. Thus, the “can-flow to” relation between labels La and Lb, illustrated with
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the symbol ≺, is defined as:
La ≺ Lb iff Sa ⊆ Sb ∧ Ia ⊇ Ib
where
La = (Sa, Ia) and Lb = (Sb, Ib)
The “can-flow-to” relation orders labels according to how “restrictive” they are. If La ≺ Lb,
La is less restrictive than Lb, and every unit that may receive an event protected with Lb
should be able to receive an event protected with La.
3.2.3 Tag and delegation privileges
Event processing units are stateful, i.e. they maintain their state in between receiving two
events. Instead of associating labels with different data that a unit stores, a single label
(Su, Iu) represents the overall confidentiality and integrity of the data stored in the unit.
The value of this label at a given point in time specifies a unit’s current contamination level.
DEFC favours unit-level over variable-level tracking granularity, which would introduce
performance penalty when executing unit code and may require extensive modifications to
the language interpreter (§2.3.3).
Units need the ability to add tags to and remove tags from their label. Since these operations
change the events that units have access to, units can only perform them if they possess the
necessary privileges. There are two types of runtime tag privileges, represented with the sets
O+u and O
−
u . If a unit has a tag t in the O
+
u set, it can add t to either the confidentiality
(Su) or the integrity component (Iu) of its label. If t appears in O
−
u , the unit can remove t
from Su or Iu.
The implications of adding or removing a tag depend on whether a tag is used for confi-
dentiality or integrity. When a unit adds the tag t ∈ O+u to Su, the unit is able to receive
confidential data stored in event parts that are protected with t. This is effectively a transi-
tion to a higher level of secrecy, and the unit exercises a clearance privilege (i.e. clearance to
high secrecy). When a unit adds t ∈ O+u to Iu instead, any event parts that it subsequently
outputs will contain t in their integrity compartment. This action endorses the unit’s current
state to be of a higher level of integrity—the unit exercises an endorsement privilege. Simi-
larly, if a unit removes t ∈ O−u from Su, its state is declassified, and it can now emit events
at a lower level of secrecy. This is an example of a unit exercising a declassification privilege.
Finally, if a unit removes t ∈ O−u from Iu, the unit is able to receive event parts without t
at their integrity component. This is effectively a transition to a lower level of integrity, and
the unit exercises a clearance privilege to achieve it (i.e. clearance to low integrity).
DEFC supports dynamic privilege management, i.e. units can delegate to other units some
of the tag privileges that they posses. The ability to delegate a tag privilege is itself a
privilege known as a delegation privilege. Delegation privileges can be used to enforce specific
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event processing topologies—this is in contrast to Asbestos, HiStar and Flume (§2.3.3). For
example, assume that in an expanded trading scenario from Section 3.1, a new Regulator
unit must inspect every event that Trader 1 sends to the Broker. This can be achieved
by delegating the appropriate tag privileges, which enforce the particular communication
pattern between Regulator, Trader 1 and Broker while withholding the relevant delegation
privileges. This scenario is described in detail later in Section 3.5.
Delegation is subject to another set of privileges: O−authu and O+authu . The semantics of these
delegation privileges are explained using a short-hand notation. For tag t and unit u:
 t+u is short for t∈O+u (tag privilege);
 t−u is short for t∈O−u (tag privilege);
 t+authu is short for t∈O+authu (delegation privilege);
 t−authu is short for t∈O−authu (delegation privilege).
The u subscript is omitted if the context is clear or when these privileges are discussed in
abstract terms.
The delegation privilege t+authu allows unit u to delegate to a receiving unit r the tag privi-
lege t+ and the delegation privilege t+auth itself. After declassification and according to the
actual privilege chosen for delegation (t+ or t−), either t+r or t+authr holds. Likewise, delega-
tion privilege t−authu allows the delegation of tag privilege t− or of delegation privilege t−auth.
Privilege delegation occurs via privilege-carrying events (presented in Section 3.2.5), which
ensures that the process does not introduce covert channels.
Tags are generated on demand by DEFCon. When a unit u requests a new tag t, it is
assigned t−authu and t+authu . The unit can use t−authu and t+authu for itself in order to acquire
t−u and t+u , respectively. The tag and all privileges are themselves transferable to other units.
When a unit u combines t−u with t+u , it has full privilege over t. This effectively enables u
to ignore any event flow restrictions with respect to t. Without t−authu and t+authu , u is still
unable to transfer these privileges.
3.2.4 Input/output labels
Processing units must posses a convenient method to exercise their privileges when receiving
and emitting events. DEFC achieves this by exposing to each unit two labels: an input
label (Sinu , I
in
u ) and an output label (S
out
u , I
out
u ). The input label is equivalent to the unit’s
contamination level (Su, Iu) and restricts the events that u may receive. The output label
restricts the labels of any events u emits. A unit may alter the tags that these two labels
contain in order to change the restrictions that the taint tracking system imposes on its input
and output. To do so, it needs to possess—and in this way exercise—the corresponding tag
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Figure 3.4: Unit labels and privileges in DEFC.
privileges for every tag added (i.e. t+) or removed (i.e. t−) to or from its labels. Figure 3.4
summarises all unit labels and privileges in DEFC.
The separation of input/output labels is a convenient mechanism that reduces the need to
exercise privileges each time an event is received or emitted. As an example, assume that a
Broker unit receives orders from Trader units and must vouch for the integrity of every event
that it emits. By adding the tag i-broker to the integrity component of its output label (Iout),
it vouches for the integrity of every subsequent trade event. This does not require the Broker
to exercise privileges explicitly. Similarly, if the Broker unit must learn and communicate the
identity of a trader from a bid event (such as in Figure 3.3) without imposing any restrictions
on the units that receive it, it can add s-trader-1 to Sin but not to Sout. Similarly to the
integrity scenario, tag privileges are only used once when the change in the input/output
labels occurs.
DEFC requires explicit requests for all changes to the input/output labels and thus avoids
information leaks due to implicit taint meta-data changes (§2.3.2). This means that, for
example, if an event protected with a confidentiality tag t is sent to a unit and the unit has
t+ but t /∈ Sin, the event is not delivered to the unit.
3.2.5 Dynamic privilege propagation
DEFC uses events as an in-band mechanism to propagate privileges between units at run-
time. Privilege-carrying events in DEFC support an additional field per event part that is
opaque to units and stores privileges. When a unit receives an event and requests to read
one of its parts, any privileges associated with that part are bestowed upon the unit.
As an example of dynamic privilege delegation, consider the bid order event that must store
in a trader id part the name of the issuing trader (Figure 3.3). Assume that a Regulator unit
is the only unit that should be able to receive this event part. Trader units can allocate a
different tag t for each bid event that they emit and use it to protect the confidentiality of
the trader id part. To delegate t+ and t− to the Regulator, Trader units can add an additional
part to the bid event that is visible to the Regulator unit only and stores t+ and t−. The
Regulator, after reading this additional part, can add t to its input label and learn the trader’s
identity from the trader id part.
For a unit to use any of the received privileges, it must have a reference to the particular tag
88
that these privileges refer to. Since privileges are bestowed implicitly upon reading an event
part, units have to communicate references to tags explicitly as part of the data stored in
an event part. Units are expected to know by design when they are supposed to delegate or
receive privileges and act accordingly. In the previous example, Trader units should store in
the additional event part that the Regulator accesses a reference to t as part of the data.
3.2.6 Partial event processing
Some applications in event processing can be seen as processing events along a main data flow
path. In this processing pattern, an event is sent to units, which in turn attach additional
parts and re-emit it. DEFC supports such event processing applications and enables them
to operate on parts of the events along the data flow path. This is in addition to scenarios,
in which units emit new events in response to the events that they receive. Emitting events
with additional parts only changes the labels of any parts that were accessed by a unit.
When a new event is emitted instead, the label of each event part has to be as restrictive as
the unit’s current output label.
As an example of partial event processing, the Broker unit that receives the bid event in
Figure 3.3 can process the order without knowing the identity of the trader that issued it.
The Broker unit may receive the body of the order, try to match the offered price with ask
events and add a new part with an error message to explain why no match was possible.
The Broker is unaware of the trader id part and thus that part’s label should not change.
After an event is received and processed by a unit u, the unit must invoke a release API
call (see Section 3.4.1) to trigger event delivery to other units. After release, the event
may be delivered to other units. The label of each event part that u modified—and not any
others—must be changed to be as restrictive as the output label of u. The modified event is
not delivered again to units that, due to their input label, are only able to receive the event
parts that u did not change. Such a behaviour would result in covert channels based on
counting the number of times an event is received by a unit. Similarly, if units with different
output labels attempt to store to the exact same event part different values, the event stores
both values. This precludes covert channels that would otherwise arise by having units at a
higher confidentiality level affect the data that units at lower confidentiality can receive.
3.3 Unit isolation in Java
DEFCon, the runtime taint tracking system that uses DEFC for data flow enforcement,
should control all channels that allow units to communicate. In every exchange of data
between units, DEFCon must invoke checking operations to enforce DEFC constraints.
Without the ability to monitor all communication channels between units, a unit with the
clearance privilege to receive confidential events but not the privilege to declassify their
content (i.e. the unit has t+ for every tag t in the confidentiality components of accessed
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event parts but not t−) could exploit such unmonitored communication channels to avoid
DEFC enforcement. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, units must execute in isolation and should
not be able to communicate directly with each other or with applications outside the runtime
taint tracking system.
At the same time, it is required that DEFCon offers low latency and high throughput
communication between units to support demanding applications such as low latency trad-
ing (§3.1.1). One option would be to use process-level isolation as offered by the operating
system. As shown in Section 3.5, process-based isolation increases the event processing la-
tency due to the additional cost of inter-process communication (e.g. the serialisation of
complex data structures stored in events) and the overhead of context-switching. There-
fore processing units in DEFCon execute within the same operating system process, and
isolation is achieved by introducing new mechanisms as part of the programming language
runtime.
The programming language used in DEFCon is Java. Java is chosen because it offers a
mature and efficient platform, static typing, and it is a typical choice for industrial-strength
event processing applications. Event processing units are implemented as Java classes and
use a specific API for event exchange with other units (see Section 3.4). Units leverage a
shared memory address space for efficient event dispatch. DEFCon has access to Java unit
bytecode and, when loading unit classes into memory, it enforces that they are restricted to
the supported API. DEFCon precludes the use of Java Development Kit (JDK) libraries that
are not required in event processing (e.g. UI frameworks or reflection) or offer unmonitored
communication with components outside the DEFCon system (e.g. I/O libraries). Enforcing
the use of a specific API, however, is not enough to isolate processing units fully, as described
below.
Ensuring that two Java objects cannot share information is not trivial because isolation was
not a goal when Java was first designed. Even if two Java objects do not have references to
each other or to a shared object, there are multiple communication channels that they can
use to exchange data. These include storage channels, which arise from shared state exposed
due to the semantics of Java (e.g. object locks) or due to the design of classes in the JDK (e.g.
through mutable static fields), and timing channels, which occur from manipulating system
resources (e.g. CPU utilisation). DEFCon prevents the use of storage channels because they
can be used for reliable, high-bandwidth communication. Monitoring timing channels is left
for future work. Timing channels are harder to use because they typically rely on resource
monopolisation—such behaviour is likely to be noticed and attributed to the users involved
given the assumption of accountable users in the threat model (§3.1.2).
Java exposes shared state to applications in multiple different ways, each time creating
additional storage channels. There are three fundamental types of storage channels that
units can potentially use:
1. In OpenJDK 6, the JDK libraries contain about 4,000 static fields. For example, the
JDK uses a static integer field Thread.threadSeqNum to identify threads. Two units
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may exchange data in an uncontrolled fashion by manipulating this field implicitly, e.g.
by launching specific numbers of threads.
2. The JDK libraries contain more than 2,000 native methods. These may expose state
of the JVM and, in the worst case, this state may be manipulated similarly to static
fields. For example, the String and Object classes both contain native methods that
retrieve state from internal data structures of the JVM.
3. The Java language offers synchronisation primitives, i.e. synchronized blocks and
wait/notify methods. These enable units to manipulate an object’s lock and thus
exchange data even if an object does not otherwise contain any fields that can be
modified.
As presented next, several past attempts have aimed to offer isolation in Java. Nevertheless,
they are not suitable for DEFCon due to two main requirements:
Low maintenance effort. Adding support for isolation to any production JVM should be
easy and only require minimal manual effort. Extensive code changes to implement isolation
are hard to maintain when the Java platform is updated. Such an approach would be of
limited practical applicability.
Efficiency. The isolation methodology should permit efficient communication across iso-
lated components. Isolation should neither significantly increase the latency nor reduce the
throughput of message passing between units.
3.3.1 Previous proposals for isolation in Java
Previous efforts to add support for isolation in Java typically require extensive manual effort.
Production JDKs have large codebases and are hard to modify without knowledge about their
internal architecture. Similarly, it is hard to guarantee the absence of covert communication
channels in the JVM. In contrast, research JDKs and JVMs are easier to inspect and modify
but are often outdated and seldom match the performance of their production counterparts.
J-Kernel [HCC+98] and Joe-E [MWC10] are two research efforts that provide isolation for
Java. They prevent shared state by rejecting user classes that use mutable static fields.
For JDK channels, custom proxies are introduced that prevent user classes from accessing
shared state, e.g. proxies prevent access to the static fields of the System and File classes.
KaffeOS [BHL00], a research JVM, requires the manual assessment of all static fields in the
JDK libraries. JDK classes are rewritten to avoid using static fields, modified to expose
different state per isolated component, or “reloaded”. With reloading, a different JDK class
is exported to each isolated component with unique values for static fields. However, the
reloading mechanism suggested cannot be applied when a class is referenced transitively
by other shared classes (e.g. as it is the case for the Object class). An extensive manual
assessment of a large number of classes is still required.
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Sun’s own MVM [CD01] and later I-JVM [GTM+09] avoid manual assessment by transpar-
ently replicating all static fields per isolated component. The JVM is modified to keep track
of which isolated component executes and to expose a different set of values for static fields.
The authors of MVM additionally assess all native methods to identify cases, in which global
state is exposed. The effort required to support newer JVM releases is therefore consider-
able. MVM itself was only completed for the Solaris/SPARC architecture and is no longer
maintained.
MVM uses distinct heap spaces for each isolated component and requires serialisation for
communication. Incommunicado [PVCD02] improves upon this design with a more efficient
form of deep-copying instead of serialisation. Both designs limit performance because the
use of separate heaps nullifies the benefit of a single memory address space.
KaffeOS and I-JVM provide for efficient communication of isolated components by allowing
objects to be shared without copying. Yet, their design is not appropriate for DEFCon
because, once an object is shared, there is no way to monitor the communication of two
isolated components. J-Kernel and JX [GFWK02] expose a proxy to allow access to objects
created in other isolated components. While a proxy would enable DEFCon to monitor
communication, synchronous method invocation creates timing covert channels that are easy
to exploit: isolated components may communicate by modulating the CPU time spent inside
method calls.
3.3.2 Isolation methodology in DEFCon
DEFCon isolates units by controlling any shared state that units have access to. Units are
only given references to objects that DEFCon controls. This is important because if two
units get to share a reference to an object of their choice, they can use it to communicate in
an unrestricted fashion. Subsequent analysis also enforces that units cannot take advantage
of any storage channels in the platform to communicate.
As a first step to achieve isolation, units communicate with each other only via message
passing. When two units exchange data in the form of objects attached to events, DEFCon
should provide pass-by-value semantics. The low latency requirement of DEFCon precludes
an implementation that involves deep-copying of messages—units should exploit the single
memory address space to minimise communication latency. Providing units with references to
shared objects is not acceptable either because it would violate isolation. Instead, DEFCon
only supports the dispatch of immutable objects inside events. Units copy the data in these
events only when needed. The mechanism to achieve efficient dispatch of immutable objects
in events is described in Section 3.4.1.
As a second step towards isolation, DEFCon prevents units from accessing covert storage
channels by employing a set of techniques to analyse dangerous targets in the JDK. As
explained before, dangerous targets include static fields, native methods and synchronisation
primitives. The next section (§3.3.3) presents how DEFCon prevents access to channels
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Figure 3.5: Isolation enforcement between units in DEFCon. Isolation relies on a combination of
static white-listing (examples A and B) and dynamic intercepts (examples C and D).
created by static fields and static methods, and Section 3.3.4 focuses on channels due to
synchronisation primitives.
3.3.3 Restricting channels due to static fields and native methods
Figure 3.5 illustrates a categorisation of dangerous targets in the JDK (i.e. static fields
and native methods) according to their reachability from different DEFCon components.
Units—given that they cannot import arbitrary Java libraries—can only reach a subset of
all dangerous targets which are denoted with Tunits. The DEFCon implementation uses
additional Java libraries, which means that it can reach targets in TDEFCon—a superset of
Tunits. The DEFCon implementation, however, does not itself use all Java libraries; TJDK
includes targets reachable neither by DEFCon nor by unit code. The following analysis is
based on the Java libraries available to units in the financial scenario presented in Section 3.5.
Static dependency analysis
Dangerous targets that are not reachable from DEFCon or unit code (TJDK) can be removed
from the JDK without further impact. To simplify subsequent analysis, any library classes
not used by DEFCon or the financial processing units in Section 3.5 are removed from the
JDK (e.g. AWT/Swing classes). This preliminary pruning of the JDK results in a subset
that contains approximately 20% of the classes in the original JDK. This subset includes
more than 2,000 dangerous targets.
Many of the remaining targets (TDEFCon) are only reachable from DEFCon code because
event processing units are constrained to classes relevant to event processing. Event process-
ing units typically only load classes from the java.lang and java.util packages—there is no
reason for (non-malicious) units to import classes from packages such as java.lang.reflect
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or java.security. To enforce that units only use a subset of classes available in the JDK,
DEFCon provides a custom class loader for units. The custom unit class loader inspects the
classes that units load and only accepts requests to load classes from a white-list. This means
that units cannot directly reach some of the dangerous targets in TDEFCon. For example, the
call labeled ‘A’ in Figure 3.5 cannot occur due to the white-list of the unit class loader.
Allowing units to load classes only from a white-list is not sufficient to ensure that units can
only reach targets in classes that are in the white-list. When the unit class loader permits a
unit to load a JDK class from the white-list, the actual loading of the class is delegated to the
“bootstrap” class loader of the JVM. The “bootstrap” class loader identifies any additional
JDK classes that the original class references and loads these as well. Since this behaviour
cannot be controlled, the unit may transitively reach targets in such additional classes by
invoking methods of the class that it was allowed to load.
Reachability analysis
To address this problem, a static reachability analysis is performed on the JDK that, starting
from classes in the unit class loader’s white-list, transitively calculates the set of targets that
a unit may reach, which is Tunits. The analysis first enumerates method-to-method execution
paths possible in the JDK. It then identifies any dangerous targets that each method accesses
directly. Finally, it combines the two data sets to calculate Tunits.
An important challenge for the static reachability analysis is dynamic method dispatch.
When a method contains a call to a given method signature, the analysis assumes conser-
vatively that any compatible method that has the same signature may be the target of the
method invocation at runtime. Method signatures are compatible when (1) the signature
is part of a Java interface and multiple JDK classes implement that interface, or (2) when
the signature is defined as part of a class and there exist subclasses of that class. Dynamic
method dispatch introduces false positives in the static reachability analysis. Despite the fact
that only the pruned JDK after the dependency analysis is considered, Tunits still contains
about 1,200 dangerous targets reachable from java.lang. The breakdown is approximately
320 native methods and 900 static fields.
Heuristic-based white-listing
Not all of the targets identified in Tunits after the reachability analysis are in fact dangerous.
The number of dangerous targets in Tunits can be further reduced by a set of heuristics to
identify and white-list targets that units cannot exploit as storage channels:
 66 static fields and 20 native methods declared in the Unsafe class cannot be used as
storage channels. The class enables applications to access JVM memory and as such,
the Java Security Framework monitors attempts to call methods of the Unsafe class.
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Targets in this class can be considered safe because any unmonitored access to JVM
memory while the Java Security Framework is active would be a critical JVM bug.
 Final static fields that store immutable values cannot be used as storage channels.
These include final static fields that store strings, primitive wrapper classes (e.g.
Integer and Boolean) and primitives (e.g. int and boolean). Their values are in
effect constants and units cannot change them in order to communicate data.
 Some private static fields, despite not being declared final, cannot be used as storage
channels. These are fields that store primitives, immutable values or vectors of con-
stants and are only written once in the class implementation. Such fields are in effect
constants.
By applying these heuristics, a number of targets in the JDK are white-listed. After this
step, the number of dangerous targets in Tunits is further reduced to approximately 500 static
fields and 300 native methods. Figure 3.5 illustrates a call that reaches a white-listed target
in Tunits marked with ‘B’.
Automatic runtime code injection
Additional mechanisms are required to ensure that any remaining dangerous targets that
units can access cannot be exploited as storage channels. Other projects for isolation in
Java [BHL00, CD01] manually assess all native methods and duplicate static fields per iso-
lated component. DEFCon minimises the number of native JDK methods that need to be
checked and avoids direct modifications of JVM code.
DEFCon employs aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [KLM+97] to modify the behaviour
of JDK classes indirectly in a programmatic fashion. AOP is used to inject code auto-
matically at specific points during JDK execution. DEFCon uses the MAJOR/FERRARI
framework [VBM08] for its ability to modify JDK bytecode (i.e. in addition to application
bytecode) using the AspectJ language. To control access to the remaining targets in Tunits
after the static analysis and the heuristic-based white-listing, multiple pointcuts are defined.
Each pointcut contains code (i.e. an advice) that prevents units from potentially exploiting
the associated target. Advice code replicates static fields per unit and attaches checks to
control how native methods are accessed, as follows:
Static fields. Replicating static fields is straightforward as long as the object stored in the
field can be cloned without sharing any references with the original object. If this
is possible, and upon unit access to the static field, a deep-copy operation clones the
object and returns a unit-specific copy to the caller. The deep-copy operation occurs
on read accesses to the static field. When, however, the field stores an immutable value,
the deep-copy operation can be delayed further—until a write operation changes the
field’s value. If copying the value stored in the static field is not possible, advice code
generates a security exception and unit execution stops.
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Native methods. Native methods in Tunits should only be invoked from DEFCon code.
When such methods are called, advice code inspects the execution stack. If code from
the DEFCon prototype has performed any of the method invocations in the stack,
the call is permitted because the DEFCon implementation is trusted not to contain
storage channels in the API exposed to units (see Section §3.4). In Figure 3.5, such a
call is marked with ‘C’. If no DEFCon code is found on the stack, advise code raises
an exception and stops unit execution (example marked with ‘D’).
Security exceptions are raised at runtime when an unsafe scenario is encountered. When
combined with the reachability analysis in the JDK, they ensure that no units in DEFCon
may exploit a storage channel. No modifications to the JVM are required.
Manual white-listing
Security exceptions, however, prevent unit execution. When attempting to deploy the units
used in the evaluation scenario from Section 3.5, 15 native methods and 27 static fields
triggered exceptions and stopped execution. These targets were manually inspected and
since none could be exploited as storage channels, all of them were added to the white-list.
Next are some examples of these targets along with a justification of the decision to add
them to the white-list.
java.lang.Object.hashCode. This is a native method that returns a hash value for each
object in the JVM. Since Java applications cannot control this value for a specific
object, this function effectively returns a constant.
java.lang.Object.getClass. This is a native method that returns a Class object used
to represent the class of a given object. Class objects are unique and constant thus
this method returns the equivalent of a constant static field.
java.lang.Double.longBitsToDouble. This is a native method that returns its param-
eter as a double. It does not access any JVM state and therefore it may not be used
by units to exchange data.
java.lang.System.security. This is a private static field that is exposed to units via the
getSecurityManager method of the same class. The Java Security Framework pre-
vents units from modifying the current security manager. Additionally, the DEFCon
security manager does not contain any mutable fields that units can access. Therefore
units may not use this static field—or the object that it contains—to exchange data.
A further consideration with runtime code injection is performance. Each time a pointcut
is activated, it triggers the associated advice to decide whether access to the target is safe.
To reduce the overhead of the approach in the evaluation scenario (see Section 3.5.1), the
execution of units is profiled to identify dangerous targets that are accessed regularly. These
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targets are manually inspected and subsequently white-listed, as well. In total, 15 additional
targets (6 static fields and 9 native methods) were inspected and added to the white-list for
performance reasons.
3.3.4 Restricting synchronisation channels
Java objects may contain mutable state that enables unrestricted communication if two pro-
cessing units reference the same object. Therefore, two units must never share a reference to
an object that contains mutable state. A way for DEFCon to prevent shared references is by
deep-copying or serialising any object dispatched between units. Deep-copy and serialisation
are effective but result in additional overhead and should be avoided in high-performance
event processing applications. DEFCon instead ensures that every object dispatched to
units does not contain mutable state and thus references to it cannot be used to exchange
data (see Section §3.4.1).
Java objects, however, contain a single piece of mutable information: the synchronisation
monitor (also know as the object lock). The synchronisation monitor can be manipulated
using synchronized blocks and the wait/notify methods. Two units may use the synchro-
nisation monitor as a covert storage channel to exchange data.
The synchronisation monitor introduces a further channel that is specific to Java and is
independent of how DEFCon dispatches references to objects across units. Strings in Java
can be “interned”, i.e. the JVM reuses instances of the same String object when applications
reference strings with the same value. The benefit of interning is that strings can be compared
with the reference comparison operator (==) instead of the much slower equals method.
The synchronisation monitor of a shared object, however, can be used as a storage channel.
Class objects (e.g. as returned by Object.getClass) are similar to strings, i.e. they are
immutable and references to them are reused. Other isolation projects [CD01, GTM+09]
suggest to allocate a different copy of String/Class objects per isolated component. This
approach is inadequate for DEFCon because units should exchange events efficiency in the
same memory address space without copying them.
Automatic runtime injection
DEFCon follows a different approach that changes how processing units may use the
synchronized keyword. Instead of enabling units to synchronise on objects of arbitrary
Java classes, DEFCon only allows synchronisation on objects that are guaranteed to never
be shared across isolated components. To indicate this, a new tagging interface called
NeverShared is introduced. For a type T to implement NeverShared, three prerequisites
must hold:
1. DEFCon prevents objects of type T from being put inside events because events are
shared between units without copying;
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2. no native method of the JDK that is white-listed may return a reference to the same
object of type T to different units; and
3. there is no static field of type T in the JDK that is white-listed as safe. Two different
units may otherwise access the object stored at the static filed at runtime.
Processing units may be synchronized on an object of a type T only if T implements
NeverShared. Since String does not satisfy the first prerequisite and Class does not satisfy
the second, they do not implement NeverShared. Therefore neither String nor Class
objects can be used for synchronisation in unit code.
Units may define their own classes that implement NeverShared and use objects of these
classes for synchronisation. DEFCon introduces an AOP aspect to identify the type of
objects used as operands in synchronized blocks. If the type is statically known to im-
plement NeverShared, the aspect introduces no runtime overhead. If instead the precise
type is unknown and the decision cannot be taken statically, the aspect introduces an advice
that checks the type of the operand at runtime. The runtime check raises an exception if
(1) the class of the object used in the synchronized block does not implement NeverShared
and (2) unit code is detected on the call stack. This identifies cases, in which units do not
perform synchronisation explicitly, yet synchronisation occurs in the implementation of the
JDK methods that they invoke. Manual inspection is required for such JDK methods.
Manual inspection
The JDK contains methods that should not be invoked from unit code because they syn-
chronise on object monitors. If the object that they synchronise on is shared across units,
the object’s monitor may be exploited indirectly as a covert channel, i.e. without an explicit
synchronized block in the unit code. For example, methods of the StringBuffer class
and ClassLoader.loadClass all synchronise on StringBuffer and ClassLoader objects,
respectively. However, these classes satisfy the three prerequisites of the NeverShared in-
terface, and shared object instances across units are not possible. To allow such safe JDK
methods to be invoked from unit code, DEFCon uses another aspect to indicate that classes
such as StringBuffer and Classloader implement NeverShared. This aspect is invoked
before the aspect introduced in the previous paragraph that detects NeverShared.
Overall, OpenJDK 6 was secured in four days, and this involved the manual inspection of
only 52 targets (15 native methods, 27 static fields and 10 synchronisation targets) and no
modifications to the JVM.
3.4 Implementation of DEFCon
We implemented a DEFCon prototype in Java. Apart from supporting DEFC and enforcing
unit isolation, as presented in the previous two sections, the prototype is designed to satisfy
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Figure 3.6: Overview of the DEFCon architecture. DEFCon provides for efficient event dispatch
while enforcing event flow requirements via label checks.
two goals: safety, i.e. the prototype must not introduce additional covert channels that
violate unit isolation, and efficiency for event dispatch.
Figure 3.6 shows the architecture of the DEFCon prototype. The DEFCon engine provides
the execution environment for event processing units. Units exchange events by leveraging
the facilities provided by the engine. The engine exposes an API for event exchange and,
additionally, monitors unit execution in order to enforce data flow according to DEFC.
Overall, the tasks that the DEFCon engine performs are as follows:
DEFC management. The DEFC model requires a set of management tasks at runtime.
The engine keeps track of allocated tags, associates input and output labels with units
and maintains sets of privileges for each unit. The engine does not expose input/output
labels to units—units receive opaque tag handles that can only be used to modify labels
via the engine API, as described in Section 3.4.1.
Event dispatch. The engine exposes publish/subscribe event communication primitives.
Units register their interest for events by issuing subscriptions, which specify predicates
on event content. Units receive call-backs in return, which are invoked with references
to events when a match occurs. The event dispatcher is the engine component that
registers all unit subscriptions and matches them against events that are subsequently
published, as described in Section 3.4.2.
Unit life-cycle management. The engine is responsible for instantiating and terminating
processing units. DEFCon monitors the changes that units perform to their labels to
restrict the events that they may subsequently receive or emit. As will be described in
Section 3.4.3, units may also request to be activated automatically upon receiving an
event and be deactivated after its processing finishes. In such cases, the engine actively
instantiates and terminates units.
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3.4.1 API for event generation and dispatch
The DEFCon engine API, which allows units to publish events and control their propaga-
tion, is presented in Table 3.1. The API consists of three different method groups. First,
methods starting from createEvent and addPart down to publish and relase enable units
to create new events, manipulate their content and sent them to other units in the same en-
gine. The second group of subscribe, subscribeManaged and getEvent methods is how
units express their interest in specific events and how they access event content. Finally,
intantiateUnit, changeInOutLabel and changeOutLabel enable units to process events
with more restrictive labels either by instantiating new units or by changing their own la-
bels. The semantics of the API methods are presented in detail in Table 3.1. The following
paragraphs expand on two properties of the DEFCon API, i.e. contamination independence
and the use of freezable objects to avoid serialisation.
Contamination independence
A unit’s contamination level imposes restrictions on the API methods that the unit invokes.
For example, addPart, a method used by units to add a new part to an event, requires the
unit to specify the label for the part added. Assuming a unit u with Soutu = {d}, u should
not be able to output an event with S = {t}. If u attempts such a call to addPart, the
engine should reject the call and notify the unit. This design, however, implies that each
unit operates at a specific initial contamination level. If a unit is instantiated at a different
contamination level that its developers did not anticipate, unit execution may fail at runtime.
Contamination independence is an important property of the DEFCon API, which allows
a unit to be instantiated at an arbitrary contamination level and continue to operate as
expected while its initial contamination level is reflected in the labels of the events that it
receives and emits. Contamination independence enables a unit a to instantiate a unit b and
sandbox it, both controlling which events b receives and the propagation of any events that
b emits. To achieve this, the DEFCon API adheres to a design that requires methods with
labels as parameters to not impose restrictions on the calling unit, i.e. every call succeeds
independently of the unit’s current contamination level. DEFCon ensures that any tags
in the unit’s current output label are used to modify the label specified in the API call
transparently. In the previous example, u’s call to addPart with S={t} results in an event
part labeled S′={d, t} instead of the call being rejected. In general, DEFCon may modify
the S and I label components provided by a unit u in API calls (Table 3.1) and use S′ and I ′
instead as follows: S′ = S ∪ Soutu and I ′ = Ioutu − I ∩ Ioutu .
Freezing shared objects
DEFCon API methods allow units that execute in the same memory address space to
exchange data via events efficiently. As explained in Section 3.3.4, DEFCon must ensure
that only immutable objects are exchanged via events. When the type of the data parameter
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DEFCon API method Description
createEvent() → e Creates and returns a handle to a new event e.
addPart(e, S, I, name, data) Creates a new part name that stores data and attaches
it to event e. The label of the new part is (S, I).
delPart(e, S, I, name) Deletes from event e any part name. The label of the
parts that are deleted is (S, I).
readPart(e, name) → (S, I, data)* Retrieves the data from part name attached to event e.
If the event contains more than one part with the same
name, all data are returned. Sp ⊆ Sinu and Ip ⊇ Iinu
must hold for every such event part.
attachPrivilegeToPart(e, name, S, I, t, p) Attaches the privilege p over the tag t to an event part.
The event part is referenced using its name and label
(S, I). To succeed, the call requires that tpauthu holds.
The result is a privilege-carrying event (§3.2.5).
cloneEvent(e, S, I) → e′ Creates e′, i.e. a copy of the event e. Every label in
the resulting event is updated to reflect the contam-
ination level of the unit that performs the operation.
Therefore, (1) every tag in S is attached to the confi-
dentiality compartment of every part’s label in e; and
(2) only tags in I are maintained in the integrity com-
partment of each part’s label. The updated labels of e′
ensure that e′ may only be dispatched to units that can
receive u’s output.
publish(e) Publishes a new event e that was created by the same
unit. The call rejects events without parts because all
events should contain labels that control their propa-
gation.
release(e) Releases an event e that was dispatched to the unit as
a result of a subscription (§3.2.6).
subscribe(filter) → s Subscribes to events by providing a filter for content-
based matching (§3.4.2). The filter is a set of predicates
on the data stored in event parts. Successful matching
occurs when the event data match the filter and Sp ⊆
Sinu , Ip ⊇ Iinu holds for each accessed part. The method
returns a subscription s.
subscribeManaged(handler, filter)→ s Subscribes to events with a filter and a subscription
handler for processing matched events. The method
returns a managed subscription s (§3.4.3). An event
is delivered to the handler when Sp ⊆ Sin,maxu and
Ip ⊇ Iin,minu hold for each part referenced by the filter.
(Sin,maxu , I
in,min
u ) is the most permissive input label
possible, i.e. given all clearance privileges that the unit
currently holds or may be delegated via the triggering
event.
getEvent() → (e, s) Blocks the calling unit until an event e matches one of
its subscriptions
instantiateUnit(u′, S, I, Opu′ , O
pauth
u′ ) Instantiates a new unit u
′ at a given contamination level
(S, I) and delegates to it the Opu′ , O
pauth
u′ privileges.
The call requires Opu′ ⊆ Opauthu and Opauthu′ ⊆ Opauthu .
Additionally, S ⊆ O+authu and I ⊆ O−authu must hold.
changeInOutLabel(〈S|I〉, 〈add|del〉, t) Adds/removes a tag t to/from a unit’s input and output
label. The method requires that either t+u or t
−
u holds.
changeOutLabel(〈S|I〉, 〈add|del〉, t) Adds/removes a tag t only to/from a unit’s output la-
bel. The method requires that either t+u or t
−
u holds.
Table 3.1: An overview of the DEFCon API available to event processing units.
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in the addPart method is of an immutable Java class such as String, the resulting event
part and its content can be safely released to another unit. Limiting events to immutable
JDK classes is unacceptable though. Units that wish to exchange objects of class Date or of
collection classes such as ArrayList<Date> would be forced to encode and decode mutable
objects into immutable counterparts. This is equivalent to serialisation and eliminates the
benefits of the shared memory address space.
DEFCon avoids the cost of serialisation for mutable classes (either performed explicitly by
units or implicitly during event dispatch) by limiting event content to a set of Freezable
classes. Freezable is a package-private base class defined by DEFCon that contains a
single method freeze. DEFCon calls freeze when it dispatches events. The method
implementation ensures that a Freezable object can no longer change after it was “frozen”.
The approach avoids serialisation at the cost of inspecting an isFrozen flag before modifying
the object during any mutating operation.
DEFCon extends Freezable to implement counterparts of many JDK collection classes, e.g.
ArrayList and HashMap. Objects of Freezable collection classes must efficiently freeze their
content when the container gets frozen. An iterative freeze implementation that visits each
object stored in a collection is unacceptable because it introduces additional overheard during
event dispatch. Instead, when objects of Freezable classes are inserted to a Freezable
collection, they store a reference to the collection’s isFrozen flag. This effectively makes
freeze execute in constant time. The downside is that mutating operations on a Freezable
object inspect the isFrozen flag of every collection that the object is part of.
A similar approach is used to avoid repeatedly updating the labels provided by units in each
API call. Contamination independence requires that any unit-provided label parameter is
modified before it is used in an event to reflect the calling unit’s current contamination level.
This introduces overhead at runtime for calls that require labels as parameters. To avoid
this overhead, the Label type in DEFCon supports a freeze method. Units must call this
method before a label is used in an API call. Label.freeze prevents future edits to the
label and, at the same time, it modifies the label to capture the unit’s current output label.
Frozen labels can directly propagate to event parts without modification. A unit is able to
use a particular frozen label as long as it does not apply any of its privileges—these change
the unit’s current output label and thus affect the labels of any subsequently emitted events.
3.4.2 Event and label matching
DEFCon supports unit communication via content-based publish/subscribe [EFGK03]. Pub-
lish/subscribe decouples the sender from the receiver, i.e. events are dispatched according
to their content and not to specific recipients. Moreover, a successful publish call does
not convey information about event delivery to the caller, thus publish/subscribe permits
unidirectional communication.
DEFCon uses a modified version of a well-known content-based matching algorithm by Fab-
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Figure 3.7: Label-aware publish/subscribe matching in DEFCon’s Event Dispatcher.
ret et al. [FJL+01]. In addition to matching event content against subscriptions, the modified
algorithm checks the “can-flow-to” relation between event and unit labels. Figure 3.7 shows
the data structures inside the DEFCon event dispatcher while it matches an event against
the subscriptions of three potential recipients.
In step 1, the event dispatcher iterates over the event parts and checks them for matches
against a set of subscription predicates. In this step, the event dispatcher uses only one of each
subscription’s predicates and indexes them for fast retrieval. This predicate is known as the
subscription’s access predicate and, to improve performance, it must be the subscription’s
most selective predicate. When a predicate matches an event part (e.g. predicate 1 and
predicate 2), the part’s label is stored temporarily with the predicate.
In step 2, the event dispatcher fetches the corresponding subscriptions for all access predicates
that matched in step 1 (i.e. subscriptions 1 and 2). Each subscription contains a reference to
the unit that issued it and, as a result, to the unit’s current input label. For the subscription
to be considered in step 3, step 2 verifies that the label of the access predicate from step 1
and the input label of the respective unit satisfy the “can flow to” relation, e.g. Lp1 ≺ Lu1
for subscription 1.
In step 3, the event dispatcher iterates over the result subscriptions with matched access
predicates from step 2. Each subscription contains references to any remaining predicates
that must also match for this subscription to receive the event. For example, subscription 1
requires that predicates 2 also matches while subscription 2 requires a match for predicate 3.
For each such subscription, in step 3 the event dispatcher verifies that all additional predicates
matched the event in step 1. In addition, it ensures that the label stored with the predicate
satisfies the “can flow to” relation when compared to the input label of the unit that issued
the subscription. In the example of Figure 3.7, the event matches subscription 1 if Lp2 ≺ Lu1
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and does not match subscription 2 because predicate 3 did not match in step 1.
If S is the number of subscriptions and P is the average number of predicates in each, the
worst case complexity of the algorithm is O(SP ). In practice however each event contains
few parts, and these parts only match a small subset of the access predicates registered by
active subscriptions. This means that only few subscriptions match after step 1 and need
to be checked in detail later (steps 2 and 3). As indicated by the performance evaluation
of the DEFCon prototype in Section 3.5, the algorithm can support a large number of
subscriptions registered at the same time with high event rates.
3.4.3 Managing unit life-cycle
DEFCon supports two different modes of execution for units: unmanaged and managed. The
managed mode of execution enables a single unit to process multiple events and avoid cross-
contamination (§2.3.3). Cross-contamination occurs when a unit processes events protected
with different tags without having the privilege to remove these tags from its output label.
Such tags accumulate in all subsequent events that the unit publishes and significantly restrict
which units may receive them.
In unmanaged mode, which is the default mode of operation for units in DEFCon, units
control their subscriptions and may stop execution at any point. A unit can initiate an
arbitrary number of threads and use them to publish events or continue processing between
event deliveries. Each unit issues subscriptions with the subscribe API method and gets
notified of matching events (see Table 3.1). Units are responsible for setting up their labels
via the changeOutLabel and changeInOutLabel methods.
Units may enter the managed mode of execution by issuing a managed subscription with
the subscribeManaged API method. In managed mode, the engine invokes a unit-supplied
subscription handler each time that there is an event that matches the subscription. The
subscription handler processes the event, may publish additional events in response, and its
execution stops with a call to release the incoming event that triggered the execution.
Managed subscriptions provide an abstraction similar to event processes in Asbestos (§2.3.3).
In a managed subscription, the subscription handler is unable to maintain state between the
delivery of events that are labeled differently. The engine generates new instances of the
subscription handler each time a new event is delivered to a managed subscription. Thus,
only the labels of the current event should propagate to any subsequent events published as
a response—not the labels of events that the handler has previously received.
To enable different instances of the event handler whose labels permit communication to
exchange data, DEFCon exposes a simple key-vale store that inspects the current contam-
ination level of the subscription handler before servicing requests.
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3.5 Evaluation
The goal of the experimental evaluation is to demonstrate the effectiveness of DEFCon in
supporting high-performance event processing applications while enforcing event flow security
requirements. This is achieved by implementing and evaluating a simple financial stock
trading platform in DEFCon. The DEFCon implementation is compared to a similar
implementation in Marketcetera [Asa09]. Marketcetera is an open-source trading platform
written in Java and is one of the few available offerings in a market dominated by proprietary
solutions. It is gaining momentum by matching the performance offered by proprietary
systems [Sho09]. It also supports various features such as complex event processing, rapid
prototyping of trading strategies and modules to interact with different stock exchanges.
The overhead of event flow enforcement, i.e. enforcing requirements expressed with the DEFC
model, is measured in terms of reduced event processing performance and increased mem-
ory consumption. Processing performance is quantified through the two metrics from Sec-
tion 3.1.1: event throughput and processing latency.
The performance results show that DEFCon, despite enforcing DEFC, performs better
than Marketcetera. Marketcetera isolates the trading strategies of different traders using
separate JVMs. Instead, DEFCon enforces isolation as described in Section 3.3. This
allows significantly more trading strategies to be hosted on a single machine along with the
stock market feed. Overall, without the increased memory consumption from multiple JVMs,
DEFCon scales to 10 times the number of trading strategies while exhibiting low processing
latency and high throughput. This makes DEFCon suitable for co-location (§3.1) as more
traders may use a single machine for secure event processing.
3.5.1 Financial trading scenario
DEFCon and Marketcetera are evaluated using pairs trading (§3.1). We implemented pairs
trading in both systems. This section describes the pairs trading implementation in Mar-
ketcetera and DEFCon.
Marketcetera implementation
In Marketcetera, the pairs trading strategy is implemented inside a Strategy Agent. Strategy
Agents are components that encapsulate the trading strategies of different users and provide
the facilities to interact with the rest of the platform. To isolate the processing inside different
Strategy Agents, Marketcetera instantiates a separate JVM for each Strategy Agent. Mar-
ketcetera does not impose restrictions on event processing via the Strategy Agent. Therefore,
third-party trading strategies may leak any information that they receive and traders must
vouch for the correctness of every trading strategy. Brokering in Marketcetera is performed
via the Order Routing Service (ORS), which can be reached from the trading strategies via the
Strategy Agent. The ORS usually only routes orders to an external exchange for matching.
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To emulate a co-location scenario, the ORS is extended to match orders locally and generate
a resulting stock tick feed, which is sent to Strategy Agents. Our implementation is based on
Marketcetera version 1.5.0.
DEFCon implementation
In DEFCon, trading strategies of competing traders execute in the same JVM for low
communication latency. Traders express confidentiality requirements using the DEFC model
and DEFCon enforces these without fear of disclosure. Figure 3.8 illustrates the trading
platform as implemented in DEFCon. It introduces the following processing units:
Trader units encapsulate trading strategies. Each trader may provide multiple such units.
In the given scenario, Trader units buy and sell stocks using pairs trading.
Pair Monitor units monitor the prices of two stocks and notify other units when an in-
vestment threshold is reached. They offer a basic monitoring service to Trader units to
facilitate the rapid development of trading strategies development such as pairs trading.
A Broker unit matches bid/ask orders from Trader units. When a match can occur locally,
no external stock exchange is involved.
A Stock Exchange unit communicates orders that cannot be matched locally to a remote
stock exchange. It is also the source of the stock tick feed for trades that occur there.
A Regulator unit samples and inspects a subset of local trades for compliance with financial
regulations. For example, it may verify that the volume of traded stock in any given
transaction does not exceed a quota.
DEFCon operation
Figure 3.8 illustrates the nine steps that describe the operation of the DEFCon trading
platform:
Step 1: A Trader unit initiates the monitoring of two stocks by publishing a Monitor event.
As the trader’s selection of stocks must be kept private independently of the processing in
the Pairs Monitor, Trader 1 allocates a unique tag t1 and uses it to protect the event. The
corresponding Pairs Monitor unit is delegated the t+1 privilege and can read the event content
to learn which stock prices to monitor. Since the Pairs Monitor unit does not possess t−1 ,
DEFCon ensures that any subsequent events that it publishes include t1 in their parts’
confidentiality compartments.
Step 2: The Pair Monitor unit issues two subscriptions for Tick events that correspond to
the two stocks referenced in the Monitor event. All Pair Monitor units are instantiated with
the tag s in their input integrity level and therefore are confined to receive only events that
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contain s. Given that only the Stock Exchange unit owns s, no other unit may influence the
monitoring of stock prices that the Pair Monitor performs, e.g. by publishing bogus events.
Step 3: Once the triggering price ratio according to the pairs trading algorithm occurs, the
Pairs Monitor unit publishes a Match event to indicate this observation. Since the Match
event is guaranteed to be protected with t1, only Trader 1 has t
+
1 , which is required to receive
the event. Additionally, the Pairs Monitor attaches the tag s to the Match event’s integrity
label, thus proving to Trader 1 that the stock price observation is based on authoritative
data.
Step 4: Given the Match event from the Pairs Monitor and trader-specific logic, Trader 1
may decide to issue an order to sell stock. It publishes a Bid event with the details of the
order and the credentials of the trader involved. The order should be matched using the local
brokering facilities offered by the Broker unit. However, Trader 1 has three confidentiality
requirements for each published order: (1) the order must convey enough information to the
Broker to allow matching with other orders; (2) only the Broker should be able to identify the
trader that issued the order; and (3) no other unit should be able to correlate two different
orders of Trader 1. Units correlating events with their publishers may infer and replicate the
trading logic despite lacking knowledge of the publisher’s identity. The Broker is also not
fully trusted by Trader 1—the trader name in an order should never be disclosed to another
unit by the Broker. These requirements are satisfied by using different confidentiality tags
in the Bid event. The first part, symbol/price, is protected with tag b while the trader name
part is protected with an additional unique tag tr that used only for this event. The Broker
is the only unit with b+/b−, so it is free to match orders and disclose the results. However,
Trader 1 delegates to the Broker only t+r via the first Bid part. The Broker may then learn
the trader name but is forced to propagate tr to any subsequent events that it publishes.
Step 5: The Broker receives the Bid event, reads the first part and waits for a matching
ask order to complete the trade. The Broker uses a managed subscription (§3.4.3) to learn
trader identities and thus avoids cross-contamination from the unique tags used in different
Bid/Ask events.
Step 6: When two orders match, the Broker publishes a Trade event to notify the units
involved in the transaction. The first part of the event (symbol/price) contains public infor-
mation and is not protected. The two parts that contain the identities of the trading parties
(buyer/seller) are protected with the respective unique tag that each Trader unit used in
Step 4. Trader 1 may thus learn about its successful trade while DEFCon ensures that any
other unit in the system is confined to public information.
Step 7+8: A Regulator unit inspects the Trade events published to verify them for legal
compliance. It samples some of the events and inspects them in detail. To gain access
to event parts that are protected by unique tags, the Regulator requests the respective t+r
privilege on-demand from the Broker (Step 7). For the Broker to be able to delegate t+r , t
+auth
r
should have been included in the order in Step 4. The Regulator uses a managed subscription
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to discover the trader names and avoid cross-contamination. Any regulating violations are
reported to the Trader units that are referenced in the Trader event (Step 8). These Warning
events are protected by the respective tag used for the trader identity in Step 4.
Step 9: The Regulator unit republishes as Tick events the public information contained in
Trade events that comply with regulations. To enable Pair Monitor units to receive events
from the Regulator, the Regulator owns tag s and uses in the integrity compartment of its
output label.
3.5.2 Experimental results
The experimental evaluation of both DEFCon and Marketcetera is based on a synthetic
workload of stock ticks derived from trading traces made in the London Stock Exchange.
The prices in the original traces were modified in order to trigger periodically the pairs
trading algorithm and circumvent the problem of choosing correlated pairs of stocks from
real market data. To generate significant order load in both systems, the workload triggered
the pairs trading algorithm once every 10 stock ticks on average.
The evaluation demonstrates the performance of DEFCon and Marketcetera when varying
the number of active trading strategies. In both platforms, each trading strategy monitors a
pair of stocks. The selection of stocks is made according to a Zipf distribution that provides
results skewed towards specific pairs. This models the fact that certain stock pairs are
known to be highly correlated, and therefore they are more likely to be selected by traders
that engage in pairs trading. The experiments were run on a dual processor Intel Xeon E5540
2.53 GHz machine with 1 GiB of maximum heap memory allocated to each JVM, which was
Sun’s Hostspot JVM version 1.6.0 16.
DEFCon performance
To evaluate the event throughput performance of DEFCon, the Stock Exchange unit contin-
uously replays the stock tick traces at the maximum achievable rate. The rate is measured
every 100 ms. The Stock Exchange unit implementation is single-threaded to follow a design
with a single point of entry for incoming market data.
Figure 3.9 shows the median event throughput when increasing the number of trading strate-
gies (each strategy is implemented as a separate Trader unit). In the simplest configu-
ration without any security enforcement (no security), the event throughput ranges from
220,000 events per second with 200 Trader units to 75,000 events with 2,000 Trader units.
Next, labels are introduced that control event propagation. To evaluate the benefit of freezing
objects instead of copying them (§3.4.1), the experiment is repeated while defensively copying
shared data in API calls (labels+clone) or freezing them(labels+freeze). The labels+clone
scenario results in a significant reduction of event throughout (around 30%) despite most
units only including simple data structures in events. The overhead in labels+freeze is neg-
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Figure 3.9: Maximum supported event throughput in DEFCon while increasing the number of
trading strategies.
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Figure 3.10: Maximum supported event throughput in Marketcetera while increasing the number
of trading strategies.
ligible with throughput being close to the no security scenario. Adding the runtime checks
to enforce isolation (§3.3) leads to an overall reduction in throughput close to 20% (la-
bels+freeze+isolation) when compared to the no security case, which is largely independent
of the number of Trader units.
Event processing latency is measured end-to-end as the timespan between the publication of
a Tick event by the Stock Exchange unit and the publication of the resulting Trade event by
the Broker. It includes the event processing time spent inside the Pair Monitor, Trader and
Broker units as well as the event dispatch time between them.
Figure 3.11 shows the 70th percentile of observed latencies to finalise a trade while increasing
the number of active trading strategies. We ignore higher latency percentiles because they are
affected by transient order queuing and by activations of the Java garbage collector. When
a popular pair of stocks triggers pairs trading, the increased load in the Broker introduces
transient queuing in the system, which affects the latency of order processing. Such spikes
are common in trading, e.g. when markets open. The Java garbage collector is also invoked
periodically and causes the preemption of processing threads. Its operation typically lasts
for 20 ms and increases the latency of individual events.
Figure 3.11 shows that the baseline for event processing latency, i.e. without security enforce-
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Figure 3.12: Breakdown of event processing latency in Marketcetera to its individual contributions
while increasing the number of trading strategies.
ment (no security), is 0.5 ms, independently of the number of Trader units. Label checks
that clone or freeze event parts and labels increase latency to approximately 1 ms. Isolation
introduces an additional 1 ms of latency resulting in an overall latency close to 2 ms, inde-
pendently of the number of Trader units. The behaviour of the system changes with more
than 1500 active Trading units because it becomes overloaded.
The memory consumption while conducting these experiments is shown in Figure 3.13.
Across all scenarios, about 300 MiB is the size of the stock tick traces that the Stock Exchange
unit caches to maximise throughput. As expected, both the labels+freeze and labels+clone
configurations require little additional memory because they do not introduce significant new
data structures in memory. Instead, the AOP framework used to enforce isolation requires
an additional 50 MiB for 200 Trader units and increases linearly with the number of Trader
units. With more than 1500 Trader units and close to overload, the additional memory
required peaks at 200 MiB.
Marketcetera performance
The results from DEFCon are compared with the performance of Marketcetera. Figure 3.10
shows the median throughput in Marketcetera. The event rate is comparable to DEFCon
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Figure 3.13: Amount of used memory in DEFCon, as a function of the number of traders.
when only two trading strategies are active but scalability suffers after that. With 10 trading
strategies, throughput falls below 10,000 events per second. The design issue that causes
this behaviour is the lack of a centralised event dispatcher in the Marketcetera architecture
similar to the one in DEFCon (§3.4.2). Therefore each Strategy Agent has to filter market
data individually.
Latency measurements in Marketcetera refer to the same timespan as DEFCon, i.e. from
publishing a tick event to generating the corresponding trade event. To avoid scheduling
phenomena that may affect our results, latency measurements are performed using a low
stock tick event rate of 1,000 events per second. Figure 3.12 shows the 70th percentile of
latencies in Marketcetera when increasing the number of active trading strategies. Com-
pared to the equivalent results for DEFCon on the same page, Marketcetera offers in-
creased latency and does not scale as well. The latency in Marketcetera is close to 8 ms
(ticks+orders+processing). To better understand this effect, the figure breaks it down to
its individual contributions: filtering of market data and processing events according to the
pairs trading algorithm in Strategy Agents (processing), propagating stock tick events from
the ORS to individual Strategy Agents for processing (ticks+processing) and propagating
orders when the trading algorithm is triggered (ticks+orders+processing). With 100 trading
strategies and an increasing cost of dispatching events across JVMs, the latency due to event
propagation surpasses the latency due to the actual processing performed. In contrast, DE-
FCon takes advantage of the shared memory address space and centralised event dispatch,
staying close to 1 ms for significantly more trading strategies.
The occupied memory is also higher in Marketcetera due to the additional memory needed
to instantiate multiple JVMs and filter market data separately in each JVM. For 20 trading
strategies, the Marketcetera deployment requires 2 GiB of memory and reaches 6 GiB with
100 strategies. DEFCon instead supports 1,500 trading strategies with less than 1 GiB of
memory.
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DEFCon and Marketcetera have different security features. DEFCon offers pairs trading
as a service to traders. DEFC guarantees that information about the stocks selected for
monitoring cannot leak to any other units in the platform despite implementation errors or
malicious disclosure attempts. Instead, each Strategy Agent in Marketcetera can commu-
nicate with arbitrary recipients—bugs in the pairs trading implementation may therefore
disclose a trader’s choices. Offering trading strategies as third-party components is not sup-
ported in Marketcetera. Similarly, bugs in the implementation of the ORS in Marketcetera
may disclose the identities of the traders involved in a transaction. In contrast, Trader units
in DEFCon use unique tags to protect their identities and ensure that the Broker forgoes
any state that contains the trader id. The Broker is forced to comply and “forget” the trader
id or it is unable to contact other units due to cross-contamination. Finally, implementing
a regulatory service in Marketcetera is a challenging task that requires the integration with
multiple components of the platform. Only Marketcetera’s original developers may reliably
implement it. In DEFCon, the Regulator is implemented without any additional changes to
the platform and only requires the delegation of the privileges necessary for its operation.
3.5.3 Discussion
The experimental evaluation demonstrates that DEFCon’s design has the potential to im-
prove the performance and the security properties of existing event processing systems. How-
ever, the comparative evaluation of DEFCon and Marketcetera has some limitations.
The most significant limitation is that we lack the expertise required to build a Marketcetera
trading platform that is equivalent to our DEFCon implementation. In both systems, the
implementation of trading strategies, the brokering algorithm and the market data filtering
logic is either identical or closely resembles each other. Marketcetera, however, may sup-
port additional features that are orthogonal to the event dispatching functionality that we
evaluate. For example, Marketcetera may offer ordering guarantees while dispatching events
that DEFCon’s publish/subscribe communication does not provide. Such features can slow
the Marketcetera implementation down, yet they may also be useful for DEFCon. If such
features are implemented in DEFCon, they will reduce the performance gap of the two sys-
tems. In addition, our integration of local order brokering into Marketcetera may be lacking
compared to a similar implementation by Marketcetera’s original authors.
A second limitation is the lack of representative and comprehensive benchmarks to test
both systems across a variety of scenarios. Our evaluation scenario shows that DEFCon
has a significant advantage when high-throughput event streams are filtered by many event
processing units. It does not, however, cover other use cases, in which the workload due to
the task that the event processing system performs is significantly different.
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3.6 Summary
High-performance event processing applications, for example, as found in algorithmic stock
trading, need end-to-end data flow enforcement that does not degrade performance. In this
chapter, we presented DEFCon: an event processing and runtime taint tracking system that
enforces Decentralised Event Flow Control (DEFC).
DEFC meets the particular security needs of event processing by providing data flow guaran-
tees for event data in the presence of processing bugs and intentional leaks. DEFC is a taint
tracking policy that associates taint meta-data, i.e. labels, with event parts. Units receive
labeled events and may process a subset of their parts without tainting all the data that
the events contain. DEFC separates tag privileges from delegation privileges and enforces
arbitrary event processing topologies.
DEFCon relies on isolation at the programming language level. We described a practical
methodology for achieving isolation in Java with low manual effort. By isolating processing
units running in the same memory address space, we tried to strike a balance between the
need for isolation and efficient inter-isolate communication. The isolation methodology first
prevents units from using certain Java features and, second, statically identifies code paths
in the JDK that may be used by units to exchange data. Such code paths are intercepted
and checked at runtime using aspect-oriented programming techniques.
The evaluation of DEFCon highlights the practicality and efficiency of the approach when
compared to an open-source trading platform. DEFCon scales to significantly more trading
strategies hosted on a single machine and co-located with the stock exchange. This enables
more traders to react to market changes with low latency.
Overall, DEFCon demonstrates runtime taint tracking as a practical and efficient solution
for supporting demanding applications with minimal performance penalty. DEFCon allows
applications in event processing to introduce data flow requirements and subsequently con-
trols data flow accordingly. Isolation of trading strategies is achieved in the same memory
address space without changes to the language runtime that are hard to maintain in practice.
In the next chapter, we will present a policy language for specifying data flow policy in
DEFCon. High-level data flow policy specification simplifies the interaction of developers
with the system. We will also show how data flow policy can be enforced across multiple
DEFCon engines.
114
Chapter 4
Event Flow Security Policy
In this chapter, we describe our solution for expressing and enforcing data flow policy in
distributed event processing applications. When distribution is considered, data flow policy
may involve multiple organisational domains, which have different requirements about data
flow in their systems. We argue that data flow policy should be expressed by policy ad-
ministrators in the different organisational domains using a high-level policy language. By
separating data flow policy from the units that constitute the event processing application,
policy administrators can focus on the high-level requirements without being overwhelmed
by implementation details. The high-level data flow policy of the application may then be
translated to DEFC labels, tags and unit privileges for enforcement.
This chapter presents the above ideas in the context of DEFCon, focusing on enforcement
of multi-domain event flow security policy. The chapter starts by introducing the need for a
policy language in distributed and multi-domain DEFCon applications and the requirements
for such a policy language. Section 4.2 presents the policy language using examples of the
different event flow constraints that it supports. Section 4.3 covers the additional components
in the DEFCon architecture for policy management and translation to DEFC. Finally, we
evaluate our approach for event flow policy with the example from healthcare (§2.1.2) in
Section 4.4. The chapter finishes with a summary in Section 4.5.
4.1 Requirements
Without additional support from the event processing system, unit developers are responsible
for the specification and initialisation of event flow security policy. As an example, consider
the pairs trading scenario from Section 3.5. Financial event processing units are expected to
allocate tags correctly, identify the units that should process published events and delegate
privileges to enable event processing. Event flow policy that specifies how events are labeled
is assumed to be controlled by a single trusted administrator. This is acceptable when event
flow policy only involves units deployed on a single DEFCon engine. Instead, if units execute
in different DEFCon engines that are under the control of different organisational domains,
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Figure 4.1: Specifying event flow policy within a bank. The figure illustrates DPL flow categories
that define boundaries around data and event flow constraints that specify which units can pass data
over those boundaries (see Section 4.2).
no single trusted administrator may exist. In such a multi-domain scenario, the assumption
that event flow policy is specified using low-level tags is error-prone and, as discussed below,
inadequate for enforcing event flow.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a multi-domain event processing scenario from banking. The event
processing infrastructure of a bank hosts event processing applications on behalf of multiple
departments: trading units identify investment opportunities and perform order brokering,
retail banking units oversee credit card transactions and private wealth management units
collect and report events of interest to the bank’s private clients. Events are exchanged
between units within the same department and across units that belong to different depart-
ments.
Each department in this bank has different event flow policies that the event processing
system must enforce. For example, the trading department requires that data stored in events
published there should never reach units involved in retail banking unless disclosed by units
in Regulation or in Portfolio Reporting. The wealth management department accepts events
from the trading department but requires that specific units receive them first. Specifying
event flow policy using DEFC tags and privileges directly in such a multi-domain event
processing scenario has a number of limitations:
L1: Low-level policy specification. Event flow policy specification using DEFC tags and
privileges is error-prone. Unit developers must translate high-level event flow policy
such as “units in Portfolio Reporting cannot send events to the group of units of the
retail banking department” to tags and privileges. Event flow policy enforcement may
be jeopardised by errors in the translation process, by bugs in the code that allocates
tags and delegates privileges at runtime, or by unit vulnerabilities that enable other
units to request and obtain privileges that they should not possess.
L2: Tight coupling of units with event flow policy. Event flow policy specification us-
ing DEFC tags and privileges makes changing policy difficult. Changes to policy re-
quire units to allocate different tags or alter the distribution of privileges between them.
This can only occur via modifications to unit source code. Units involved in the same
policy specification are therefore coupled by the policy that they implement. Changing
the policy requires, in the worst case, modifications to every unit referenced by it.
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L3: No shared semantics of tags across engines. Event flow policy specification using
DEFC tags and privileges requires the translation of tags between DEFCon engines.
The reason for this is that tags are opaque random bit-strings (§3.2.2) specific to
the engine in which they are allocated. As such, tags cannot be used in a different
DEFCon engine. A potential solution is for engines to enforce that local tags are
globally unique, e.g. by communicating tag allocations or devising a structured naming
scheme for tags. Any solution will require additional coordination in distributed event
processing applications and must not reduce event processing performance within each
engine.
L4: No support for event flow enforcement across engines. Event flow policy spec-
ification using DEFC tags and privileges cannot enforce event flow across engines
without delegating privileges. Assume, for example, that units in Brokering should not
directly send events to units of the retail banking department. If all units execute in a
single DEFCon engine, this requires labeling all events emitted by units of the trading
department with a single confidentiality tag t and delegating to units in Brokering only
t+. This policy cannot be enforced when the units are deployed in different engines.
Assume that units of the retail banking department are deployed in engine A and the
units of the trading department are deployed in engine B. The units in Brokering,
however, are deployed in engine A instead of B. Notice that units in Brokering must
still communicate with the other units of the trading department in engine B. To
allow external communication, the engine A requires that units in Brokering have t−
(i.e. declassification privilege). However, given t− for a confidentiality tag, a unit can
ignore t and send events to arbitrary destinations.
L5: Inconsistent understanding of policy between domains. Event flow policy spec-
ification using DEFC tags and privileges does not protect against inconsistent policy
implementation between domains. In the example of Figure 4.1, units in Portfolio Re-
porting are allowed to send events to units of the wealth management department.
Assume, however, that the two departments use different DEFCon engines and that
the trading department requires that only specific units of the wealth management
department are able to publicly release event content. Units of the trading department
cannot ensure that units of the wealth management department enforce this event flow
policy. The reason is that the trading department is unable to control event processing
in a different DEFCon engine and correctness depends on the event flow policy of the
wealth management department.
Based on the above limitations (L1–L5), when specifying event flow policy in distributed
and multi-domain event processing applications, we devise the following requirements:
 Event flow security policy should be separate from the label-based enforcement mech-
anism inside DEFCon (see L1).
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 Event flow security policy should be decoupled from the implementation of event pro-
cessing units (see L2).
 Event flow security policy should provide guarantees for confidentiality and integrity of
event flow in distributed and multi-domain event processing applications end-to-end,
i.e. across DEFCon engines that belong to different organisational domains (see L3,
L4).
 Event flow security policy should support specification by multiple collaborating do-
mains while the result is amenable to checks for inconsistencies (see L5).
 Event flow security policy should map to DEFC efficiently, without resulting in an
unacceptable degradation of event processing performance.
4.2 The DEFCon Policy Language
The DEFCon Policy Language (DPL) [MPE+10b] is a language for event flow policy spec-
ification in DEFCon applications. This section presents DPL using the banking scenario
from the previous section. The events in that scenario can be divided into event flow cat-
egories. An event flow category in DPL identifies a set of events with separate data flow
requirements. Examples of potential event flow categories are (1) all the events that units
of the trading department publish (see Figure 4.1); (2) the events that units in Portfolio
Reporting publish that must be sent to the wealth management department; and (3) the
events that units in Brokering publish. Such events must propagate amongst a particular set
of units and must not be corrupted or leaked by software faults or malicious behaviour of
any unit involved in their processing. Event flow categories are marked in Figure 4.1 with
dashed lines.
4.2.1 Event flow constraints
DPL defines data flow policy as event flow constraints on event flow categories. Event flow
constraints restrict how units communicate the data that they receive from events in the flow
category (event flow confidentiality) and which data may be used when generating events in
the flow category (event flow integrity). They have the following syntax:
flow constraint ::= 〈flow name〉 ':' '{' flow part (',' flow part)∗ '}' '.'
flow part ::= ['->'] 〈processing context〉 ['->']
As an example, consider a constraint to describe how events should flow between units in
Figure 4.1. For the trading department, all units in Bank Trading should only generate
events for other units in the same department and should not send data directly to the retail
banking department. Units in Regulation instead are trusted to output events outside the
trading department. The following DPL example specifies a flow constraint for events in the
trading department:
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1 trading flow: {
2 −> bank trading,
3 −> client trading,
4 brokering,
5 regulation −>,
6 portfolio reporting −>
7 }
Flow constraints start with a name of an event flow category (e.g. trading flow, line 1)
and then list flow parts (lines 2–6), stating whether each part can emit events inside the flow
or receive events published outside the flow. Each flow part represents a processing context,
i.e. a set of units. A processing context can be as specific as a single processing unit that
receives and emits events of the particular flow or may enclose many processing units1. A
unit that is included in a flow constraint without any additional annotation is able to receive
events from and publish events in the flow. However, it is sand-boxed and may not receive or
publish events outside the event flow. In this particular example, the brokering unit may
receive but not disclose events from the trading flow. Therefore, it resembles the operation
of the DEFCon Broker unit in Section 3.5.
Flow parts in DPL constraints may be annotated using the -> operator. If -> is used as
a prefix operator (lines 2 and 3), the annotated unit is an input unit for that event flow.
Input units, such as bank trading and client trading for trading flow, are restricted to
publish events in the flow but there are no restrictions for their input. They can receive events
from arbitrary sources and publish them “inside” the flow. If -> is used as a postfix operator
instead (lines 5 and 6), the annotated unit is an output unit for that event flow. Output units,
such as regulation and portfolio reporting in trading flow, are restricted to receive
events from within the flow only, and they are able to publish events without restrictions.
If -> is used as both a prefix and postfix annotation, the corresponding unit is free to
receive and publish events ignoring the flow constraint. Input and output units therefore
have a degree of freedom when receiving and publishing events, respectively; input units may
choose to receive events either “inside” or “outside” the event flow and output units may
similarly publish events “inside” or “outside” the flow.
A single event flow constraint restricts event processing to guarantee the confidentiality and
the integrity of events in a flow. For example, the trading flow constraint specifies that
only the bank trading and client trading units may mark events as having trading flow
integrity. These two units protect other units in the flow from receiving bogus events. Sim-
ilarly, only the regulation and portfolio reporting units are privileged to communicate
freely events published by units in trading flow. Again, these two units prevent information
disclosure that may potentially occur via other units in the trading flow constraint.
1To simplify the discussion, a processing context is assumed to be equivalent to a single unit; this assump-
tion is relaxed in Section 4.2.5, in which the general case is addressed. The rest of the section switches to
lower-case names for units to highlight that, in reality, the discussion refers to processing contexts.
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Sand-boxed units have their input and output restricted by the flow constraint and, due to
the enforcement of DPL policies with DEFC (presented later in Section 4.3), they cannot
receive or emit events in violation of the constraint. As a consequence, the unit code that
has to be trusted to maintain the integrity of the event flow is limited to input units and,
for the confidentiality of the event flow, to output units.
There are two ways that policy specification can distinguish flows of information by applying
flow constraints: vertical and horizontal flow separation. Vertical flow separation is applied
in flow constraints that require end-to-end restrictions on event processing from input to
output. Horizontal flow separation is used to separate individual stages of event processing
from each other, effectively guaranteeing that transformations on events are applied in the
correct order.
4.2.2 Vertical flow separation
Each flow constraint in DPL describes the propagation of events with different security
requirements. The policy administrator may provide arbitrary event flow constraints that
reference non-overlapping sets of units. Such flow constraints separate event processing verti-
cally, i.e. each constraint is enforced independently of other constraints. If, however, two flow
constraints reference overlapping set of units, the constraints—when enforced collectively—
may cut off units from input events or prevent units from publishing events. Overall, verti-
cal flow separation should never prevent the event flow to reach all units referenced by the
constraints.
As an example, consider the units referenced by the trading flow constraint from the pre-
vious section. Assume that the regulation unit should only monitor the trading activity
of the bank and not its clients, while the portfolio reporting unit should only report to
units of the wealth management department the results of client trading activity. These
event flow requirements may be specified in DPL using two constraints as follows:
1 bank trading flow: {
2 −> bank trading,
3 −> client trading,
4 brokering,
5 regulation −>
6 }
1 client trading flow: {
2 −> bank trading,
3 −> client trading,
4 brokering,
5 portfolio reporting −>
6 }
The intersection of two flow constraints may introduce conflicting flow requirements for events
received or published. For example, the bank trading flow and client trading flow con-
straints both reference three units: bank trading, client trading and brokering (Fig-
ure 4.2(a)). Some events that brokering publishes should be part of one flow (e.g. events
that mark successful trades of the bank published to regulation) while others should be part
of both flows (e.g. events exchanged between brokering, bank trading and client trading
units that issue, handle and respond to orders). Events published by units at the intersection
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Figure 4.2: Vertical (a) and horizontal (c) flow separation in DPL. Each type of flow separation
permits different communication flows, presented in (b) and (d) respectively.
of the two event flows (e.g. by brokering) may be received by other units at the intersection
or by units in one of the two flows that are also input units for the other flow. This, however,
is not the case for either the regulation or the portfolio reporting units. Therefore these
units cannot receive events from the other three units. They are, in effect, cut off from in-
put. Figure 4.2(b) illustrates the possible interactions between units from Figure 4.2(a) and
highlights this problem. DEFCon checks DPL policies for such consistency errors before
activation and alerts the administrator (see Section 4.3.1).
There are two ways to address the above issue and allow events to reach regulation and
portfolio reporting units. The first is to split every shared unit into two units, one for
each flow constraint. This acknowledges the fact that the taint tracking system cannot track
separate event flows within a single unit. Therefore splitting a unit enables DEFCon to
track event flow in each and thus enforce constraints between different units. The second
solution is to relax the two flow constraints to allow a communication pattern that was not
possible before, for example, to enable brokering to act an input and output unit for the
bank trading flow and client trading flow constraints. The downside of this is that the
brokering unit will have to be trusted to categorise correctly the events that it publishes in
the two different flows that it is part of.
4.2.3 Horizontal flow separation
A second use of flow constraints is to control event propagation between categories. The goal
is to “chain” different constraints together and control how events propagate from one set
of units to the next. When flow constraints separate event processing in stages, horizontal
flow separation occurs.
With horizontal flow separation, a policy administrator enforces a specific ordering in event
processing. In contrast to vertical flow separation that separates the processing of events
with different security requirements, horizontal flow separation ensures that only particular
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units may communicate data from the events in one flow constraint to the events in another
constraint. In addition, units that are assigned to this role are forced not to disclose data
from the events that they process.
Consider the trading flow constraint from Section 4.2.1. An alternative policy would re-
quire that all trades are audited for regulatory or reporting purposes. This can be expressed
with the horizontal separation of trading flow into two new flow constraints as follows:
1 brokering flow: {
2 −> bank trading,
3 −> client trading,
4 brokering −>
5 }
1 auditing flow: {
2 −> brokering,
3 regulation −>,
4 portfolio reporting−>
5 }
As seen in Figure 4.2(c), the two flow constrains share references to a single unit, i.e.
brokering. In contrast to vertical flow separation in Figure 4.2(a), these flow constraints
neither cut off a unit from input events nor preclude a unit from outputting events (Fig-
ure 4.2(d)). Instead, the intersection of the two flows benefits event flow enforcement. The
shared unit, brokering, may only receive events from the bank trading or client trading
units but, as an output unit for brokering flow, it is able to communicate the events
that it outputs freely. The auditing flow, however, references brokering as an input unit
thus brokering may only output events that are covered by the auditing flow constraint.
Overall, data propagate from events in the brokering flow to events in the auditing flow,
event processing occurs in two consecutive steps and units that are not referenced by the
two constraints may not affect the process or identify the data it involves.
4.2.4 Parameterisation
Some event flow policies require that multiple flow constraints with the same structure
are separated vertically, e.g. to isolate the processing of different clients. DPL provides
a simple method to define multiple such constraints using parameters. For example, the
client trading flow constraint may be parameterised with the parameter client name to
ensure that all units involved in order processing for a given client are not used for trading
on behalf of other clients:
1 client trading flow[client name]: {
2 −> bank trading[client name],
3 −> client trading[client name],
4 brokering[client name],
5 portfolio reporting[client name] −>
6 }
Parameters may appear both in flow category names and next to processing units. When
one or more parameters appear next to the flow category name, for each value of these
parameters, a different flow constraint is generated. If instead the flow category name is
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not parameterised (while at least one of the units in the constraint is), a single constraint
is assumed that references each unit independently of the parameter’s value. For example,
a single flow constraint that forces all trading activity to reach portfolio reporting units
via brokering is:
1 reporting flow: {
2 −> brokering[client name],
3 portfolio reporting[client name] −>
4 }
As with horizontal and vertical flow separation, the communication patterns that arise due
to parameterised constraints must not cut off units from input or prevent output.
4.2.5 Event processing contexts
Up to this point, all DPL examples are presented assuming a deployment scenario in a
single domain. A single policy administrator who understands the requirements of every
unit specifies the event flow policy. In such scenarios, the policy administrator can link the
policy constraints to the units and events that they refer to. This assumption, however, is
unrealistic for multi-domain deployments for two reasons: (1) it places a significant burden
on the policy administrator who may not be in a position to known and understand in detail
the event flow policy of multiple domains; and (2) when the event processing application
involves units administered by different domains, no single domain has control over the
details of event processing performed in other domains.
Key to specifying event flow policy for event processing applications that span multiple
organisational domains is the abstraction of the relationship between flow constraints and
units. DPL achieves this with the concept of event processing contexts. Event processing
contexts are hierarchical names that capture the organisational structure of domains involved
in event processing. The hierarchical structure of contexts facilitates policy specification for
multi-domain applications: domains provide policy constraints at a level that administrators
are familiar with and then rely on a federated naming service (analogous to the domain name
system (DNS) [Moc87]) for policy specification in other domains (see Section 4.3.1).
Processing context names provide a common, consistent and structured naming scheme to
correlate the policies provided by different organisations with units that execute on multiple
DEFCon engines. Flow constraints reference contexts—not units—and contexts are mapped
to units at a later stage. This relaxes the assumption made in Section 4.2.1 and allows for
multiple units referenced in a flow constraint via a single processing context.
By referencing a context, a flow constraint restricts event processing not only for units that
are directly part of this context but also for units that are part of any of its sub-contexts.
Processing contexts are illustrated with two examples. The first example further refines
the event flow inside the portfolio reporting context (Figure 4.1) with an additional
constraint:
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1 anon portfolio reporting: {
2 −> portfolio reporting.anonymiser,
3 portfolio reporting.stats −>
4 }
The anon portfolio reporting constraint introduces anonymiser and stats as two sub-
contexts of portfolio reporting. It ensures that all events are anonymised before they are
used for calculating statistics in reports. Every unit that is instantiated inside these two sub-
contexts is restricted not only from the anon portfolio reporting constraint but also from
other policy flow constraints that reference portfolio reporting (e.g. the trading flow
constraint).
As a second multi-domain example, consider an alternative version of the trading flow
constraint defined as follows:
1 policy uk.co.bank
2 trading flow: {
3 −> bank trading,
4 −> .uk.co.hedge−fund.trading,
5 brokering,
6 .uk.co.fsa.regulation.bank −>,
7 portfolio reporting −>
8 }
Identifiers that start with a dot (e.g. .uk.co.hedge-fund.trading) mark fully-qualified
context names. These may refer to arbitrary contexts. Unqualified context names, such as
bank trading, are appended to the context prefix that is specified in each policy’s header
(e.g. uk.co.bank).
The example constraint introduces two new contexts: a hedge fund that the bank trades
with (i.e. uk.co.hedge-fund) and the UK’s Financial Services Authority (i.e. uk.co.fsa).
Each organisation authorises the bank to introduce DPL flow constraints that restrict event
processing in its contexts (here trading flow). The actual units that are instantiated in
these contexts and the events that these units publish, however, are under the control of the
respective organisation. Additional flow constraints that further specify event flow policy in
these contexts are managed directly by the respective organisations.
4.3 Policy enforcement
DEFCon engines enforce DPL policies by translating them into local constraints on event
processing units. The process involves three new components implemented in DEFCon
engines, which are presented in Figure 4.3:
Policy manager. The policy manager instantiates, authorises and checksDPL policies that
refer to contexts local to an engine. It also coordinates with other policy managers in
remote DEFCon engines to instantiate multi-domain policies.
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Figure 4.3: Overview of the DEFCon architecture with DPL support.
Policy compiler. The policy compiler translates DPL policies that have been checked by
the policy manager into DEFC labels and privileges for enforcement.
Event communicator. Event communicators propagate events securely between DEF-
Con engines. They ensure that the local tags that are attached to events in each
DEFCon engine correspond to the same DPL flow constraints.
The operations that these components perform are presented in detail in the following three
sections.
4.3.1 Distributed policy management
To support large multi-domain deployments, DEFCon needs to handle many DPL process-
ing contexts deployed across different engines. The policy manager is the central component
that handles the deployment of such policies. It identifies the DEFCon engines that should
participate in the enforcement of a new DPL policy, ensures that all engines authorise the
policy and finally verifies that the policy does not result in inconsistencies such as those
presented in Section 4. The following paragraphs describe these steps.
Step 1: Context to engine resolution
After the submission of a new DPL policy, the first step of the policy manager is to resolve
each DEFCon engine responsible for contexts mentioned in the policy’s flow constraints.
A distributed directory service is used for this process. The directory service may also be
federated to allow participating organisations to own part of the namespace. DNS fulfills
these requirements.
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Step 2: Engine trust verification
The second step of the policy manager is to verify that the local administrator trusts
that all remote engines referenced by the policy enforce event flow. This is an impor-
tant step because the actual DEFCon engines referenced in a policy are only known af-
ter context resolution. For example, the context .uk.co.fsa.regulation.bank from the
trading flow constraint in Section 4.2.5 may map to a local engine hosted by the bank
while the context .uk.co.hedge-fund.trading may map to a remotely-hosted engine at
the defcon.hedge-fund.co.uk domain. The policy manager has to verify that a remote
engine and the organisation that manages it are trusted for event flow enforcement.
Each domain, such as bank.co.uk, specifies a set of engines that it trusts for policy en-
forcement. There are multiple possible choices for this, e.g. specifying trusted engines per
organisation, per individual DPL policy or even per individual flow constraint. It is assumed
that a trusted DEFCon engine correctly enforces event flow across all the units that it hosts,
and therefore no additional trust is required per unit.
Step 3: Policy deployment and authorisation
With trust in all engines verified, the policy manager communicates theDPL policy to remote
engines. At this step, it is the policy managers of the remote engines that must authorise the
operation. The remote policy managers should not only be able to authenticate the engine
that initiates the policy deployment but also they should determine whether the engine is
allowed to place constraints on the contexts that the policy references. An authorisation
scheme using PKI may be used for this purpose. For example, an SPKI-based [EFL+99]
solution could use authorisation certificates [Gol99] that specify which DEFCon engines
may place constraints on another engine’s contexts. Identity certificates [Ell96] may then
map DEFCon engines to organisations. Certificates can be integrated with the directory
service from Step 1.
Step 4: Policy checking
The last step of the policy manager before instantiating a new policy is to verify that the
policy does not lead to inconsistencies, as those described in the vertical separation example
in Section 4.2.2. An inconsistent policy may violate liveness properties leading to units that
are isolated from input or from output due to policy constraints.
The policy manager recursively fetches all policies that reference contexts from the new
policy. It then performs a graph traversal to ensure that every context has at least a single
event flow from the outside world that provides it with input (reachability) and at least a
single output event flow towards the outside world (observability). While this strategy does
not prevent all policy mis-configurations (e.g. a unit may require a different event flow policy
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than the one imposed), it ensures the bare minimum: input and output are possible to and
from every context referenced in the policy.
4.3.2 Translation to DEFC
After the policy was distributed to engines, the policy compiler in each engine sets up policy
enforcement. DEFC is used for this purpose. The policy compiler translates DPL con-
straints to DEFC using a simple algorithm. For each flow constraint f , a tag pair (cf , if ) is
created. The policy compiler chooses the labels for units affected by the constraint according
to their context. It assigns privileges over cf and if according to the position that a context
appears in the DPL flow constraint:
 Sandboxed and output units are initialised with cf and if in the confidentiality and
integrity components of their input label, respectively. They are given c+f and therefore
can receive every event published inside the flow constraint. They are, however, limited
to receive events that contain if , i.e. they can only receive events from inside the flow
constraint.
 Sandboxed and input units are initialised with cf and if in the confidentiality and
integrity components of their output label, respectively. They are constrained to have
their emitted events contain cf , i.e. they publish inside the flow constraint.
 Input units are additionally given i+f and therefore can produce events with if , even
without having if in the integrity component of their input label. They are also given
i−f . With these two privileges, they can receive events from outside of the flow and
publish them inside the flow.
 Output units are given c−f to produce events without cf , even if the confidentiality
component of their input label contains cf . Therefore, they are able to receive events
from inside the flow constraint and publish events outside the constraint.
In the multi-domain example from Section 4.2.5, assume that the three sub-contexts of
uk.co.bank, i.e. bank trading, brokering and portfolio reporting, are resolved to the
the DEFCon engine at defcon.bank.co.uk. The policy compiler of this engine creates
the c, i tags to represent the trading flow constraint. Processing units are instantiated as
follows:
 in bank trading, with empty input label and Lout = ({c}, {i});
 in brokering, with Lin = Lout = ({c}, {i}); and
 in portfolio reporting, with Lin = ({c}, {i}) and an empty output label.
The policy compiler also reserves i+ and i− for units in bank trading, c+ for units in
brokering and c− for units in portfolio reporting. Delegation privileges such as c−auth
and i+auth are not allocated to units.
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When a context is mentioned in multiple flow constraints, the labels and privileges of units
instantiated in that context are the union of the corresponding labels and privileges as a
result of each individual constraint. For example, a unit in a context sand-boxed by two
constraints, f1 and f2, has L
in = Lout = ({cf1, cf2}, {if1, if2}).
Instantiating a unit at an arbitrary contamination level is possible due to the contamina-
tion independence property of the DEFCon API (§3.4.1). Units may process events at an
arbitrary contamination level without having to adapt manually to the policy enforced.
4.3.3 Inter-engine communication
Units that execute in different DEFCon engines need to exchange events according to event
flow policy. As described in Section 4.1, this requires additional support from the engine.
DEFC only permits a unit to receive low integrity data from external sources and send
sensitive data to arbitrary destinations if its input and output labels are empty. With empty
input/output labels, a unit may not participate in the processing of sensitive events. Alter-
natively, a unit may process sensitive events and communicate with the external environment
as long as it owns each tag in its input and output label. Allocating tag privileges, how-
ever, is unacceptable if an event flow policy is to constrain a unit—with declassification and
endorsement privileges, units can ignore event flow enforcement.
DEFCon addresses this problem with a trusted proxy unit, the event communicator. The
event communicator accumulates privileges for each tag used for DPL enforcement in a
DEFCon engine. Therefore it can transfer every event published to another engine. Using
the services of the event communicator in a remote DEFCon engine, the tags that protect
an event locally are replaced by their equivalents in the remote engine. The mapping of tags
across engines is agreed on-demand when a request to transfer an event is made. It relies on
Step 3 of policy deployment (§4.3.1), which ensures that the relevant constraints are known
to all engines with contexts referenced by a policy.
The multi-domain trading flow constraint from Section 4.2.5 is an example in which inter-
engine communication is required. The policy involves both the defcon.bank.co.uk and
defcon.hedge-fund.co.uk engines (assuming such a resolution of the .uk.co.bank and
.uk.co.hedge-fund.trading contexts). In order to enforce the trading flow constraint
locally, the policy manager at defcon.hedge-fund.co.uk first allocates the tags c, i and then
ensures that units in .uk.co.hedge-fund.trading are instantiated with Lout = ({c}, {i})
and the i+ privilege. These units cannot use the network to send events to brokering
units in defcon.bank.co.uk directly. The reason is that their output events are sensitive
according to the trading flow constraint; only units in .uk.co.fsa.regulation.bank or
portfolio reporting may disclose data.
The two policy managers in defcon.bank.co.uk and defcon.hedge-fund.co.uk contact
their local event communicators to delegate to them i+, i−, c+ and c−. When a unit in
the .uk.co.hedge-fund.trading context sends an event to units in defcon.bank.co.uk, it
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Figure 4.4: A multi-domain healthcare scenario for the evaluation of DPL. Different domains
provide domain-specific DPL constraints while an NHS policy limits event flow.
routes the message through the local event communicator. It is the event communicator in
defcon.hedge-fund.co.uk that exercises the c− privilege to declassify, encrypt and transmit
the message to the event communicator in defcon.bank.co.uk. The defcon.bank.co.uk
event communicator uses its own local i+ and c+ privileges to ensure that the published
message is received only by units in the contexts referenced in the trading flow constraint.
4.4 Evaluation
The goal of the experimental evaluation is to demonstrate the ease-of-use and the effectiveness
of DPL from a software developer’s standpoint. DPL is used to specify event flow security
policy for a multi-domain event processing application in healthcare. The section presents
how DEFCon enforces DPL policy and compares event flow policy specification in DPL to
manipulating DEFC labels and privileges directly.
4.4.1 Healthcare case study
The healthcare scenario used for the evaluation has been presented before in Section 2.1.2—
it is repeated in Figure 4.4 for easy reference. The workflow begins when a patient visits
a GP and the GP requests a biopsy. A Pathology Laboratory analyses the biopsy request
(event e1) and responds with a report to the GP (event e2). A Cancer Registry must receive
a report (event e3) each time that the a Pathology Laboratory identifies a cancer incident.
The event flow policy should provide the following three guarantees:
G1 Pathology reports are only sent to the GP that requested them or to the Cancer
Registry.
G2 The Cancer Registry only receives pathology reports that involve cancer incidents.
G3 In the Pathology Lab, sensitive patient data are released only to doctors that perform
biopsies.
Listing 4.1 shows an extract of the policy that enforces these guarantees. The extract consists
of three different sections:
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1 policy uk.nhs
2 sensitive[gp]: {
3 −> GP[gp].sensitive −>,
4 −> lab.doc[gp] −>,
5 lab.sensitive[gp],
6 cancer registry.sensitive −>
7 }
8
9 policy uk.nhs.GP
10 patient data[gp]: {
11 −> sensitive.patient data,
12 sensitive.patient data.anonymiser −>,
13 sensitive.pathology.patient data −>,
14 −> sensitive.pathology.incoming reports
15 }
16 anonymised data[gp]: {
17 −> sensitive.patient data.anonymiser,
18 statistics.anonymised data −> ,
19 performance.anonymised data −>
20 }
21 path request[gp]: {
22 −> sensitive.pathology.test requests,
23 −> sensitive.pathology.patient data,
24 .uk.nhs.lab.doc[gp].pathology.request −>,
25 .uk.nhs.lab.sensitive[gp].pathology.patient data −>
26 }
27
28 policy uk.nhs.lab
29 path report[gp]: {
30 −> doc[gp].pathology.report,
31 −> sensitive[gp].pathology.patient data,
32 .uk.nhs.GP[gp].sensitive.pathology.incoming reports −>
33 sensitive[gp].pathology.cancer registry reporting −>
34 }
35 tumour report: {
36 −> sensitive[gp].pathology.cancer registry reporting,
37 .uk.nhs.cancer registry.sensitive.pathology.incoming −>
38 }
Listing 4.1: Extract of the DPL policy specification for the healthcare scenario [MPE+10b]. Con-
straints not related to the scenario of Figure 4.4 are omitted.
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policy uk.nhs The first seven lines specify an NHS policy that constraints data propaga-
tion. It ensures that the sensitive data of GPs are only handled by specific contexts
inside Pathology Laboratories and the Cancer Registry. The parameter gp is used to
avoid introducing multiple identical policies for individual GPs. The lab context is
subdivided into two sub-contexts, lab.doc and lab.sensitive, with only the first,
which represents doctors, being trusted for input/output (lines 4–5). Finally, the
cancer registry.sensitive context allows the Cancer Registry to output reports
for computing tumor statistics (line 6).
policy uk.nhs.GP GPs specify individual policies to refine or extend the constraints im-
posed by the global NHS policy (lines 9–26). This particular policy specifies three
constraints that focus on (1) handling of patient data and incoming lab reports,
(2) anonymisation of data for statistical purposes and (3) controlling the propagation
of data in pathology requests. The first constraint (patient data) states in line 12
that an anonymiser context processes events first, i.e. before units designed to oper-
ate on unclassified data (e.g. units that measure performance or calculate statistics in
lines 16–20). Similarly, the patient data constraint allows patient data to be used in
pathology requests (line 13) while the path request constraint restricts sensitive data
propagation in other domains (lines 21–26). Line 14 states that incoming pathology
reports may be combined with sensitive patient data.
policy uk.nhs.lab The lab specifies how units in its contexts interact when generating
reports. The first constraint (lines 29–34) ensures that reports may combine data from
the lab.doc and lab.sensitive contexts. The resulting reports may be disclosed
only by units in the GP context (line 32) or to the Cancer Registry (line 33). The sec-
ond tumor report constraint in lines 35–38 restricts event processing when generating
tumor reports.
4.4.2 Policy enforcement with DEFC
The specification of event flow policy in DPL is translated to DEFC tags and privileges
using the process described in Section 4.3. Each flow constraint is enforced with a single tag
pair (ix, cx). The x subscript in the tag symbols indicates the line number in Listing 4.1, in
which the corresponding constraint is defined.
The enforcement of guarantee G1, which restricts the propagation of pathology reports, oc-
curs via the cgp29 and c35 tags. The tag c
gp
29 protects the reports of a particular GP. Only units in
two contexts possess the declassification privilege cgp−29 , which is required to declassify reports:
GP[gp].sensitive.pathology.incoming report and lab.sensitive[gp].pathology.cancer re-
gistry reporting. The first context represents units of the requesting GP, and thus is the
correct destination for reports. The second context restricts unit output to contain c35 due
to the constraint in line 35. G1 is therefore enforced because only units in cancer regis-
try.pathology.incoming may remove the tag c35.
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The second guarantee, G2, which restricts the Cancer Registry to receive only cancer pathol-
ogy reports, is enforced with tag i35. Units in the cancer registry.pathology.incoming
context—tainted by i35— may only receive events from units in the lab.sensitive[gp].pa-
thology.cancer registry reporting context that possess the i+35 privilege (line 33). While
the actual identification of tumor reports depends on the correctness of units in lab.sen-
sitive[gp].pathology.cancer registry reporting, DEFCon ensures afterwards that only
events that have been identified as tumor reports may flow to the Cancer Registry.
The third guarantee, G3, which restricts patient data disclosure to doctors, is enforced us-
ing tag cgp2 . Units in GP[gp].sensitive generate sensitive events protected with tag c
gp
2 .
The only units in the Pathology Laboratory that can declassify cgp2 and reveal sensitive
patient data to doctors are those in lab.doc[gp]. Due to GP policy, however, this does
not occur directly: the patient data constraint (line 10) requires that sensitive data pub-
lished by units in GP[gp].sensitive.patient data are also protected with tag cgp10. Units
in lab.doc[gp].pathology.request belong to a sub-context of lab.doc[gp]. Therefore they
possess the cgp−2 privilege but lack c
gp−
10 . Nevertheless, the flow constraint in line 21 allows
units in GP[gp].sensitive.pathology.patient data to swap cgp10 with c
gp
21 (horizontal flow sep-
aration), which units in lab.doc[gp].pathology.request can declassify.
The DPL policy fragment consists of 38 lines. If n is the total number of GPs in the system,
the policy fragment generates 10n+2 tags. These correspond to one pair of tags for each GP
in every flow constraint in lines 1–34 and one pair of tags for tumor report. Assuming that
one unit is instantiated in each context, at least 14n+2 units must be initialised with correct
taints. The policy fragment also results in the distribution 34n+1 privileges according to the
procedure in Section 4.3. To provide just the initial set-up of labels manually, a programmer
would have to call the low-level DEFCon API (§3.4.1) at least 24n + 4 times, i.e. one call
to changeInOutLabel() and changeOutLabel() per unit. Instead, these calls, the creation
of tags and the distribution of privileges are carried out by DEFCon automatically.
4.5 Summary
Event processing applications can be distributed across multiple administrative domains.
Enforcing event flow in such scenarios is challenging because policy specification using DEFC
primitives is prone to developer errors, couples policy with unit implementations and requires
privileged unit code to transfer events between engines.
In this chapter, we presented how DEFCon achieves practical end-to-end enforcement of
distributed event flow security policy based on the DEFCon Policy Language (DPL). DPL
captures policies that control the propagation of events in DEFCon independently of the
actions of the units involved. It decouples event flow policy from event processing.
This chapter provided details on DPL and sketched its semantics. DPL expresses event flow
policy through the definition of constraints on event flow categories. Flow constraints are
used to control the processing of events with similar event flow requirements. Event flows can
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be separated vertically in order to isolate processing events with different security require-
ments from each other. Horizontal flow separation instead controls processing within a single
flow by introducing specific ordering in how units process events. Flow constraints, however,
reference processing contexts—not units. Processing contexts are hierarchical names that
enable a domain to specify additional event flow restrictions between the controlled units.
DPL policies are checked for consistency and are translated to DEFC for enforcement.
Three new components were introduced in the DEFCon architecture: (1) a policy manager
coordinates engines to setup policies and checks that every processing context referenced
is observable and reachable; (2) a policy compiler translates policies to DEFC; and (3)
event communicators propagate events between engines and translate tags to their local
representations at runtime.
The evaluation of DPL with a real-world healthcare workflow from the NHS demonstrates
the practicality of the approach. Event flow security policy using DPL is easier to develop
compared to manipulating DEFC labels and privileges directly, enables different domains
to refine and enforce policy collaboratively, and reduces the number of DEFCon API calls
that unit developers must perform.
In the next chapter, we shift our focus from the back-end of an organisation (in which event
processing is often performed) to its front-end. Web applications may display a significant
subset of the data that an organisation maintains internally, and thus they are an attractive
target for attackers. PHP Aspis is a runtime taint tracking system that protects web
applications from injection attacks while, similar to DEFCon, avoids modifications to the
execution platform.
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Chapter 5
Partial Taint Tracking for
Protection against Injection
Attacks
This chapter presents PHP Aspis [PMP11], our solution for practical protection of PHP web
applications from injection attacks. PHP Aspis improves on past research on runtime taint
tracking by combining three important ideas: (1) partial taint tracking, i.e. it propagates
taint meta-data only to parts of a web application, which significantly minimises the per-
formance overhead of the approach; (2) configurable taint categories, i.e. the administrator
adapts the taint tracking policy to match the sanitisation operations of the web application
and thus avoids redundant sanitisation operations; and (3) source code transformations, i.e.
taint tracking is performed by transforming the source code of a web application without
changes to the language interpreter.
PHP Aspis augments PHP values with taint meta-data to track their origin in order to
detect and prevent injection attacks while they occur. To improve performance, it performs
taint tracking only in an application’s most vulnerable parts: third-party plugins. It then
rewrites the source code of the web application to invoke additional methods that propagate
taint meta-data explicitly during processing. Overall, taint tracking via source code transfor-
mations enables administrators to harden the security of web applications without the need
to maintain a custom interpreter. Partial taint tracking reduces the performance overhead
of the approach while we show that it effectively prevents real-world injection exploits.
This chapter starts with an introduction of why partial taint tracking is a suitable defence
against injection attacks in web applications. Section 5.2 presents an overview of PHP As-
pis as a runtime taint tracking system, and Section 5.3 describes the taint meta-data that
it maintains. Section 5.4 covers the core of the transformations that PHP Aspis applies.
Transformations on web application source code, however, create incompatibilities with parts
of the application that are not transformed due to partial taint tracking. Section 5.5 ex-
plains how interoperability is achieved between these two parts of a transformed application.
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PHP Aspis is evaluated using Wordpress, the popular open source weblog platform, and
the chapter is summarised in Section 5.7.
5.1 The case for partial taint tracking
PHP is the most popular web development language, as indicated by web surveys1, and its
gentle learning curve often attracts less experienced developers. At the same time, PHP
lacks fully automated features that protect web applications from injection attacks (§2.3.3).
This increases the likelihood for less experienced developers to create web applications that
are vulnerable to injection attacks [FW11].
Less experienced developers frequently extend mature web applications through third-party
code in the form of plugins. Such extensibility is a popular feature for applications but
leads to a significant security threat from plugins. In 2009, the CVE database [MIT12]
reported that the Wordpress platform suffered from 15 injection vulnerabilities, out of which
13 were introduced by third-party plugins and only 2 involved the core platform. In 2010, the
breakdown was similar: 10 vulnerabilities were due to plugins and only 2 due to Wordpress.
Not all application code is equally prone to injection vulnerabilities. For example, Wordpress
spends much of its page generation time in initialisation code, setting up the platform before
handling a user request. This involves time-consuming steps such as querying the database
for installed plugins, setting them up and generating static parts of the response with theme-
aware headers and footers. Injection vulnerabilities tend to exist in code that handles user-
generated content: CVE-2010-4257, an SQL Injection vulnerability, involves a function that
handles track-backs after a user published a post; CVE-2009-3891, an XSS vulnerability,
involves a function that validates uploaded files; and CVE-2009-2851 and CVE-2010-4536,
again XSS vulnerabilities, involve functions that display user comments. Overall, injection
vulnerabilities are more likely to occur when less experienced developers handle user data.
Partial taint tracking exploits this observation to improve performance by propagating taint
meta-data only in the most vulnerable parts of an application. We suggest a simple heuristic
to decide when to propagate taint meta-data in a web application: focus on parts of third-
party plugins that handle user-generated data. This restricts the propagation of taint meta-
data to a small fraction of the codebase of a web application. As a consequence, the large
performance penalty that exhaustive taint tracking at the source code level would incur is
mitigated.
5.2 Overview
Figure 5.1 presents an overview of how PHP Aspis transforms applications. First, it
identifies specific data entry points, in which the application receives data from users (e.g.
1Programming Languages Popularity Website, http://langpop.com/, last accessed: 19/9/2012
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Figure 5.1: Overview of partial taint tracking using PHP Aspis.
through input HTTP requests) and transforms the application code to mark data as user-
generated (label 1). Second, it divides the application’s codebase into two parts: tracking
and non-tracking code. Instead of propagating taint meta-data everywhere, it focuses on
parts of the codebase that are more likely to contain code injection vulnerabilities (label 2).
In tracking code, PHP Aspis records the origin of data and filters data at output state-
ments when an injection vulnerability could exist (label 3). These output statements, in
which data filtering occurs, are called guarded sinks. For non-tracking code, PHP Aspis
does not perform taint tracking, trusting the code not to be vulnerable (label 4).
PHP Aspis prevents injection attacks transparently in existing applications. It achieves this
via character-level taint tracking, i.e. it tracks the taint meta-data of each string character
individually. As explained in Section 2.3.3, variable-level taint tracking implementations such
as Ruby’s taint mode are inadequate if the system must secure existing web applications
without developer input and without introducing false positives. Consider an application
that concatenates a user-provided value with a static HTML template, stores the result in
variable $v and returns $v to the client as a response. Inferring that variable $v is tainted
is not enough for transparent protection because, with this information alone, a runtime
taint tracking system can only stop the operation. This will prevent normal users from using
the application even if XSS is not performed. Instead, with character-level taint meta-data,
PHP Aspis can sanitise only the user-generated parts of $v and secure the web application
in the presence of XSS attacks transparently.
Figure 5.2 shows an application transformed with PHP Aspis in the context of the runtime
taint tracking model from Section 2.3.1. PHP Aspis performs source code transforma-
tions in the web application to intercept operations on variables and to invoke tracking
operations that propagate taint meta-data per string character. PHP Aspis stores and
propagates one bit of taint meta-data per character and per taint category (explained next
in Section 5.3). When the application invokes specific functions, in which an injection vul-
nerability may manifest (also referred to as sink functions), PHP Aspis imposes checking
operations, i.e. sink guards (see Section 5.3). Sink guards inspect the taint meta-data of
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Figure 5.2: PHP Aspis as a runtime taint tracking system. PHP Aspis uses character-level
tracking granularity that propagates taint meta-data within parts of an application.
the sink function’s parameters and abort the invocation or transparently prevent a poten-
tial attack. As explained next, PHP Aspis allows the administrator of a web application
to control the actions and the placement of checking operations via the definition of taint
categories.
5.3 Taint meta-data representation
The taint tracking policy that PHP Aspis enforces depends on the targeted web application.
First, only some types of injection vulnerabilities are feasible in a given web application. For
example, Eval injection can only occur if the application uses the eval statement. Second,
user data sanitisation depends on the business logic of a web application. For example, the
administrator of a weblog may be allowed to add Javascript code in a post’s comments while
unregistered users should be unable to do so.
PHP Aspis adapts its taint tracking policy to propagate taint meta-data only for injection
attacks that are possible in a given web application. It also monitors the application’s
sanitisation efforts to avoid sanitising data that the application considers secure. The next
two sections describe how the application administrator controls the taint tracking policy
in PHP Aspis and how the flexibility that PHP Aspis offers in specifying a taint tracking
policy affects the taint meta-data that it propagates.
5.3.1 Taint categories
PHP Aspis tracks multiple independent and user-provided taint categories. A taint cate-
gory is a generic way of defining how an application is supposed to sanitise data and how
PHP Aspis should enforce that the application always sanitises data before they are used.
A taint category consists of a set of sanitisation functions and a set of guarded sinks (i.e.
sink functions along with corresponding sink guards). Sanitisation functions can be PHP
library functions or may be defined by the application. A sanitisation function is called by
the application to transform untrusted user data so that they cannot be used for a particular
type of injection attack. Commonly, sanitisation functions either transform unsafe character
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Sanitisation htmlentities()
functions htmlspecialchars()
Guarded sinks
echo() ⇒ AspisAntiXss()
print() ⇒ AspisAntiXss()
. . .
Table 5.1: Excerpt of the definition of an XSS taint category in PHP Aspis.
sequences to safe equivalents (e.g. htmlentities) or filter out a subset of potentially dan-
gerous occurrences (e.g. by removing <script> but not <b>). Calls to sanitisation functions
by the application are intercepted, and PHP Aspis untaints the corresponding data to avoid
sanitising them again.
Sink guards are functions that protect data flow to sensitive sink functions. When a call to a
sink function is made, PHP Aspis invokes the sink guard with references to the parameters
passed to the sink function. The sink guard is a user-provided function that has access to the
relevant taint category meta-data and typically invokes one or more sanitisation functions
for that taint category.
For example, Table 5.1 shows an excerpt of an XSS taint category definition. It speci-
fies that a user-provided string can be echoed safely to the user after htmlentities or
htmlspecialchars has been invoked on it. The second part lists all functions that can
output strings to the user (e.g. echo, print etc.) and guards them with an external filter-
ing function (AspisAntiXss). The sink guard either aborts the print operation or sanitises
any remaining characters. The administrator can change the definitions of taint categories
according to the requirements of the application.
By listing all the sanitisation functions of an application in the relevant taint category,
PHP Aspis can monitor the application’s sanitisation efforts and adapt its tracking oper-
ations accordingly. When applied to a well-designed application, PHP Aspis untaints user
data as they get sanitised by the application, but before they reach the sink guards. Thus,
sink guards can apply a simple, application-agnostic sanitisation operation (e.g. htmlenti-
ties) acting as a “safety net” for cases, in which the application developer has omitted a call
to a sanitisation function. Some applications may not define explicit sanitisation functions or
these functions may be omitted from the relevant taint category. In such cases, sink guards
have to replicate the sanitisation logic of the application.
A different taint category must be used for each type of injection vulnerability. PHP As-
pis tracks different taint categories independently from each other. For example, when a
sanitisation function of an XSS taint category is called on a string, the string is still consid-
ered unsanitised for all other taint categories. This ensures that a sanitisation function for
handling one type of injection vulnerability is not used to sanitise data for another type.
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String Taint meta-data
$s='Hello' array(0=>false)
$n='John' array(0=>true)
$r=$s.$n array(0=>false, 5=>true)
Table 5.2: Representation of taint meta-data for a single taint category in PHP Aspis.
5.3.2 Storing taint meta-data
It is challenging to represent taint meta-data so that it supports arbitrary taint categories
and character-level taint tracking. This is due to the following properties of PHP:
P1 PHP is not object-oriented. Although it supports objects, built-in types such as string
cannot be augmented transparently with taint meta-data. This precludes solutions that
rely on altered class libraries (as suggested for Java [CW09]).
P2 PHP does not offer direct access to memory. Any solution must track PHP references
because variables’ memory addresses cannot be used [XBS06].
P3 PHP uses different assignment semantics for objects (“by reference”) compared to other
types including arrays (“by copy”). This property of PHP prevents the substitution of
a scalar type with an object without manually copying objects to avoid aliasing.
P4 PHP is a dynamically typed language, which means that there is no generic method
to identify all string variables statically.
Due to these properties, PHP Aspis uses arrays to store taint meta-data. Table 5.2 shows
how PHP Aspis encodes taint meta-data for a single taint category. For each string, it keeps
an array of character taints, with the index representing the first character that has a given
taint. In the example, string $s is untainted and $n is tainted. Their concatenation $r is
untainted from index 0 to 4 and tainted from index 5 onwards. Numerical values use the
same array-based approach for representing taint meta-data but only store a common taint
for all digits.
Taint meta-data must remain associated with the value that they refer to. As shown in
Table 5.3, this is achieved by enclosing the value and the taint meta-data inside an additional
array. First, all scalars such as 'Hello' and 12 are replaced with arrays (rows 1 and 2),
which is referred to as the value’s Aspis2. The Aspis contains the original value and an
array of the taint meta-data for all currently tracked taint categories (TaintCategories).
Similarly, scalars within arrays are transformed into Aspis-protected values.
According to property P4, PHP lacks static variable type information. Moreover, it offers
type identification functions at runtime. When scalars are replaced with arrays, the system
must be able to distinguish between an Aspis-protected value and a regular array. For this,
2“Aspis” is the name of the circular wooden shield used by soldiers in Ancient Greece.
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Original value Aspis-protected value
1. Hello array(Hello,TaintCategories)
2. 12 array(12,TaintCategories)
3. array() array(array(),false)
4. array(John)
array(
array(
array(John,TaintCategories)
)
,false)
5. array(13=>20)
array(
array(13=>
array(20,ContentTaintCategories,
KeyTaintCategories)
)
,false)
Table 5.3: Augmenting values with taint meta-data in PHP Aspis.
the resulting arrays are themselves enclosed in an Aspis-protected value, albeit without any
taint (false in rows 3 and 4). The original value of a variable can always be found at index 0
when Aspis-protected. Objects are handled analogously. Aspis-protected values can replace
original values in all places except for array keys: PHP arrays can only use the types string
or int as keys. To circumvent this, the key’s taint categories are attached to the content’s
Aspis (KeyTaintCategories) and the key retains its original type (row 5).
Overall, this taint representation is compatible with the language properties mentioned
above. By avoiding storing taint meta-data inside objects, an assignment cannot lead to
two separate values referencing the same taint meta-data (P3). By storing taint meta-data
in-place, variable aliasing correctly aliases taint meta-data (P2). Finally, by not storing
taint meta-data separately, the code transformations that enable taint propagation can be
limited to handling the original, Aspis-protected values correctly. As a result, the structure
of the application in terms of functions and classes remains unchanged, which simplifies
interoperability with non-tracking code, as explained in Section 5.5.
5.4 Taint tracking transformations
Based on the taint representation, PHP Aspis modifies an application to support taint
tracking. The source code transformations employed to achieve this, i.e. the taint track-
ing transformations, are applied to the part of the codebase that is marked as tracking
code (§5.2). These transformations achieve the first three steps from Figure 5.1: marking
data as untrusted at data entry points, propagating taint meta-data and invoking sink guards
at sink functions.
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Original expression Transformed expression
$s.$t concat($s,$t)
$l = &$m $l = &$m
$j = $i++ $j = postincr($i)
$b+$c add($b,$c)
if ($v) {} if ($v[0]) {}
foreach foreach
($a as $k=>$v) ($a[0] as $k=>$v)
{...} {restoreTaint($k,$v) ...}
Table 5.4: Example source code transformations in PHP Aspis. Transformations are used to
propagate taint meta-data and preserve the original program semantics in the presence of Aspis-
protected values.
5.4.1 Data entry points
Taint tracking transformations must mark any user-generated data as fully tainted, i.e. all
taint meta-data for each taint category in an Aspis-protected value should be set to true.
Any input channel, such as the incoming HTTP request, that is not under the direct control
of the application may potentially contain user-generated data.
In each transformed PHP script, PHP Aspis inserts initialisation code that (1) scans the
arrays that contain HTTP request data and identifies any values submitted to the script
by the user; (2) replaces all submitted values with their Aspis-enclosed counterparts; and
(3) marks user-submitted values as fully tainted (i.e. all taint meta-data for every taint
category have the value true). All constants defined in the script are also Aspis-protected,
but are marked as fully untainted (i.e. all taint meta-data for each taint category have the
value false). As a result, all initial values are Aspis-protected in the transformed script.
5.4.2 Taint propagation
Next all statements and expressions are transformed to (1) operate with Aspis-protected
values, (2) propagate taint meta-data correctly and (3) return Aspis-protected values.
Table 5.4 lists representative transformations for common operations supported by PHP As-
pis. Functions in the right-hand column are introduced to maintain the original semantics
and/or propagate taint meta-data. For example, concat replaces operations for string con-
catenation in PHP (e.g. double quotes or the concat operator “.”) and returns an Aspis-
protected result. Control statements are transformed to access the enclosed original values
directly. All these transformations do not introduce additional statements—only the foreach
transformation requires an extra call to restoreTaint to restore the taint meta-data of the
key for subsequent statements in the loop body. Notice that, before the call to restoreTaint
in the transformed expression, $k is a scalar value and not Aspis-protected. The meta-data
of $k are stored with the content $v (see row 5 of Table 5.3). The call to restoreTaint
ensures that $k is Aspis-protected for subsequent statements in the loop body.
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PHP function library
Without modifications, built-in PHP functions cannot operate on Aspis-protected values
and do not propagate taint meta-data. Since these functions are typically compiled for
performance reasons, PHP Aspis uses interceptor functions to intercept calls to them and
attach wrappers for taint meta-data propagation.
By default, PHP Aspis uses a generic interceptor for built-in functions. The generic inter-
ceptor reverts Aspis-protected parameters to their original values and wraps return values to
be Aspis-protected again. This default behaviour is acceptable for library functions that do
not propagate taint meta-data (e.g. fclose). However, the removal of taint meta-data from
result values may lead to false negatives in taint tracking. PHP Aspis therefore provides
custom interceptor functions for specific built-in functions (e.g. for sort and trim), which
ensure correct propagation of taint meta-data to the functions’ output. By increasing the
number of intercepted functions, the accuracy of taint tracking is improved and this reduces
the number of false negatives.
The purpose of a custom interceptor is to propagate taint meta-data from the input param-
eters to the return values. Such interceptors rely on the well-defined semantics of library
functions. When possible, the interceptor computes the meta-data of the return value based
on the meta-data of the inputs (e.g. substr). It then removes the taint meta-data from the
input values, invokes the original library function and attaches the computed meta-data to
the result value. Alternatively, the interceptor compares the result value to the value of the
function’s input parameters and infers the taint meta-data of the result.
As an example, consider the case of stripslashes, a function that removes backslashes
from a string. Assume that the interceptor for stripslashes receives a string with a taint
category array(0=>false,5=>true). The comparison of the original to the result string
identifies the actual character indices that stripslashes removed from the original string;
assume here, for simplicity, that only index 2 was removed. To calculate the taint meta-
data of the result, the interceptor subtracts from all taint category indices the total number
of characters removed before each index. Thus, it returns array(0=>false,4=>true) in
the given example. In total, 66 of the interceptors provided with the current prototype of
PHP Aspis use this method.
For other functions, the interceptor can use the original function to obtain a result with the
correct taint meta-data automatically. For example, usort sorts an array according to a
user-provided callback function and thus can sort Aspis-protected values without changes. If
the callback is a library function, the function is unable to compare Aspis-protected elements
and calls to usort would fail. When callbacks are used, custom interceptors introduce a new
callback replacing the old. The new callback calls the original callback after removing taint
meta-data from its parameters. In total, 21 of the interceptors provided with the current
prototype of PHP Aspis use this method.
For cases in which the taint meta-data of the result cannot be determined, such as for sort,
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an interceptor provides a separate, taint-aware version of the original PHP library function.
19 library functions are re-implemented in this way.
The current PHP Aspis prototype provides custom interceptors for 106 library functions.
These include most of the standard PHP string library, which is enough to propagate taint
meta-data in Wordpress effectively (see Section 5.6).
Dynamic features
PHP has many dynamic features, such as variable variables, variable function calls and
the eval and create function functions (§2.2.1). These are not compatible with Aspis-
protected values, but PHP Aspis must nevertheless maintain correct semantics.
Variable variables allow dynamic access to a variable based on the string stored in another
variable. Their transformation only requires access to the enclosed string. Thus a dynamic
access to a variable named $v is transformed from $$v to ${$v[0]}.
Variable function calls allow a script to call a function that is statically unknown. They are
supported in PHP using variables when invoking functions (e.g. $v()) or via specific library
functions (e.g. call user func array). PHP Aspis transforms these calls and inspects
them at runtime. When a library call is detected, PHP Aspis generates an interceptor, as
described in the previous section, at runtime.
The functions eval and create function are used to execute code generated at runtime.
Since application-generated code does not propagate taint meta-data, PHP Aspis must
apply the taint tracking transformations at runtime. To avoid a high runtime overhead,
PHP Aspis uses a caching mechanism, such as Zend Cache3, when available.
5.4.3 Guarded sinks
PHP Aspis protects web applications from injection vulnerabilities transparently using the
taint meta-data and the defined taint categories. As described in Section 5.3.1, sink guards
(specified as part of the taint categories) are invoked before the calls to their respective sink
functions. Sink guards use PHP’s sanitisation routines or define their own and transparently
sanitise untrusted user data before they are used in an unsafe way. For example, an SQL
filtering routine rejects queries with user-provided SQL operators or keywords [NTGG+05].
5.5 Partial taint tracking
The taint tracking transformations used by PHP Aspis require extensive changes to the
source code, which has an adverse impact on execution performance. To preserve program
3Zend Framework, http://framework.zend.com/, last accessed: 20/10/2012
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Figure 5.3: Example of an XSS vulnerability manifesting in non-tracking code.
semantics, transformations frequently require the replacement of efficient low-level operations
by slower, high-level ones (see Table 5.4).
Partial taint tracking aims to improve execution performance by limiting taint tracking to
the parts of the application, in which injection vulnerabilities are more likely to exist. Partial
taint tracking can be applied at the granularity of contexts: functions, classes or the global
scope. The administrator can assign each of these to be of the following types: tracking or
non-tracking. The decision to classify application contexts into tracking or non-tracking is
based on the trust that the application administrator has in the developers of a given part
of the codebase.
The next two sections discuss the implications of partial taint tracking in an application
transformed by PHP Aspis. First, the presence of non-tracking code reduces the ability of
PHP Aspis to prevent injection attacks and, second, it requires additional transformations
to preserve program semantics. The following two sections describe how these problems are
overcome.
5.5.1 Detecting vulnerabilities in presence of non-tracking code
With partial taint tracking, PHP Aspis must maintain the ability to detect and mitigate
injection vulnerabilities in tracking code. When parts of the codebase are classified as non-
tracking code, injection vulnerabilities within these parts cannot be detected. However, in
the presence of non-tracking code, vulnerabilities that exist in tracking code may result in
injection attacks that only manifest themselves in non-tracking code. PHP Aspis must
detect and prevent such attacks.
Assume, for example, that the non-tracking function n in Figure 5.3 calls the tracking func-
tion t (step 1). It receives a user-provided value $v from function t (step 2) and prints this
value (step 3). If t fails to escape user input, n is unable to sanitise the data transparently.
This is because taint meta-data are not available in non-tracking code and calls to sensitive
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sinks, such as print, are not intercepted. From the perspective of n, t acts as the source of
user generated data that must be sanitised before they leave a tracking context.
To address this issue, PHP Aspis takes a conservative approach. It can sanitise data at the
boundary between tracking and non-tracking code. Taint categories are augmented for this
purpose. Non-tracking application functions must be added as sinks, and the administrator
should specify guard functions that sanitise user data passed as function parameters when
non-tracking functions are called from tracking code.
PHP Aspis adds another type of guards, source guards, to each taint category in order to
provide sanitisation functions when non-tracking code invokes a tracking function. A source
is a tracking function and the guard is the sanitisation function applied to its return value
when called from non-tracking code. In the example from Figure 5.3, the tracking function t
can act as a source of user-generated data when called from the non-tracking function n. A
guard for t would intercept t’s return value and apply htmlentities to any user-generated
characters. Sink and source guards ensure that user data are sanitised properly before they
can be used in non-tracking code.
Note though that this early sanitisation is an additional operation introduced by PHP Aspis.
Thus, if the non-tracking context that received the data attempts to sanitise them again,
the application would fail. Moreover, there is no generic sanitisation routine that can always
be applied because the final use of the data is unknown. Instead, early sanitisation is only
suitable for cases when both the final use of the data is known and the application does not
perform any additional sanitisation. This often holds for third-party plugin APIs, which are
typically well-documented.
5.5.2 Compatibility transformations
The taint tracking transformations in Section 5.4 generate code that handles Aspis-protected
values. For example, a tracking function that changes the case of a string parameter $p
expects to find the actual string in $p[0]. Such a function can no longer be called directly
from non-tracking code with a simple string for its parameter. Instead, PHP Aspis requires
additional transformations to intercept this call and automatically convert $p to an Aspis-
protected value, which is marked as fully untainted. Compatibility transformations are a set
of additional transformations that aim to preserve program semantics when PHP Aspis is
configured for partial taint tracking.
Compatibility transformations make changes to both tracking and non-tracking code. These
changes alter the data that are exchanged between a tracking and a non-tracking context,
i.e. data exchanged between functions, classes and code in the global scope. They strip
Aspis-protected values when passed to non-tracking contexts and restore Aspis protection
for tracking contexts.
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Function calls
A function call is the most common way of passing data across contexts. PHP Aspis
transforms all cross-context function calls: a call from a tracking to a non-tracking context
has its taint meta-data removed from parameters and the return value Aspis-protected again.
The opposite happens for calls from non-tracking to tracking contexts. This also applies to
method calls.
Transforming parameters and return values is similar to using the default interceptor function
from Section 5.4. User code, however, can share objects of user-defined classes. Instead of
transforming each internal object property, PHP Aspis uses proxy objects that decorate
the objects that are passed as parameters or returned as results. Consider an object $o of
class c and assume that c is marked as a tracking context. When $o is passed to the non-
tracking context of function f, f is unable to access $o’s state directly or call its methods.
Instead, it receives the decorator $do that points to $o internally. $do is then responsible for
transforming the parameters and the return values of method calls when such calls occur. It
also handles reads and writes of public object properties.
PHP also supports call-by-reference semantics for function parameters. Since changes to ref-
erence parameters by the callee are visible to the caller, these parameters effectively resemble
return values. Compatibility transformations handle reference parameters similarly to return
values—they are transformed to match the calling context (i.e. to Aspis-protected values if
the calling context is tracking and to normal values if the calling context is non-tracking)
after the function call returns.
This behaviour can lead to problems if a single variable is aliased by contexts of different
types, i.e. if a tracking class internally stores a reference to a variable also stored in a non-
tracking class. In such cases, PHP Aspis can no longer track these variables effectively
across contexts because references to them are not passed explicitly from one context to
the other (e.g. as a function call parameter) right before the variables are used. This forces
the administrator to mark both contexts as tracking or non-tracking. Since shared refer-
ences to internal state make it hard to maintain class invariants, they are considered bad
practice [Blo08], and a manual audit did not reveal any occurrences in Wordpress.
Accessing global variables
PHP functions can access references to variables in the global scope using the global key-
word. These variables may be Aspis-protected or not, depending on the type of the current
global context and previous function calls. The compatibility transformations rewrite global
statements: when the imported variable does not match the context of the function, the vari-
able is altered so that it can be used by the function. After the function returns, all imported
global variables must be reverted to their previous forms—return statements are preceded
with the necessary reverse transformations. When functions do not return values, reverse
transformations are added as the last function statement.
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Accessing superglobal variables
PHP also supports the notion of superglobals: arrays that include the HTTP request data
and can be accessed from any scope without a global declaration. Data in these arrays
are always kept Aspis-protected; removing their taint meta-data would effectively stop taint
tracking everywhere in the application. The reason is that if non-tracking code modifies the
data stored in superglobal arrays, the taint meta-data stored there would be invalidated, and
therefore the taint meta-data would have to be discarded. As a result, only tracking contexts
are permitted to access superglobals directly. In addition, compatibility transformations
enable limited access from non-tracking contexts when access can be statically detected (for
example, a direct read to $ GET but not an indirect access through an aliased variable).
This is because PHP Aspis does not perform static alias analysis to detect such indirect
accesses [JKK06b].
Include statements
PHP’s global scope includes code outside of function and class definitions and spans across
all included scripts. Compatibility transformations can handle different context types for
different scripts. This introduces a problem for variables in the global scope: they are Aspis-
protected when they are created by a tracking context but have their original value when
they are created by a non-tracking context.
To address this issue, PHP Aspis transforms temporarily all variables in the global scope to
be compatible with the current context of an included script, before an include statement is
executed. After the include, all global variables are transformed again to match the previous
context type. In PHP, two different files may serve different types of HTTP requests or may
be combined (i.e. via include) in order to serve the same type of requests. In the latter
case, transforming all variables in the global scope every time include is called significantly
reduces performance. To mitigate this performance overhead, code in the global scope of
different files but used to handle the same type of requests should be of the same context
type (i.e. tracking or non-tracking).
Dynamic features
Compatibility transformations intercept calls to create function and eval at runtime.
PHP Aspis rewrites the code provided as an input parameter to these functions based
on the context type of the caller: when non-tracking code calls eval, only the compatibility
transformations are applied and non-tracking code is generated. Moreover, create function
uses a global array to store the context type of the resulting function. This information is
used to adapt the function’s parameters and return value in subsequent calls.
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5.6 Evaluation
The goal of the evaluation section is to explore the effectiveness of PHP Aspis in preventing
real-world vulnerabilities and to measure the performance penalty for transformed applica-
tions. To achieve this, PHP Aspis is used to secure an installation of Wordpress, a popular
open source web logging platform, with known vulnerabilities.
The section first describes how an administrator sets up PHP Aspis to protect a Word-
press installation. It then discusses the vulnerabilities observed and shows how PHP Aspis
addresses them. Finally, the performance penalty that PHP Aspis incurs is measured for
multiple applications, and the evaluation finishes with a short discussion about the practi-
cality of the approach.
5.6.1 Securing Wordpress
The extensibility of Wordpress relies on a set of hooks defined at certain places during
request handling. User-provided functions can attach to these hooks and multiple types are
supported: actions are used by plugins to carry out operations in response to certain events
(e.g. sending an email when a new post is published), and filters allow a plugin to alter data
before they are used by Wordpress (e.g. a post must receive special formatting before being
displayed).
A plugin contains a set of event handlers for specific actions or filters and their initialisation
code. Plugin scripts can also be requested directly via HTTP requests from a client (i.e. via
direct requests to .php files of the plugin). The web server executes these plugin scripts and
returns their response to the client. In such cases, plugin scripts execute outside of the main
Wordpress page generation process.
Each plugin is secured from injection vulnerabilities using PHP Aspis as follows.
1. The functions, classes and scripts defined by the plugin are listed and the relevant
contexts are marked as tracking.
2. The plugin is automatically inspected for possible sensitive sinks, such as print state-
ments and SQL queries. This step involves deciding upon the taint categories to be
used in order to avoid irrelevant tracking (i.e. avoid maintaining taint meta-data for
Eval injection if no eval statements exist).
3. A list of event handlers is obtained from the add filter statements used by the plugin.
The taint category definitions are augmented with these handlers as guarded sources
because return values of filters are subsequently used by Wordpress (§5.5).
4. Any plugin initialisation code is classified as non-tracking because it is less likely to
contain injection vulnerabilities (§5.1).
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5.6.2 Security
Table 5.5 lists all injection vulnerabilities reported in Wordpress plugins in 2010 and in
the first quarter of 2011. For each vulnerable plugin, the vulnerability is verified using the
attack vector described in the CVE report. The same attack vector is then replayed on an
installation protected by PHP Aspis. The table shows whether the attack is prevented in
the installation protected with PHP Aspis. The table also presents the total number of
guarded sources specified as part of the taint category to secure the event handlers that each
plugin registers as filters (§5.6.1).
The experiments are done on the latest vulnerable plugin version, as mentioned in a CVE
report, running on Wordpress 2.9.2. PHP Aspis manages to prevent most vulnerabilities,
which can be summarised according to three different categories:
Direct request vulnerabilities
The most common type of vulnerability involves direct requests to plugin scripts. Many
scripts do not perform sanitisation for certain parameters (e.g. CVE 2010-4518, CVE 2010-
2924, CVE 2010-4630, CVE 2010-4747 and CVE 2011-0740). Others do not anticipate invalid
parameter values and neglect to sanitise when printing error messages (e.g. CVE 2010-4637,
CVE 2010-3977 and CVE 2010-1186).
PHP Aspis manages to prevent all attack vectors described in these CVE reports by prop-
agating taint meta-data correctly from the HTTP parameters within the plugin scripts. Be-
fore printing or script termination statements such as die and exit are called, PHP Aspis
invokes sanitisation functions and prevents the injection attacks from succeeding.
Action vulnerabilities
Some of the plugins tested (e.g. CVE 2010-4402, CVE 2011-0641 and CVE 2011-1047) in-
troduce a vulnerability in an action event handler. Similarly, a few other plugins (e.g. CVE
2010-2924, CVE 2010-1186 and CVE 2011-1047) only exhibit a vulnerability after a direct
request but explicitly initialise Wordpress before servicing such a request. The common char-
acteristic of these two scenarios is that Wordpress, upon initialisation, transforms the $ GET
and $ POST superglobal arrays (these arrays store the parameters of the HTTP request) by
applying some preliminary functions to their values in wp-settings.php. As the Wordpress
initialisation code is classified as non-tracking, these functions effectively remove all taint
meta-data from the HTTP parameters and introduces a false negative for all plugins that
execute after Wordpress has loaded.
Since this behaviour is common for all plugins, taint tracking is used in a limited set of
Wordpress contexts—the functions add magic quotes, esc sql and the wpdb class—which
are invoked by the initialisation code of Wordpress. As the assignment statements that alter
the superglobal arrays are in the global scope of the wp-settings.php file, taint tracking is
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CVE Type Description
Guarded
Sources Prevented
2010-4518 XSS Plugin script wp-safe-search-jx.php, when
called directly, uses $ GET parameters to con-
struct the response.
1 3
2010-2924 SQLI Plugin script myLDlinker.php, when called di-
rectly, uses the $ GET parameter url to concate-
nate a query. The parameter is only partially
sanitised and it can contain SQL keywords.
2 3
2010-4630 XSS Plugin script create.php, when called directly,
echoes the $ REQUEST parameter action to the
client without any sanitisation.
0 3
2010-4747 XSS Plugin script popup.php, when called directly,
echoes the $ GET parameter pluginurl to the
client without any sanitisation.
1 3
2011-0740 XSS Plugin script magpie slashbox.php, when
called directly, echoes the $ GET parameter
rss url without any sanitisation.
1 3
2010-4637 XSS Plugin script handler image.php, when called
directly, calls a third party library with the $ GET
parameter i. The library echoes the parameter
if it does not have a valid value.
2 3
2010-3977 XSS Plugin script lib ajax.php, when called directly
with an invalid $ GET parameter rs, echoes the
invalid value to the client.
5 3
2010-1186 XSS Plugin script media rss.php, when called di-
rectly with an invalid $ GET parameter mode,
echoes the invalid value to the client.
15 3
2010-4402 XSS Plugin handler for the register form action
prefills the Wordpress registration page with
multiple $ GET/$ POST parameters.
6 3
2011-0641 XSS Plugin function iriStatPressSearch concate-
nates multiple $ GET parameters into an SQL
query without sanitisation and echoes that query.
2 3
2011-1047 SQLI Plugin scripts wpf.class.php, wpf-post.php
use $ GET/$ POST parameters to concatenate
SQL queries without sanitisation. Plugin script
feed.php behaves similarly when called directly.
1 3
2010-4277 XSS Plugin handler for the the content filter edits
a post before display and attaches video embed-
ding code.
3 3
2011-0759 XSS Plugin handlers for various filters echo to the
client configuration fields stored in the local
database that are not sanitised.
9 7
2011-0760 XSS Plugin handler for the the content filter echoes
to the client data fields stored in the local
database that are not sanitised.
1 7
2010-0673 SQLI The plugin was not publicly available.  
Table 5.5: Injection vulnerabilities in Wordpress plugins; as reported by the CVE database in 2010
and the first quarter of 2011. PHP Aspis prevents the majority of attacks from succeeding.
151
Partial Taint Tracking for Protection against Injection Attacks
performed in this context as well to ensure that taint meta-data are not lost.
Unfortunately, this file is central to the initialisation of Wordpress: enabling taint tracking
there leads to substantially reduced performance. To avoid this problem, a small function is
introduced that encloses the assignment statements and its context is marked as tracking.
This change required an extra three lines of code to define and call the function but it
improved performance significantly.
Filter vulnerabilities
From all tested plugins, only one (CVE 2010-4277) introduces a vulnerability in the code
attached to a filter hook. Although the behaviour described in the CVE report is verifiable,
it is likely intended functionality of Wordpress: the Javascript injection can be done only by
a user who is permitted to post Javascript-enabled text. PHP Aspis correctly marks the
post’s text as untainted before it is passed to the filter hook and avoids a false positive.
This plugin, however, was the only one with a reported vulnerability in code attached to
a filter hook. To test the associated source guard despite the discussion in the previous
paragraph, the plugin was edited to receive the text of posts from a tainted $ GET parameter
instead of the Wordpress hook. This indeed introduces an XSS vulnerability. With this
change, however, PHP Aspis properly propagates taint meta-data and correctly escapes the
dangerous Javascript in the source guard applied to the filter hook.
False positives and negatives
The taint tracking performed by PHP Aspis may result in false negatives. By propagating
taint meta-data accurately (see §5.6.4), the problem of false positives is largely avoided. False
negatives, however, can occur because they are introduced (1) by built-in library functions
that do not propagate taint meta-data; (2) by calls to non-tracking contexts; and (3) by data
flows that involve the file system or the database. In these cases, taint meta-data are removed
from data, and when that data are subsequently used, vulnerabilities cannot be prevented.
PHP Aspis’ current inability to propagate taint meta-data in the database is the reason
why the XSS vulnerabilities CVE 2011-0760 and CVE 2011-0759 are not prevented.
To reduce the rate of false negatives, interceptors are used that perform precise taint tracking
for all built-in library functions called by the tested plugins. In addition, classifying the
aforementioned set of Wordpress initialisation routines as tracking contexts is sufficient to
prevent all other reported injection vulnerabilities. Note that the last vulnerable plugin
(CVE 2010-0673) was withdrawn and thus not available for testing.
5.6.3 Performance
To evaluate the performance impact of PHP Aspis, the page generation time is measured
for:
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App. Tracking Page generation Penalty
Prime Off 44.9 ms -
Prime On 466.8 ms 10.4×
DB Off 0.4 ms -
DB On 1.3 ms 3.4×
WP Off 65.6 ms -
WP On 394.4 ms 6.0×
WP Partial 144.3 ms 2.2×
Table 5.6: Performance overhead of PHP Aspis in terms of page generation time.
 a simple prime number generator that tests each candidate number by dividing it by
all smaller integers (Prime);
 a typical script that queries the local database and returns an HTML response (DB);
 Wordpress (WP) with the vulnerable Embedded Video plugin (2010-4277). Wordpress
is configured to display a single post with a video link, which triggers the plugin on
page generation.
The measurements were taken on a 3 Ghz Intel Core 2 Duo E6850 machine with 4 GiB of
RAM, running Ubuntu 10.04 32-bit. The machine had PHP 5.3.3 and Zend Server 5.0.3 CE
installed, with Zend Optimizer and Zend Data Cache enabled. For each application, tracking
was enabled for two taint categories, XSS and SQL Injection.
Table 5.6 shows the 90th percentile of page generation times over 500 requests for various
configurations. Overall, performing taint tracking in the whole application (Tracking: On)
has a performance impact that increases page generation between 3.4× and 10.4×. The
overhead of PHP Aspis depends on how CPU intensive the application is: DB is the least
affected because its page generation is the result of a single database query. On the other
hand, Prime has the worst performance penalty of 10.4×, mostly due to the replacement of
efficient mathematical operators with function calls.
Performing taint tracking everywhere in Wordpress (WP) results in a 6.0× increase of page
generation time. With partial taint tracking configured only on the installed plugin (Track-
ing: Partial), page generation overhead is reduced significantly to 2.2×. Given that Word-
press uses globals extensively, the main source of performance reduction for the partial taint
tracking configuration are the checks on global variable access as part of the compatibility
transformations.
Although performing taint tracking everywhere in an application at the source code level
incurs a significant performance penalty, partial taint tracking can reduce the overhead
considerably. In practice, a 2.2× performance overhead when navigating Wordpress pages
with partial taint tracking is acceptable for deployments, in which security has priority over
performance.
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5.6.4 Discussion
PHP Aspis aims to be a practical tool for hardening existing PHP web applications against
injection attacks. It follows a design philosophy that assumes data are trusted when the
taint tracking system is unable to track taint propagation. In practice, this means that if
PHP Aspis cannot assess fully how to update taint meta-data (e.g. when accessing the i-th
element of an array a, in which i is tainted but the value stored in a[i] is not—should
a[i] be considered tainted?), it considers the result not to be tainted. The alternative
philosophy—assuming such data are untrusted—may result in false positives and affect ap-
plication semantics [SB09]. PHP Aspis favours a reduced ability to track data propagation
on some execution paths, leading to false negatives. For this, PHP Aspis should not be
trusted as the sole mechanism for protection against injection attacks.
Partial taint tracking is suited for applications, in which a partition between trusted and
untrusted components is justified, e.g. in applications that employ third-party code. In
addition, interactions across such components must be limited because, if data flow from a
tracking to a non-tracking context and back, taint meta-data may be lost. PHP Aspis also
does not propagate taint meta-data in file systems or databases. However, techniques for
this have been presented earlier [DC10, YWZK09].
Although the performance penalty of PHP Aspis can multiply the page generation time
several times, if taint tracking is limited only to a subset of a web application, the perfor-
mance penalty is reduced significantly while many real world vulnerabilities are mitigated.
The evaluation with Wordpress shows that PHP Aspis can offer increased protection for a
Wordpress installation when a moderate increase in page generation time is acceptable.
The evaluation of partial taint tracking with PHP Aspis, however, does not show the broad
applicability of partial taint tracking across different taint tracking systems and applications.
The 63% speedup of partial taint tracking compared to performing taint tracking everywhere
in Wordpress is indicative but does not prove that other taint tracking systems would benefit
in the same way. The reason is that the performance gains observed may be significant
only because performing taint tracking in PHP Aspis using source code transformations is
slow. Nevertheless, a similar system for applications written is C [CSL08] also demonstrates
significant performance gains. Exploring the applicability and the performance impact of
partial taint tracking as a generic method for reducing the overhead of variable-level runtime
taint tracking systems is left for future work.
PHP is a language without formal semantics. Available documentation is imprecise regarding
certain features (e.g. increment operators and their side effects), and there are behavioural
changes between interpreter versions (e.g. runtime call-by-reference semantics). Although
the source code transformation approach in PHP Aspis requires changes when the lan-
guage semantics changes, this cost is smaller than the maintenance of a third-party runtime
implementation that requires updates even with maintenance releases.
The taint tracking transformations in PHP Aspis support most common PHP features, as
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specified in the online manual4. Support for newer features from PHP5, such as namespaces
or closures, has not been implemented yet. This precludes an evaluation of the current
PHP Aspis prototype with applications that take advantage of these features (e.g. Drupal)
without additional engineering effort.
5.7 Summary
Injection vulnerabilities are a result of web applications using untrusted user data without
sanitisation. Manually ensuring the lack of injection vulnerabilities is challenging because it
requires that developers comprehensively track and sanitise user-provided data before they
are used in sensitive operations.
In this chapter, we presented PHP Aspis, a tool that applies partial taint tracking at the
source code level, with a focus on third-party extensions. PHP Aspis avoids the need for
taint tracking support in the PHP runtime. Instead it transforms application source code in
order to propagate taint meta-data explicitly as the application processes data.
PHP Aspis tracks taint meta-data for multiple taint categories. Taint categories allow
it to adapt to the sanitisation operations of different web applications and not replicate
sanitisation effort. At a high level, a taint category describes how PHP Aspis propagates
taint meta-data and how it uses these to protect against a single type of injection attacks.
Taint categories also specify the sanitisation functions that the web application is supposed
to use. Sanitisation functions are trusted to operate correctly by PHP Aspis. Therefore
any data that they return have their meta-data removed. Taint categories also define guard
functions, i.e. additional functions invoked automatically when calls to functions that can
be used in injection attacks are detected. Taint categories correspond directly to additional
bits of taint meta-data that PHP Aspis maintains per string character.
PHP Aspis divides application source code into tracking and non-tracking code. In tracking
code, all PHP values are transformed to Aspis-protected values, which are arrays that also
contain taint meta-data. Taint tracking transformations applied on tracking code ensure that
operations on Aspis-protected values maintain their semantics and additionally propagate
taint meta-data. A second set of compatibility transformations is applied to both tracking
and non-tracking code. These ensure the interoperability of tracking and non-tracking parts
of the application codebase.
The evaluation of PHP Aspis with Wordpress highlights the effectiveness of the approach in
preventing injection attacks. Partial taint tracking focused on Wordpress plugins reduces the
performance penalty of the approach by several times while still mitigating many injection
vulnerabilities.
Despite these contributions, PHP Aspis is limited by the lack of support for taint tracking
in the PHP interpreter. The source code transformations of PHP Aspis make the resulting
4PHP Online Manual, http://www.php.net/manual, last accessed: 18/1/2012
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applications easy to deploy (especially when compared to maintaining a third-party PHP
interpreter) but deployments in organisations with significant performance requirements are
challenging. In the next chapter, we present SafeWeb, a runtime taint tracking system
that combines design choices from both DEFCon and PHP Aspis to control sensitive data
dissemination, end-to-end, across an organisation. We show that the Ruby language allows
developers to collect and maintain meta-data with minimal overhead at runtime, and this
forms the basis of a practical and efficient runtime taint tracking system.
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Chapter 6
Protecting Data Confidentiality in
Ruby-based Web Applications
In this chapter we leverage runtime taint tracking to provide a practical solution for pro-
tecting patient data confidentiality in a cancer registry at the NHS. Our key ideas towards a
system that can readily be deployed given the constraints of the cancer registry are: (1) the
handling of web requests is decoupled from the processing of sensitive data for security;
(2) a runtime taint tracking system ensures that data flow is accurately tracked, end-to-end,
across the organisation’s systems; and (3) we leverage specific dynamic features of the Ruby
programming language, such as the ability to redeclare existing library methods, to propa-
gate taint meta-data and invoke checking operations without modifications to the language
interpreter. These three design choices result in a system that is easy to implement, efficient
and can be deployed easily because it requires few changes to existing infrastructure.
Our system, SafeWeb [HMP+11], is a Ruby-based runtime taint tracking system for pro-
tecting against accidental data disclosure in web applications. When data leave an organi-
sation’s central database, SafeWeb ensures that they are labeled correctly and processed
in an application-specific manner using event processing. Labels are used while process-
ing web requests. Taint tracking guarantees that developer errors cannot disclose sensitive
information in violation of application security policy. This reduces the need for extensive
security audits of new applications. Compared to previous taint tracking systems, SafeWeb
improves maintainability, performance and ease-of-use because its implementation builds on
standard features of Ruby.
This chapter presents SafeWeb starting with the functional and security requirements for
the cancer registry application. Section 6.2 provides a high-level overview of SafeWeb, fo-
cusing on the separation between sensitive data processing in the back-end of an organisation
and the presentation of sensitive data in the front-end. These two parts of SafeWeb are
described in detail in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. SafeWeb is evaluated in Section 6.5
by implementing a web application for a cancer registry in the NHS. The chapter finishes
with a summary in Section 6.6.
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6.1 Requirements
Many organisations in the public and private sectors collect, store and process sensitive
data. Maintaining data confidentiality is crucial for such organisations. Two things must be
ensured at all times: (1) the organisation’s infrastructure and applications must not contain
vulnerabilities that may be exploited to disclose or modify sensitive data, and (2) the data
processing performed must be compliant with the organisation’s security policy.
Guaranteeing data confidentiality is hard, costly and time-consuming when following cur-
rent industry best practices. Organisations typically employ multiple security measures such
as risk assessments, internal security code reviews and external consultations with security
experts. All these measures introduce a significant overhead during development and can
be seen as the primary reason for limited development of new services. For example, organ-
isations within the NHS that handle sensitive patient data struggle to create new medical
applications with a potential to improve patient care (see Section 6.1.1).
Runtime taint tracking can minimise the auditing effort required and therefore reduce the
cost of developing new applications. SafeWeb’s goal is to implement taint tracking within
the constraints of a production environment, leverage taint tracking to guarantee data con-
fidentiality in applications and shift the auditing effort to the taint tracking system instead.
This approach minimises the need for code audit of each new application because the same
taint tracking system can guarantee data confidentiality across multiple applications.
6.1.1 The case for a data quality assurance application in ECRIC
The Eastern Cancer Registry and Information Centre (ECRIC) is an NHS organisation
that acts as a registry for cancer cases in eastern England. It collects data to provide a
comprehensive picture of cancer incidents and cancer treatment within the NHS. ECRIC uses
many data sources: Multidisciplinary Teams of doctors (MDTs) that oversee patient care,
Patient Administration Systems (PAS) in hospitals, the Office of National Statistics (ONS)
and pathology laboratories.
Most applications in ECRIC are built using the Ruby programming language to leverage the
availability of rich application frameworks and local developer expertise. ECRIC maintains
a main database, which stores structured data about tumors, patients and treatments. It is
hosted in a secure private network isolated from the public Internet. Data are collected from
the different sources, processed using domain knowledge of staff and then imported to the
main database. ECRIC staff has the ability to access the main database remotely using a
web application server that has undergone extensive security audit.
Discussions with staff at ECRIC identified one new application that they want to introduce:
a web portal to improve the collection of data from MDTs. MDTs at hospitals send reports
about cancer incidents and patient treatment to ECRIC through paper-based reports or
158
NHSmail1, i.e. a government-accredited email service for the transmission of patient data.
ECRIC receives and processes these reports but often identifies errors, e.g. entries that
miss particular information or discrepancies between the data provided by different MDTs.
Currently, ECRIC staff is involved in a laborious process of manually generating information
about data quality and then disclosing it to the relevant MDTs. Instead, an MDT portal
application would allow MDTs to see their own data after they have been processed by
ECRIC, compare data quality to their peers and notify ECRIC about any changes required.
The MDT portal application should satisfy the following functional requirements:
F1 Members of an MDT may access the MDT portal application using a web browser,
log in and view the detailed ECRIC records for the patients whom they treat. They
should have the option to provide feedback, which is handled externally in compliance
with the current workflow, e.g. using secure NHSmail.
F2 Members of an MDT may access various metrics that ECRIC generates from their
data, e.g. how complete MDT-provided data actually are in regard to the data that
they are supposed to provide to ECRIC.
F3 Members of an MDT may compare their own data with statistics generated from the
data of their peers, e.g. relevant to data completeness.
ECRIC has the following two security requirements for each application that it deploys
internally (they must also be satisfied by the MDT portal application):
S1 External users should only be able to access a fixed subset of ECRIC’s confidential
data that is decided statically and never be in a position to modify any of the data
that the organisation stores internally.
S2 Data should be protected from inadvertent disclosure throughout the workflow of an
application. Implementation errors must be contained and not result in violations of
requirement S1.
In particular, ECRIC has the following application-specific security requirement for the MDT
portal application:
AS1 Members of any MDT may only consult the details of the patients treated by their
team. All MDTs in a given region may consult MDT-level aggregates within the same
region. Every MDT may consult regional-level aggregates.
ECRIC has ruled out a standard design for the MDT portal application, in which the web
application server directly accesses the main ECRIC database. First, such a design would
1NHSmail, http://http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/nhsmail/, last ac-
cessed: 18/11/2012
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violate the security requirement S1 for static, one-way access of data. If the application server
is ever compromised, attackers may gain access to ECRIC’s internal network and target the
main database hosted there. Second, such a design would violate the security requirement
S2: implementation errors in the MDT portal application may result in confidential data
disclosure.
The application-specific requirement AS1 is also challenging to enforce with a traditional
web application design because it is an end-to-end requirement with different provisions for
different types of data. The MDT portal application fetches information from the main
ECRIC database, processes it in an application-specific manner and finally presents the
results to individual members of MDTs. While the propagation of regional aggregates is
relatively permissive, the MDT portal application must carefully restrict access to detailed
patient records. Any developer error in either data processing or access control may result
in violations of security policy. ECRIC would have to perform security audits repeatedly
during the application’s life-cycle to prevent such errors.
If a security mechanism is to satisfy ECRIC’s requirements, it should both be able to en-
force end-to-end data flow guarantees and to control the propagation of different data in
compliance of different policies. As this thesis demonstrates, runtime taint tracking is such
a mechanism.
6.1.2 Practical runtime taint tracking for web applications
Runtime taint tracking can enforce the application-specific requirement AS1, independently
of implementation errors in the MDT portal application. AS1 must first be translated into a
taint tracking policy for enforcement (§2.3.1). A simple option is to associate taint meta-data
that take the form of unique tags to confidential patient information and then allow only
users with declassification privileges over those tags to receive the associated information
(i.e. similar to confidentiality labels in DEFC). Each user of the MDT portal application
should be allocated the declassification privilege (§3.2.3) for a subset of possibly different
tags. If data labeling and the assignment of declassification privileges to users is correct, the
application-specific requirement AS1 will be enforced.
A taint tracking system can also ensure that application bugs do not disclose confidential
patient data (security requirement S2). First, the propagation of taint meta-data is trans-
parent to the application and the invocation of checking operations occurs automatically
before any data are released to external parties. Second, since application code is written
by in-house developers at ECRIC, the benevolent developer assumption (§2.3.1) holds: code
does not attempt to evade taint tracking actively. For these two reasons, the taint tracking
system has an accurate view of the confidentiality of the data that the application processes.
Therefore it can prevent inadvertent data disclosure.
The application-specific security requirement AS1 introduces restrictions for patient data
aggregates at the MDT and regional levels. Aggregates are challenging for taint tracking
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due to cross-contamination: a single component that inspects confidential data on behalf
of multiple patients should generate output as confidential as all of its inputs combined.
No user would be able to receive such cross-contaminated data because no single user may
receive confidential data for patients treated by other MDTs.
The cross-contamination problem can be avoided with a component that is trusted to de-
classify patient data. Such a component would (1) receive the aggregate data and remove
all tags; (2) identify a single tag that captures the confidentiality of the aggregate data and
attach it to them; and (3) ensure that all users that should be able to receive the aggre-
gate data possess the declassification privilege for the tag used. Overall, the MDT portal’s
security policy AS1 can be enforced using taint tracking with two different types of tags:
MDT-level and region-level.
Introducing taint tracking, however, in the production environment of ECRIC is challenging.
ECRIC prefers not to replace existing infrastructure with research prototypes because their
staff do not possess the necessary resources or expertise to maintain them. For example, while
unit isolation in DEFCon incurs minimal performance overhead, verifying future versions
of the JDK may require familiarity with some JDK internals. Similarly, for taint tracking to
be practical its impact on performance must be minimal—partial taint tracking as suggested
in PHP Aspis achieves good performance but the cost of relaxing policy enforcement is not
acceptable to ECRIC.
SafeWeb improves the state-of-the-art in taint tracking systems in two aspects, which
enable a production deployment at ECRIC. First, SafeWeb does not require changes to
the underlying Ruby interpreter. The implementation leverages Ruby’s meta-programming
and security primitives, resulting in a system that is easy to understand and maintain. The
performance overhead of the approach is en par with taint tracking implementations in other
interpreted languages that require custom interpreter modifications. Second, SafeWeb
suggests a system design that combines tracking at different granularities, i.e. at variable-
level and at unit-level, to track data flow across ECRIC’s systems. Unit-level taint tracking
ensures that the processing performed when extracting data from ECRIC’s main database is
monitored, i.e. right from the point when confidential data are first accessed. As explained
in the next section, the generated taint meta-data are then used at the variable level by the
web application to ensure that data are never disclosed in violation of security policy.
6.2 End-to-end tracking of confidential data
SafeWeb separates the processing of confidential patient data from their presentation and
uses taint tracking to enforce data flow constraints end-to-end in an organisation’s systems.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the two parts of SafeWeb: the event processing back-end which hosts
application-specific processing, and the web front-end, which exports the result of the pro-
cessing to clients via a web interface. Confidential data processing in the back-end occurs in
event processing units that consume and emit events. The architecture satisfies the security
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the SafeWeb architecture.
requirement S1 because it decouples the handling of web requests from confidential data
processing [YJ10]. It ensures static and one-way access to data because a compromised web
server cannot affect event processing.
The event processing back-end hosts business logic for processing confidential data stored in
the main database. Its design is similar to a DEFCon engine (§3.4). Event Processing Units
generate, process and store events according to the functional requirements of the applica-
tion. Units that access ECRIC’s main database (Main DB) are responsible for correctly
labeling the events that they publish. The Event Dispatcher ensures that labeled events
only propagate to units that are eligible to receive them. The Event Processing Engine acts
as the runtime execution platform for units: it controls unit access to the environment to
enforce isolation and invokes checking operations to inspect labels. Result events are stored
together with their associated labels in an application-specific database (Application DB),
which is subsequently exported to the web front-end.
The web front-end serves client web requests and is restricted to confidential data stored in
the local application database. A second database, the Web Database, stores other manage-
ment data that the web application requires. SafeWeb’s Taint Tracking Library is respon-
sible for taint meta-data propagation at the front-end. It fetches the labels stored with the
data in the application database and propagates them during page generation. The security
requirement S2 for end-to-end protection from accidental disclosure is therefore satisfied:
labels are associated with data throughout processing and label checks before sending re-
sponses to clients ensure that data are never disclosed in violation of the application security
policy.
Figure 6.2 uses the taint tracking model from Section 2.3.1 to illustrate the design of Safe-
Web. The event processing back-end tracks taint meta-data at the granularity of individual
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Figure 6.2: SafeWeb as a runtime taint tracking system. SafeWeb combines two tracking
granularities, the unit- and the variable-level granularities, to satisfy the security requirements of web
applications in ECRIC.
event subscription callbacks that units register. SafeWeb uses a simplified version of the
DEFC label model (§3.2) for taint meta-data focused on confidentiality only. The tracking
granularity of the system changes at the web front-end in which confidentiality labels are
associated with individual Ruby variables. Tracking operations at the front-end propagate
confidentiality labels transparently to the application. Labels are used as input for checking
operations, which are invoked when the web application generates HTTP responses.
6.3 Event processing back-end
The SafeWeb back-end houses the event processing engine. The event processing engine
supports and controls unit execution as follows: it associates confidentiality labels with events
and units (§6.3.1), it dispatches events between units (§6.3.2) and it restricts unit access to
the environment (§6.3.3).
6.3.1 Taint tracking policy
The design of the taint tracking policy in SafeWeb focuses on simplicity and ease-of-use.
Compared to DEFCon, the SafeWeb engine tracks event flow using a single label per
event, it only enforces confidentiality (not integrity) data flow constraints and the data flow
policy enforced is assumed to be known statically (and does not change at runtime).
Events in SafeWeb are key-value attribute pairs with an optional data payload. Both
the event attributes and the data payload are untyped strings. Additionally, each event
is protected with a single confidentiality label that consists of a set of tags. Tags are arbi-
trary strings with application-specific semantics, e.g. the URI ecric.org.uk/mtdp/patient/
56321 may be used as a tag to protect the data of a single patient.
In the MDT portal application a unit periodically inspects the main ECRIC database and
identifies new patient records. It then publishes events that correspond to new records
protecting each event with a label specific to an MDT (i.e. a label that contains the MDT’s
ID). This is always possible because adding tags to a label of an event does not require
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1 subscribe ’/mdt update’, ’type=deletion’ do |event|
2 list = get ’mdt list ’ + event[:mdt id]
3 list delete at event[:del index]
4 set ’mdt list ’+ event[:mdt id], list
5 end
6 subscribe ’/update mdt portal’ do |event|
7 event[:mdt total] times do | mdt id |
8 list = get ’mdt list ’ + mdt id
9 publish ’/mdt report’, list, :remove => $LABEL,
10 :add => [’label:conf:ecric.org.uk/mdt/’ + mdt id]
11 end
12 end
Listing 6.1: An example of a unit in SafeWeb.
additional privileges. Aggregates calculated from confidential data of multiple MDTs are
labeled with region-specific labels following the process described in Section 6.1.2.
Unit access to events is controlled by allocating clearance and declassification privileges. As
in DEFCon (§3.2.3), the clearance privilege over a tag allows a unit to receive an event
protected by the tag but the tag propagates to the unit’s output. The declassification
privilege enables the unit to remove the tag from any subsequent events that it publishes.
Privileges are assigned to units statically using a policy configuration file.
SafeWeb does not support data flow policies that change dynamically at runtime. Units
cannot allocate new tags or delegate privileges over existing tags. Unit developers reference
tags directly, i.e. tags can be communicated freely and knowledge that a specific tag is being
used does not convey any useful information. This design decision limits the generality of
SafeWeb but results in a system that is simple for developers to use.
6.3.2 Event dispatch
The Event Dispatcher enables units to communicate by exchanging events. It supports
topic-based publish/subscribe communication, i.e. each event is matched to subscriptions on
a given topic, with optional content filtering on event attributes within a topic [EFGK03].
Events are filtered according to their attributes and only delivered to units if labels permit
communication. SafeWeb’s checking operations inside the dispatcher compare the label of
the event to the clearance privileges of the subscriber unit and only permit dispatch if the
tags in the event label are a subset of the tags that the unit has clearance for (i.e. according
to the “can-flow-to” relation).
Listing 6.1 shows part of a unit that is responsible for updating the MDT portal applica-
tion. The unit issues two subscriptions, one to receive notice when a patient record has
been deleted (mdt update events in line 1) and one for events that trigger an update of the
application database at the front-end (update mdt portal events in line 6). Each subscrip-
tion is associated with a callback that is invoked when an event matches the subscription
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(lines 2 to 4 and 7 to 12). The event dispatcher records the unit’s clearance privileges when
registering a subscription for use in checking operations during event dispatch.
Units may store state that persists between event deliveries in a unit-specific key-value store.
The key-value store associates labels with its keys and allows different callbacks to share
state in a secure fashion (explained next in Section 6.3.3). For example in Listing 6.1, the
key-value store is used by the first callback to keep track of deleted patient files (lines 2
and 4) and by the second callback to publish cumulative results per MDT (lines 8 and 10).
The event dispatcher relies on the Streaming Text Oriented Message Protocol (STOMP)2,
which it extends for transferring additional meta-data. STOMP is a simple yet extensible
message protocol similar to HTTP with existing Ruby bindings3. Its requests consist of
a command field (e.g. CONNECT, SEND or SUBSCRIBE), optional headers and a body. The
destination header is used for the topic of events published while additional SafeWeb-
specific headers store labels. An optional header stores the subscription filter that is specified
by units as an SQL-92 selector.
The SafeWeb event dispatcher implementation builds upon the Ruby open-source server
implementation of STOMP2, in which it adds support for SSL at the transport layer. While
matching events to subscriptions, the dispatcher calculates the “can-flow-to” relation and re-
jects messages, which recipients are not eligible to receive. The STOMP client library used by
units to communicate with the event dispatcher is implemented using the EventMachine I/O
library4.
6.3.3 Controlling unit execution
The SafeWeb engine effectively enforces confidentiality constraints by maintaining taint
meta-data about the confidentiality of the data that unit callbacks are allowed to receive
(callback label tracking) and by monitoring all communication channels available to units
(callback isolation).
Label tracking
The engine monitors data flow by associating a single label with the execution of a sub-
scription callback. Before an event is delivered to a subscription callback for processing, the
callback’s label is initialised to the label of the incoming event. The current callback label is
accessible to unit code though the variable $LABEL. When a new event is published by the
callback, the value of $LABEL is assigned to a new label used to protect the confidentiality
of the published event. A unit can change the label of the events that it publishes by speci-
fying tags to add or remove in publish calls (Listing 6.1; lines 9 and 10)—the latter is only
possible if the unit has the declassification privilege for each tag removed.
2STOMP Protocol, http://stomp.github.com, last accessed: 20/9/2012
3StompServer, http://stompserver.rubyforge.org/, last accessed: 20/9/2012
4EventMachine, http://rubyeventmachine.com/, last accessed: 20/9/2012
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Figure 6.3: Isolation of units and callbacks performed by the event processing engine.
For values stored in the key-value store, the engine maintains labels per key. When a unit
callback reads a value from the store, $LABEL is updated to reflect the confidentiality of the
data that the unit receives. For this, the tags stored in the value’s key are added to $LABEL.
Similarly when a unit stores a value in the store, the current value of $LABEL becomes the
key’s label (except for any tags added or removed, as in publish calls).
Note that such implicit tainting of unit state upon receiving events or when reading from
the key-value store is acceptable because SafeWeb only prevents accidental data disclosure.
SafeWeb does not protect data confidentiality for cases, in which units maliciously attempt
to disclose information (i.e. in contrast to DEFCon; see §3.1.2).
Isolation
The SafeWeb engine must isolate unit callbacks to ensure that they cannot use I/O chan-
nels or variables outside the local scope, exchanging data in violation of the application
security policy (i.e. through global variables, instance variables and local variables of enclos-
ing scopes).
SafeWeb leverages Ruby’s safe levels to avoid unit access to I/O functions and to prevent
communication via variables outside of the local scope. The variable $SAFE is a global variable
that may have a different value in each thread. Setting $SAFE to a value between 1 and 4
activates a hard-coded taint tracking policy that the Ruby interpreter enforces (§2.3.3).
When $SAFE is set to 4, the following restrictions apply: the thread cannot perform I/O
operations, every object that the thread creates is flagged using a single “taint” bit and the
thread can only modify objects that are not marked as tainted5 (e.g. it cannot modify global
variables).
Figure 6.3 shows how unit callbacks are isolated using the Ruby safe level 4. Before the
engine initiates a unit, it launches a new thread and sets $SAFE=4 (step 1). The new thread
invokes unit code that initialises unit variables and registers subscription callbacks (step 2).
Having unit threads start with $SAFE=4 guarantees that unit initialisation routines cannot
5For another example of a less restrictive taint tracking policy available, see the Ruby taint mode (i.e.
$SAFE level 1) presented in Section 2.3.3.
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circumvent isolation: at safe level 4, a thread may not write to untainted global variables
and thus it has no way to share references that point to mutable objects with other unit
threads (which are also created with $SAFE=4). When a new event is received from the
event dispatcher through the engine’s STOMP client, a new thread is instantiated (again at
$SAFE=4) and executes the callback (step 3). Callbacks may only store data in the key-value
store, in which the engine maintains labels.
Despite safe level 4, callbacks of the same unit can exchange data via shared variables in
their enclosing scopes. Such variables are, for example, those declared by unit initialisation
code. Due to $SAFE=4, the variables created by unit intialisation code are tainted, and Ruby
does not prevent modifications from other threads at $SAFE=4. To prevent callbacks from
using such shared and mutable variables, the engine creates a separate variable instance per
callback. New variable instances are created transparently to unit code when a subscription
callback is activated. The implementation leverages the programmatic access to variable
scopes in the Rubinius interpreter6.
Safe level 4 prevents unit access to I/O channels but is overly restrictive for privileged units
that import and export data between the event processing engine and external databases
(see Figure 6.1). The engine allows units with dual clearance and declassification privileges
for a set of tags to operate at $SAFE=0 and perform I/O. It only restricts event processing
for such privileged units as follows: if a unit does not possess the clearance privilege for a
tag, the event dispatcher does not deliver to the unit events protected by that tag.
6.4 Web front-end
The SafeWeb front-end displays the result of event processing to remote users over the web.
It requires no modifications to web application source code: developers only have to import
SafeWeb’s taint tracking library to prevent accidental data disclosure. SafeWeb’s taint
tracking library propagates the labels generated at the back-end to capture the confidentiality
of the data in the front-end. When the web application attempts to return a response to a
client, the library inspects the confidentiality of the data stored in the response and aborts
the operation if the application security policy would be violated.
At the front-end, SafeWeb associates labels with individual Ruby variables. As an example,
if a variable ctype stores the type of cancer for an individual patient, the variable also carries
a label with tags that protect the confidentiality of that particular patient’s data.
SafeWeb switches to tracking taint meta-data at the granularity of Ruby variables in order
to protect typical database-backed web applications. Typical database-backed web applica-
tions receive HTTP requests from a client, fetch data from a local database and return the
data in HTTP responses. Web applications handle requests on behalf of multiple users, and
they need access to the confidential data of every user of a particular application, i.e. access
6Rubinius, http://rubini.us/, last accessed: 21/9/2012
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Figure 6.4: Variable-level taint tracking granularity in the SafeWeb web front-end.
to all confidential data stored in the database. Such a non-compartmentalised design clearly
violates the security requirement S2 for preventing accidental disclosure of confidential data
in the presence of implementation errors. The reason is that without variable-level taint
tracking, once a web application is given the privilege to communicate confidential data on
behalf of multiple users, the application could disclose private data of one user to another.
SafeWeb invokes checking operations to inspect the confidentiality of the data in HTTP
responses before the responses are sent to clients. The checking operations ensure that the set
of tags in the response’s confidentiality label is a subset of the tags that the user is privileged
to receive—otherwise the response is suppressed. This is sufficient to prevent accidental data
disclosure, assuming that the propagation of taint meta-data inside the web application is
precise. No further modifications to the web application’s architecture are required.
Figure 6.4 illustrates how a web request is served by the front-end when the SafeWeb taint
tracking library is active. In step 1, a new HTTP request arrives. Control is given to the
taint tracking library, which authenticates the user and identifies their privileges. In step 2,
the web application fetches confidential data from the application database. SafeWeb’s
taint tracking library intercepts this operation. It inspects the data retrieved and ensures
that the corresponding labels (as set in the application database) are attached to the Ruby
object returned to the application. The application then continues with data processing in
step 3 to generate a response.
The SafeWeb taint tracking library modifies the semantics of Ruby statements and library
functions to propagate taint meta-data. The rules for meta-data propagation are simple: if
the result of a statement or function call contains data from its input, all tags in the labels
of the input are attached to the label of the output. In step 4, the taint tracking library
inspects the label of the response—unless the label contains a subset of the tags that the
user is privileged to receive the operation is aborted.
The SafeWeb taint tracking library redefines the String class and subclasses of Numeric
so that: (1) each instance stores a SafeWeb label and (2) each method propagates labels
according to the method’s semantics. As an example of label propagation, consider string
concatenation. When two strings are concatenated, the result string should be as confidential
as the original two strings. To achieve this, the SafeWeb taint tracking library declares a
new method nconcat() in the String class. It aliases the existing concatenation method ‘+’
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to call nconcat(), which, in addition to string concatenation, also propagates the labels
of the input to the result. All subsequent invocations of ‘+’ correctly propagate taint
meta-data. Assuming non-malicious developers, who do not attempt to circumvent this
mechanism at runtime (§6.1.2), this change effects correct taint meta-data propagation for
string concatenation. Similar redefinitions are introduced for all String methods.
The implementation of meta-data propagation in the SafeWeb taint tracking library out-
lined above leverages the pure object-oriented foundations and standard meta-programming
features of Ruby. All types in Ruby are classes (there are no primitive types), all language
operators are implemented as class methods and all class method definitions can change at
runtime. This flexibility (compared to languages such as Java and PHP) eliminates the need
for changes to the execution platform and results in a practical taint tracking implementation
that is easy to maintain.
SafeWeb requires that web applications are written using the Sinatra web framework7
and execute on the Rubinius interpreter. Sinatra is a simple web framework for rapid web
application development in Ruby. It is used by SafeWeb because it offers well-defined
interception points for incoming HTTP requests and outgoing responses. The taint track-
ing library intercepts execution and attaches code to either fetch user privileges or invoke
checking operations. The Rubinius interpreter allows the SafeWeb taint tracking library to
manipulate the regular expression variables ($~, $1 etc). These are special variables set in the
calling scope when a regular expression function is invoked. With Rubinius, the SafeWeb
taint tracking library can modify the regular expression variables and ensure their correct
labeling.
SafeWeb does not introduce additional functionality to protect web applications from code
injection attacks such as XSS or SQL Injection. This is considered an orthogonal problem,
and Ruby already offers some support for it. As presented in Section 2.3.3, when $SAFE is
set to 1, Ruby activates a simple taint tracking policy that can be used as the basis of a
variable-level taint tracking system. Such a system would intercept functions that perform
sensitive operations to check the value of the taint bit before proceeding.
6.5 Evaluation
The experimental evaluation of SafeWeb has two goals: to explore the system’s effectiveness
in preventing inadvertent disclosure of confidential data and to measure the performance
overhead while doing so. The security properties of SafeWeb and its impact on performance
are evaluated with a prototype of the MDT portal application.
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Figure 6.5: Deployment of the MDT portal application using SafeWeb at ECRIC.
6.5.1 Implementation of the MDT portal application
Figure 6.5 shows the MDT portal application and its deployment using SafeWeb at ECRIC.
The MDT portal application consists of three units in the event processing back-end (1a–
1c) and a Sinatra-based web application (MDT web portal) in the front-end (5). These are
deployed into the two separate zones of ECRIC’s network: the Intranet and the demilitarised
zone (DMZ ). A firewall separates the Intranet from the DMZ permitting only unidirectional
connections from the Intranet to the DMZ. Critical infrastructure such as the main database
is only accessible from within the Intranet. MDTs may access the web front-end in the DMZ
using the HTTP protocol and the NHS-wide N3 network that connects NHS organisations8.
The MDT portal application is implemented using three units in the back-end:
1. The data producer accesses the main ECRIC database for input. It reads patient
data from multiple tables using ECRIC’s framework for data access, labels the data
according to the MDT that is responsible for each patient and finally publishes the
result as labeled events using the event dispatcher. The data producer only uses MDT-
level tags (not unique tags per individual patient) because they are sufficient to satisfy
the application-specific requirement AS1.
2. The data aggregator continuously listens for events published locally that require ad-
ditional processing before they are sent to the MDT web portal. It receives events
on behalf of multiple patients and calculates MDT-level and region-level aggregates to
satisfy the functional requirements F1–F3. The events that the data aggregator gen-
erates are labeled correctly despite implementation errors because the data aggregator
7Sinatra, http://www.sinatrarb.com/, last accessed: 20/9/2012
8N3, http://n3.nhs.uk/, last accessed: 20/9/2012
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executes without declassification privileges over the tags used for individual MDTs.
3. The data storage unit is responsible for data persistence. It ensures that labels are
correctly associated with the data that they protect inside the application database.
The data storage unit executes with clearance and declassification privileges for each
tag used in the MDT portal application.
The MDT web portal in the front-end is implemented as a Sinatra application that imports
SafeWeb’s taint tracking library. As described in Section 6.4, SafeWeb’s taint tracking
library authenticates users transparently to the web application. In particular, it adds hooks
to the MDT web portal, which intercept every incoming HTTP request. The current proto-
type of the SafeWeb taint tracking library uses HTTP Basic Authentication and relies on
Transport Layer Security (TLS) for the secure transmission of user credentials. There are
plans at ECRIC to add support for authentication using smartcards.
The different components of the SafeWeb prototype and the MDT portal application are
deployed within ECRIC as follows. The event processing engine, denoted with (1) in Fig-
ure 6.5, provides a shared execution environment in the back-end for event processing on
behalf of multiple applications. A single event dispatcher (2) dispatches events between units
using the “can-flow-to” relation to compare labels. The units of the MDT portal applica-
tion in particular (1a–1c) use a database to store labeled output (3). ECRIC’s firewall only
allows unidirectional connections from the Intranet to the DMZ. Therefore two instances of
the application database exist: one inside the Intranet (3) and one in the DMZ (4). The
Intranet instance is transmitted periodically to the DMZ using push replication. The MDT
portal in the front-end (5) does not have write access to the DMZ instance. This prevents a
compromised web application from changing how data are exported, as per security require-
ment S1. The web database (6) stores data specific to the MDT web portal (such as session
data).
6.5.2 Security properties
The MDT portal application is used as a case study to explore SafeWeb’s effectiveness in
preventing information disclosure. Specific instances of well-known errors are introduced in
the MDT portal. SafeWeb should detect these errors and prevent information disclosure.
The errors introduced to the MDT portal application are representative of typical devel-
oper errors. We inspect the CVE database, studying previous occurrences of vulnerabilities
classified as “Information Disclosure”, “Access Control” or “Design Error”. We group such
vulnerabilities according to their underlying cause. We then model the errors that we in-
troduce after these groups. The following paragraphs report whether SafeWeb manages to
prevent information disclosure for each type of error.
Omitted access control checks. A common developer error that leads to information dis-
closure is an omitted access control check (e.g. CVE reports 2011-0701, 2010-2353 and
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1 require ‘sinatra’
2 require ‘safeweb−tracking’
3 get ’/records/:mid’ do
4 content type :json
5 return nil if !check privileges(params[:mid])
6 r = Records.by mid(:key => params[:mid])
7 process r
8 r.to json
9 end
Listing 6.2: An example of a rule in the web front-end of the MDT portal application.
2010-0752). Listing 6.2 shows a method in the MDT web portal that returns patient
records to an MDT after an access control check (line 5) has succeeded. To emulate the
effect of an omitted access control check in an application executing without SafeWeb,
lines 2 (which enables the SafeWeb taint tracking library) and 5 (which invokes the
access control check) are commented out. After this change and when a user requests
the record of a patient that is treated by another MDT, confidential patient data are
disclosed in line 8 in violation of application security policy. If the SafeWeb taint
tracking library is enabled (line 2), it results in a JSON string (line 8) labeled with
tags specific to the MDT that treats the patient. The checking operation invoked by
the taint tracking library inspects the result’s label, detects the problem and prevents
information disclosure by displaying an error message to the user.
Errors in access checks. Even when an access control check is invoked, there is no guar-
antee that it enforces the application security policy correctly and thus prevents in-
formation disclosure (e.g. CVE reports 2011-0449, 2010-3092 and 2010-4403). Errors
inside access control checks are hard to discover during development because they only
manifest with specifically-crafted input. To emulate such problems, the access control
check presented in Listing 6.3 is modified to ignore the case of the username (line 4).
With this change, a user may get assigned the privileges of another MDT if their user-
names only differ in the case of some characters. To test the setup, two new accounts
were created with usernames mdt1 and MDT1, with different privileges. User MDT1 is
able to access patient records that only user mdt1 should be able to receive. With
SafeWeb’s taint tracking library enabled, the patient records are labeled correctly
and data disclosure is prevented.
Inappropriate access checks. Developers who are asked to implement complex security
policies may not share the same understanding of the requirements. This category
of application vulnerabilities covers cases, in which access control checks are invoked
consistently yet the policy that they enforce is not the one expected (e.g. CVE reports
2010-4775 and 2009-2431). Such scenarios are emulated by removing the check in the
check privileges method that compares the clinic the user is member of with the
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1 def check privileges id
2 m = Measurement.find(id)
3 @is admin or Privileges.count( :conditions => {
4 :u id => User.find by name(@username).id,
5 :hospital => m.hospital id,
6 :clinic => m.type
7 }) > 0
8 end
Listing 6.3: An access control check used by the MDT portal application.
type of the stored data (Listing 6.3; line 6). With SafeWeb’s taint tracking library
disabled, the missing condition allows a user to see patient records of other MDTs at
different clinics of the same hospital. Again, such inadvertent information disclosure is
prevented with taint tracking because the labels of the result records capture the true
confidentiality of the data.
Design errors. The last group of vulnerabilities are due to design errors in the business
logic of an application (e.g. CVE reports 2011-0899 and 2010-3933). In such cases, an
application processes data in an unexpected way, and while doing so, it discloses con-
fidential information. No action is typically taken to prevent confidential information
disclosure because developers did not anticipate the particular use case. To emulate
such design errors, the data aggregator unit from Figure 6.5 is modified to ignore the
hospital of origin when calculating aggregates on behalf of a specific MDT user named
mdt1. The result aggregates for user mdt1 thus mix patient records from multiple dif-
ferent MDTs. Without SafeWeb’s end-to-end label propagation from the back-end
to the front-end, the MDT web portal discloses the aggregate records to mdt1. With
SafeWeb enabled, the aggregate records are cross-contaminated with multiple MDT
tags, one per MDT whose data are included in each record. Confidential data disclo-
sure is prevented because no user in the front-end possesses the necessary privileges to
access cross-contaminated aggregate records.
SafeWeb enforces data confidentiality but it still requires trust in the SafeWeb infrastruc-
ture and in important components of the MDT portal application. First, the taint tracking
library in the front-end must correctly propagate labels, authenticate users, fetch user priv-
ileges and invoke checking operations before an HTTP response is returned. Second, the
event processing back-end must isolate unit callbacks, keep track of their current label and
privileges, propagate labels in the key-value store and invoke checking operations while dis-
patching events. Third, the two privileged units in the back-end, i.e. the data producer
and the data storage unit, must correctly assign labels to the events that they publish and
correctly store these labels in the application database. Finally, the policy file that assigns
privileges to units (in the back-end) and to users (in the front-end) must not contain errors.
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Figure 6.6: Processing latency within the MDT portal application [HMP+11].
SafeWeb therefore does not eliminate the need for a code audit. Instead, it greatly reduces
the effort required because the audit can focus on a few components, which can be reused
in future applications. The current implementation of SafeWeb consists of 1943 LOC in
the taint tracking library and 1908 LOC in the event processing engine. After this code
has been audited, the data confidentiality in each additional application only depends on a
small trusted part that controls labels and privileges. In the MDT portal application, for
example, such code is found only in the two privileged units in the back-end (138 LOC).
The remaining 2841 LOC of the MDT portal application need not to be audited because the
confidentiality of patient data does not depend on their correctness.
6.5.3 Performance overhead
To measure the performance overhead of SafeWeb, the metrics of processing latency and
event throughput are used (§3.5). The measurements are taken on an AMD Opteron 6136
2.4GHz machine with 16 GiB of RAM running Ubuntu 10.04 and Rubinius 1.2.3. The 95%
confidence interval for each of the measurements reported lies at most 5% of the value on
each side.
Processing latency in the front-end is measured as the page generation time of the MDT
portal’s main page. We issue 10.000 requests, with SafeWeb’s taint tracking library enabled
or disabled. Due to label propagation and checking operations, the taint tracking library
increases the page generation time by 14%, from 158 ms to 180 ms.
Processing latency in the back-end is measured as the time between the publication of an
event at the data producer and the reception of the corresponding event at the data stor-
age unit. Due to the additional operations required to propagate labels, invoke checking
operations and enforce isolation between unit callbacks, the latency to process a single event
increases by 15%, from 73 ms to 84 ms.
Figure 6.6 illustrates the impact of various operations on processing latency when SafeWeb
is enabled. In the front-end, HTTP basic authentication and the transformation of the MDT
web portal’s ERB-based templates9 to HTML are the most time-consuming operations, taking
9ERB–Ruby Templating, http://ruby-doc.org/stdlib-1.9.3/libdoc/erb/rdoc/ERB.html, last ac-
cessed: 20/9/2012
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87 ms and 63 ms to complete, respectively. Fetching the privileges of the current user takes
3 ms while label propagation adds 17 ms. “Other” includes access to the databases and the
rest of the processing to generate a response; together they account for the remaining page
generation time. In the back-end, event processing and data serialisation when units com-
municate with the event dispatcher are the most time-consuming operations, taking 51 ms
and 20 ms to complete, respectively. Label management, which includes label serialisation
and checking operations at the dispatcher, adds another 13 ms.
The event throughput performance of the event processing engine exceeds the relatively
modest requirements of the MDT portal application. Therefore, the maximum achievable
throughput is measured with a simple microbenchmark of two units: an event producer that
sends events continuously to an event consumer. Throughput is sampled at a frequency
of one measurement per second for 1000 seconds. Without callback isolation in the event
processing engine and without label checks at the event dispatcher, the observed throughput
is 4455 events/second. It decreases by 17% to reach 3817 events/second when isolation and
label tracking are activated. During the experiment, memory consumption remains stable,
which indicates that the rate achieved is not due to queuing of events in the system.
Overall the performance overhead of SafeWeb is small and comparable to approaches that
implement taint tracking by modifying the language interpreter [YWZK09]. In practice, the
impact of SafeWeb on processing latency and event throughput is acceptable, considering
the security requirements of the MDT portal application.
6.6 Summary
Organisations in the public and private domains that handle sensitive user data often find
it challenging to deploy new applications accessible over the Internet. In this chapter, we
presented SafeWeb, a runtime taint tracking system for creating secure web applications
in Ruby. It enforces end-to-end confidentiality guarantees and minimises the need for code
reviews, security consultations and risk assessment, while integrating with existing web de-
velopment practices.
The strict data security requirements of an organisation within the UK National Health
Service (NHS) provided us with a set of real-world design constraints. The sensitivity of
healthcare data required careful consideration of the parts of the taint tracking system that
push and pull data. The back-end requirements suited an event processing system, whereas
the front-end is a typical web application.
The event processing back-end of SafeWeb is deployed within the organisation’s Intranet
and performs taint tracking at the granularity of event subscription callbacks in units. Units
publish confidential data as events labeled according to a security policy. Units specific
to each web application may receive and process these events, yet they are constrained by
their privileges. Labels propagate to result data and are stored inside an application-specific
database.
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The web front-end is isolated at the network level from the back-end. It performs taint
tracking at the granularity of Ruby variables in a web application. SafeWeb’s taint tracking
library intercepts requests and associates privileges with the user that issued each request.
It fetches the labels stored in the application database along with the data and propagates
them transparently. The labels are used to abort responses that would disclose confidential
data in violation of the application’s security policy.
In contrast to other taint tracking systems, SafeWeb is implemented by taking advantage
of standard meta-programming features of the Ruby language and the Rubinius runtime.
This simplifies the maintenance of the taint tracking system because it does not require
expert knowledge of the internals of the Ruby interpreter or extensive transformations to
application source code.
SafeWeb was evaluated by implementing a web application for assisting Multidisciplinary
Teams (MDTs) in hospitals. SafeWeb significantly reduces the part of the application’s
codebase that must be audited for security, while it effectively prevents many types of well-
know vulnerabilities from disclosing confidential data.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
An important problem in application security is the lack of practical methods to enforce
security policy that controls the propagation of sensitive data. Once data have been com-
municated to an application, the application is free to process the data and use them in
arbitrary operations. As such, any developer error inside the application may lead to the
disclosure of confidential data or introduce application-level vulnerabilities.
Runtime taint tracking is a method for controlling data propagation. It intercepts the op-
erations of an application and associates meta-data with the data that it processes. By
studying previous runtime taint tracking systems suggested in the literature, we identified
common design properties and limitations. We observed that fundamental operations in a
taint tracking system, i.e. the isolation of application components and the interception of
an application’s operations to propagate taint meta-data, are challenging to achieve in prac-
tice and reduce performance at runtime. Past research has tackled these problems mainly
by suggesting novel operating systems and modified interpreters. These demonstrated the
applicability of taint tracking in various scenarios but render taint tracking hard to adopt.
This thesis focused on the practicality and efficiency of runtime taint tracking. We considered
three important requirements for a taint tracking system: minimal performance overhead
at runtime, the ability to configure the data flow policies that are being enforced and an
implementation that eliminates the need to modify existing infrastructure.
Our key observation to satisfy these requirements was to only support a particular class of
applications each time. We considered three different types of applications: event processing
applications written in Java, web applications written in PHP and Ruby web applications
deployed at an organisation in the NHS. Focusing on a particular type of application allowed
us to leverage unique language features and make certain assumptions that facilitate the
operation of the taint tracking system.
DEFCon, our event processing system, exposed a subset of the Java Developement Kit (JDK)
class library to applications and employed bytecode transformation techniques to weave run-
time checks at specific code paths. This allowed DEFCon to isolate application components
effectively without extensive changes to the Java Virtual Machine or to JDK classes. To min-
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imise the overhead of runtime taint tracking while controlling the propagation of events we
suggested DEFC, a taint tracking policy that uses labels as taint meta-data. DEFCon also
enforces policies specified in the DEFCon Policy Language (DPL). DPL enables high-level
specification of data flow policy and efficient enforcement via translation to DEFC.
PHP Aspis, our tool for protecting PHP web applications from injection attacks, introduced
partial taint tracking, an attempt to propagate taint meta-data only in the application’s
most vulnerable parts. With partial taint tracking, the runtime overhead of updating taint
meta-data is reduced to an acceptable level while still preventing many real-world injection
attacks. PHP Aspis performs taint tracking by transforming web applications at the source
code level both statically and at runtime (i.e. when code is generated dynamically). This
eliminates the need for a proprietary PHP interpreter. Finally, taint categories provide a
way to adapt the taint tracking policy to each web application and to avoid sanitising data
that applications consider secure.
SafeWeb, our taint tracking system for guaranteeing data confidentiality in Ruby web ap-
plications, demonstrated the applicability of Ruby for implementing runtime taint tracking.
Specific features of Ruby, i.e. safe levels and redefinitions of library methods using meta-
programming, enable isolation and invocations of tracking and checking operations without
modifying the language interpreter. The resulting taint tracking system is easy to maintain
because it is itself implemented using standard features of Ruby. SafeWeb incurs mini-
mal performance overhead. It facilitates the development of new applications in an NHS
organisation because it minimises the need for security audits.
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that an efficient and practical implementation of a
runtime taint tracking system is possible and can readily benefit applications in the web and
in event processing.
7.1 Thesis summary
We begun this thesis with an overview of security challenges in two domains, the web and
event processing. We observed that applications there would benefit from a method to en-
force data flow policies that restrict their processing. In web applications, the lack of a
practical method to enforce data flow results in injection vulnerabilities. In event process-
ing, application scenarios that have the potential to benefit multiple users (e.g. low-latency
trading via co-location with the stock exchange) are considered insecure without the ability
to guarantee how sensitive data flow in the application.
Past research on data flow enforcement followed either a static or a dynamic approach.
We presented three static methods: taint analysis, symbolic execution and security-typed
languages. While static methods do not incur runtime overhead and enforce data flow even
if the application code actively tries to evade the analysis, they typically suffer from false
positives and support for dynamic features of most programming languages is limited.
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Runtime taint tracking controls data flow at runtime by associating taint meta-data with the
data that an application processes. We presented a model that identifies the common design
choices available to taint tracking systems: (1) the tracking granularity; (2) the type of taint
meta-data; and (3+4) the tracking and checking operations required to propagate and check
taint meta-data at runtime. We used this model to present various taint tracking systems and
argued that, despite the different design choices explored, many systems make assumptions
that render their adoption impractical. For example, systems such as Asbestos [EKV+05] and
HiStar [ZBWKM06] assume fundamentally redesigned operating system kernels to support
data flow enforcement in arbitrary applications. Instead, we suggested to focus on specific
types of applications, minimising any modifications to the underlying execution platform.
DEFCon was the first taint tracking system presented in this thesis. DEFCon supports the
execution of multi-domain event processing applications and provides data flow guarantees
for exchanged events. To minimise the runtime overhead of the approach, the system uses
DEFC, a taint tracking policy with label-based taint meta-data attached to events. DEFC
supports partial event processing, dynamic privilege propagation and the enforcement of
specific processing topologies. Event processing units execute in the same address space for
efficiency. We achieved isolation between them by prohibiting access to certain Java features
and by identifying dangerous code paths in the JDK where runtime checks are invoked. The
performance overhead of DEFCon is small and we showed that DEFCon is capable of
supporting demanding event processing applications such as low-latency trading.
DEFCon supports DPL, a policy language to decouple data flow policy specification from
unit implementation and to avoid the complexity of specifying data flow policy by manipu-
lating DEFC labels. DPL policies consist of event flow constraints that isolate events with
different security requirements. These constraints involve processing contexts, i.e. hierar-
chical names that map to specific units at runtime and enable administrators in different
organisations to collaboratively specify data flow policy. DEFCon was extended to check
DPL policies for consistency and to translate them to DEFC for enforcement. We evaluated
DPL with an example workflow for cancer reports in the NHS that demonstrates how DPL
facilitates specification of data flow policy.
PHP Aspis was the second taint tracking system presented in this thesis. PHP Aspis pre-
vents injection attacks in web applications written in PHP by applying partial taint tracking,
i.e. tracking taint meta-data only inside part of a web application. We motivated this design
with the observation that injection vulnerabilities often occur in application plugins that
handle user-generated data. Therefore, by performing taint tracking only in a small part of
an application, the performance overhead at runtime can be reduced significantly. This is of
particular importance for PHP Aspis because the system uses source code transformations
to avoid modifications to the PHP interpreter—these transformations reduce performance
significantly. PHP Aspis transforms both tracking and non tracking application source code
and it monitors web applications at runtime to support dynamic features of PHP. We eval-
uated PHP Aspis with Wordpress plugins and we showed that PHP Aspis protects the
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application in presence many injection vulnerabilities previously discovered in plugins.
The final taint tracking system presented in this thesis was SafeWeb. SafeWeb provides
confidentiality guarantees for web applications that handle sensitive data such as those found
in healthcare. Based on discussions with NHS staff at ECRIC, we identified a set of data flow
requirements for patient data and we designed SafeWeb to satisfy them. In the back-end of
an organisation, SafeWeb enables web applications to export data for display in the front-
end. Taint tracking at the back-end ensures that exported data are labeled correctly. In the
web front-end, SafeWeb propagates labels on each application statement and uses these
labels to prevent unauthorised data disclosure due to developer errors. We implemented
SafeWeb in Ruby and we noticed that Ruby’s safe levels and meta-programming features
simplify significantly the implementation of a taint tracking system. SafeWeb demonstrates
that taint tracking is a viable alternative to security audits because it effectively prevents
patient data disclosure in various scenarios.
7.2 Lessons learned
The design and implementation of DEFCon, PHP Aspis and SafeWeb enabled us to
identify important lessons for building practical and efficient taint tracking systems. These
lessons can benefit future security and systems researchers that wish to build upon this work.
Method interception is important. The single most important property that an ex-
ecution platform should have in order to facilitate the implementation of a runtime taint
tracking system is the ability to intercept method invocations at runtime efficiently. This
should cover both invocations of methods provided by the platform and invocations of meth-
ods provided by applications. The existence of a flexible interception platform for Java
(§3.3.3) enabled our practical isolation strategy for threads that permits efficient sharing of
data. In Ruby, meta-programming features simplified the implementation of a practical taint
tracking system compared to our solution for PHP, which transforms source code.
High-level languages facilitate taint tracking. High level-languages that rely on an
execution platform (e.g. an interpreter) simplify the implementation of a taint tracking sys-
tem. They facilitate method interception and provide libraries with well-defined semantics.
It easy to implement method interception for most high-level languages. Ruby supports it
out of the box, and numerous projects offer AOP support for Java applications. Even for
languages that do not support method interception such as PHP, it is possible to imple-
ment method interception by extending the language interpreter1. The argument against
supporting method interception at runtime, i.e. reduced performance due to another level
of indirection, is less important in high-level languages because most execution platforms
1PHP-AOP extension, http://code.google.com/p/php-aop/, last accessed: 19/2/2013
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already invoke methods indirectly using pointers for other reasons. In PHP, for example, the
interpreter does not allow applications to intercept method calls (i.e. without third-party
extensions) although the interpreter supports method interceptions internally to facilitate
its extensibility.
Libraries bundled with an execution platform simplify taint tracking because they have well-
defined semantics. The taint tracking system can leverage their semantics and avoid tracking
data propagation within the implementation of library methods. For example, a taint track-
ing system can avoid analysing code that implements a common data structure. Instead,
it may calculate easily the taint meta-data for the return values of functions that perform
well-known operations on the data structure. This is a significant advantage compared to
taint tracking systems at the operating system or binary level.
The taint tracking policy should be configurable. If a taint tracking system is used
to enforce data flow and not just for data flow analysis, the data flow policy that it enforces is
likely to have to change during its lifetime. Ruby’s default safe levels demonstrate this: they
successfully prevent specific types of attacks but cannot be used easily to protect against
the newer types of injection attacks that later became popular in the web. Recent systems
such as GuardRails (§2.3.3) and SafeWeb completely bypass the existing mechanism and
end-up replicating the operations of the taint tracking system in the language interpreter.
Another example that demonstrates the need for configurable taint tracking policies comes
from recent research in the context of protection against XSS attacks [WSA+11]. Weinberger
et al. show that in order to protect against many types of XSS attacks, the taint tracking
system has to perform different sanitisation operations according to the place untrusted data
are used in an HTML document. This requires intercepting tainted data at a later stage, i.e.
when the full HTML document is available, compared to where most systems presented in
this thesis intercept HTML output (GuardRails [BMW+11] is a notable exception). Without
support for configurable taint tracking policies, this discovery can limit significantly the
applicability of existing taint tracking systems.
The taint tracking policy should also be configurable so that the taint tracking system can
satisfy custom data flow requirements of individual applications. A default taint tracking
policy—despite being useful to enforce a particular data flow with limited or no configuration—
is seldom enough. In Chapter 5 we showed that Wordpress had its own sanitisation rules
that a taint tracking system must adhere to. Unless a taint tracking system is configurable
and can adapt to these rules, it will not be practical.
7.3 Limitations in runtime taint tracking system design
Performing the work presented in the thesis has highlighted many important limitations that
arise when designing a runtime taint tracking system. Often, such limitations are overlooked
in relevant research despite the fact that they affect the capabilities of the resulting systems.
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In this section we discuss some of these limitations. We hope that the discussion will inspire
and help future work on runtime taint tracking systems.
The unit tracking granularity is restrictive. The unit tracking granularity, as used in
DEFCon, SafeWeb and similar systems (§2.3.3), significantly constraints the processing
that a unit can perform. It does not permit units to combine data of different security
classes, and it increases the need for trusted code.
The unit tracking granularity considers all the data that a single unit processes to be of
the same security class. This reduces the overhead of taint tracking at runtime because
intra-unit tracking and checking operations are not invoked; but imposes important limits
on the types of data flow policies that can be enforced. For example, a data flow policy may
specify that data belonging to different users must not be disclosed to each other. Such a
policy cannot be enforced if a single unit has to combine data on behalf of different users,
even if the unit does not disclose data of one user to the other. Without access to the
data of different security classes, many applications cannot be implemented. For example,
inspecting the social circles of two users to dispatch messages between them is hard if a single
unit cannot access the confidential list of friends of other users [PME+10]. Such requirements
are common in practice, and we had to find solutions for the applications that we built both
in DEFCon (§3.5.1) and in SafeWeb (§6.1.2).
Unfortunately, there is no strategy to avoid the constraints that the unit granularity imposes
without weaknesses if access to data of different security classes is required. The only option
is to relax the data flow policy, i.e. to allow a single unit to process data on different security
classes and trust the unit that performs the processing not to introduce errors. This increases
the trust a developer has to place on the codebase and defeats the purpose of using taint
tracking to enforce data propagation. However it may be an acceptable solution if only
a small part of the original unit has to be trusted. Managed subscriptions in DEFCon
(§3.4.1) and event processes in Asbestos (§2.3.3) allow a single unit to efficiently process
data of different security classes while avoiding cross-contamination. The downside here is
that no code in such a unit can access data of a different security class because that would
enable data flow that the taint tracking system cannot track.
Overall, we consider the unit tracking granularity more restrictive than the variable-level and
character-level counterparts when general-purpose application development is considered.
The unit tracking granularity is better suited for applications that rely more on isolation
and, when data of different security classes have to be combined, the process occurs via
trusted code (the Chrome extension architecture [BFSB10] is such an example).
Variable-level versus character-level taint tracking. Variable-level and character-
level taint tracking systems are better positioned to track data propagation in general purpose
applications. Character-level systems, in addition to discovering violations of data flow
policy, can transparently mitigate many types of injection attacks. It is not clear, however,
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if the additional overhead that they introduce is justified.
Variable-level taint tracking systems are easy to implement and introduce low overhead if
implemented as part of the language interpreter. Their typical use case is to raise errors
when dangerous data flow occurs and let the developers of the application devise the best
solution to tackle the underlying security issue. This is often acceptable even if it means
that an error in data flow analysis may prevent an application from executing in a specific
use case.
In contrast, character-level systems such as PHP Aspis attempt to protect also against
injection attacks and, for this, they require more detailed taint meta-data (i.e. per charac-
ter). This additional layer of security is of particular importance when administrators have
to secure legacy applications, which they do not maintain themselves. Unfortunately, the
overhead of updating character-level taint meta-data is significant. Resin [YWZK09], for
example, introduces overheads of up to 33% for serving a common web application despite
a taint tracking implementation within the interpreter. In addition, due to the existence of
control and implicit flows, which can lead to false negatives, a character-level runtime taint
tracking system should not be trusted as the sole mechanism to enforce data flow.
For the above reasons, we consider variable-level taint tracking systems as most suitable
for generic data flow analysis and enforcement. Character-level systems are also useful but
the increased performance overhead and their inability to be used as the sole protection
mechanism reduces their applicability for data flow enforcement across different applications.
Data flow policy enforcement in DEFCon using labels. DEFCon tracks data flow
and enforces data flow policy specified in DPL using DEFC labels. Label-based data flow
policy enforcement improves performance, however, it introduces challenges that may hamper
the adoption of a taint tracking system.
The first limitation of label-based data flow enforcement is the inability to enforce policy
that combines data flow with functional requirements. One such example was presented in
Section 4.4.1, in which only reports that identified cancer incidents had to be forwarded
to the cancer registry. DEFCon cannot enforce this policy without relying on a trusted
unit because identifying which pathology reports constitute cancer reports is a functional
requirement that cannot be expressed with labels. Instead, systems that use policy objects
as taint meta-data (§2.3.3) can enforce functional requirements if these requirements are
expressed with executable code by a policy administrator.
The second limitation of label-based enforcement is the need to translate high-level data
flow policy to tags, labels and privileges. DPL facilitates this process but significant effort
is still required to specify data flow policy and DEFCon cannot detect many policy miscon-
figurations. The reason for requiring a complex translation effort is that application-specific
concepts that a data flow policy may need to reference (e.g. users, method invocations, data
stores) do not have straightforward equivalents in labels, tags or privileges. Expressing data
flow policy with code via policy objects does not suffer from this problem.
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The last obstacle for practical label-based data flow policy enforcement is the observation that
external data sources and data stores rarely provide labeled information to bootstrap data
flow tracking or support storing labels with data. This makes maintaining the association of
labels with data challenging without tools to help with this process (e.g. a label-aware file
system or a database server that preserves labels).
Character-level taint tracking via source code transformations. PHP Aspis demon-
strates that character-level taint tracking via source code transformations offers a way to
secure existing web applications without support from the interpreter. It does not, however,
demonstrate that this is the ideal way to implement taint tracking in PHP.
The performance overhead of performing taint tracking via source code transformations is
high. Most of that overhead is introduced by replacing operations on scalar values with
operations on arrays. While an alternative implementation may avoid this cost, language
semantics limit the available design space (§5.3.2).
A second limitation when implementing taint tracking for a dynamic language via source
code transformations is the need for an additional transformation step before executing the
application. This can slow application development down significantly and renders the wide
acceptance of the technique as the preferable way of securing PHP applications unlikely.
An ideal implementation of taint tracking for PHP will have to operate within the inter-
preter. A recent ongoing project2 aims to offer variable-level taint tracking support as a
binary extension to the PHP interpreter. The extension leverages the interpreter’s ability to
use extension-provided handlers for executing the intermediate code being generated. This
approach, despite the fact that it requires significant expertise in the internals of the PHP
interpreter to be implemented, is the most likely to be adopted widely.
7.4 Future work
Runtime taint tracking will continue to be an important tool for the security research com-
munity. However, for it to be a practical option to secure applications, research has to focus
on runtime overhead and on interoperability with the languages and platforms popular with
developers.
Explore techniques to speed up character-level taint tracking. The overhead of
updating taint meta-data at the character level is the most important limitation for character-
level taint tracking systems. In addition, the size of taint meta-data becomes significant
because even though large parts of the character data used by an application may not be
tainted, the taint tracking system has to reserve space to mark such data as untainted.
2TAINT extension, http://svn.php.net/viewvc/pecl/taint/, last accessed: 20/2/2013
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There may exist multiple different techniques to bring the overhead of keeping taint meta-
data per character down to more acceptable level. PHP Aspis groups equal taint meta-data
of nearby characters but this increases the cost of random access to character strings. An
alternative approach would be to store taint meta-data along with the actual string characters
by taking advantage of the binary representation of characters in different encoding schemes.
Integration with web frameworks. Past research [FW11] has suggested that automatic
protection mechanisms provided by popular web application frameworks, in contrast to man-
ual protection, appear to be most effective against persistent security problems in the web.
Future research must therefore focus on providing an implementation of taint tracking for
most popular web frameworks that, in addition, can be customised to enforce arbitrary data
flow policies.
A prominent example is the Ruby-on-Rails (RoR)3 framework for Ruby web applications.
By taking advantage of the Ruby features we employed in Chapter 6, taint tracking can
be added to RoR with minimal overhead when activated. Such an implementation may be
complimented with pre-configured taint tracking policies to protect web applications against
different types of attacks (e.g. injection attacks). A taint tracking policy that, similar to
SafeWeb, acts as a shadow protection mechanism to prevent sensitive user data disclosure
due to implementation errors would also be useful.
Rethinking cloud security. Whilst cloud computing gains traction, security concerns
about the loss of control over data are common between adopters [SSSF12]. Cloud providers
consolidate data from multiple services, and this may result in widespread data disclosure
if their security is compromised. Security in the cloud is challenging to achieve because it
requires that the cloud platform cannot be compromised by hosted applications and that
applications belonging to different cloud tenants are isolated to prevent data leakage.
A potential approach to improve cloud security would rely on taint tracking to enable clients
and cloud providers to control how sensitive data are transferred across their systems and
to prevent user actions violating data flow policy. Runtime taint tracking can offer the
cloud platform a “safety net”, protecting it against data flow policy violations caused by
implementation errors in applications or vulnerabilities in the cloud platform itself.
Support for untrusted code in the browser. Web applications typically combine
source code of different origin; external mapping services, analytics frameworks and presen-
tation libraries can all be used as part of the same web page. Users of such web applications
effectively trust all third-party source code with their personal data—even if they do not
realise it. A malicious analytics framework, for example, which is imported in a page with
the <script> tag, could leak a user’s cookies to a third party. Existing Javascript security
3Ruby on Rails, http://rubyonrails.org/, last accessed: 12/9/2012
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mechanisms, such as the same origin policy4, cannot control how user data flow to different
servers when third-party source code is used.
The browser can employ runtime taint tracking to augment the security that it provides. A
potential application is to give users the ability to mark input data as sensitive and have the
browser alert users before sensitive data is sent to any other destination but the domain of
the web site currently being visited.
The browser is a particularly challenging environment for runtime taint tracking as the
benevolent developer assumption does not hold for untrusted Javascript. Systems described
in Section 2.3.3 [VNJ+07] combined taint tracking with static analysis, yet their effectiveness
is unclear if the attackers are aware of the protection mechanism employed. Another challenge
is how to reduce the rate of false positives, which increases significantly due to the need to
monitor control flow.
4Same Origin Policy, W3C, http://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy, last accessed:
24/9/2012
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